out of the chaos of passion, which gives to reason its serenest dignity, and imparts to morality at once its sternest might and its tenderest grace, is alone out of harmony with the reality of things, and the widowed soul must clothe itself in weeds, and drop more scalding tears in proportion as its love is fervent and its aspiration high?

(c) Testimony of the Religious Element to Doctrines

The line of reasoning which we have been following is capable of legitimate extension, and we must next endeavour to enunciate a theory corresponding to the facts of the case, and serving as a basis for further investigation.

We may begin by laying down a proposition which can hardly be called in question :-All doctrines which are simply generalized statements of spiritual facts or experiences, provided the induction of such facts or experiences be sufficiently wide, are to be accepted as true. This proposition is important in regard to all that portion of theology which relates to the nature of man, his religious requirements, and the means of his spiritual growth. It points, for instance, to the mode of solving the controversy in regard to the nature and extent of human sin.

The truth of the following proposition is not so immediately evident :-When a doctrine is necessary for the satisfaction of a primitive feeling or tendency of the religious element, that doctrine is to be accepted as true. On the other hand, a doctrine which would render it impossible for such primitive feeling or tendency to receive satisfaction is to be rejected as false. And a doctrine which only partially satisfies such primitive feeling or tendency is to be regarded as an approximation to the truth.

This proposition is an attempt to state in a concise form the actual process of human belief, assuming at the same time the validity of that process. I do not mean that men as a rule deliberately say to themselves, This doctrine satisfies an inward want, and therefore I believe it,' but only

that they do believe because it satisfies the inward want, though they may themselves be quite unconscious of the process by which the belief is arrived at. It is only when the question is raised whether we have any good grounds for our belief that we begin to trace the process; and then men speak of a 'verifying faculty,' of truth authenticating itself, or as being its own witness. The proposition seeks to give precise expression to these vague interpretations of our internal experience. Its meaning, and the cautions by which it must be guarded, will be fully brought out in the course of our investigation. The following considerations may be urged in its support :

I. It follows as a corollary from the proposition which was laid down in regard to the religious element as a whole; for if the existence of the religious element proves the existence of some object corresponding to it, we must by parity of reasoning admit that every primitive feeling or tendency within that element points to a corresponding truth. To use a figure, if the religious element be a mirror which reflects the image of God, then, if that mirror be complete and pure, it will present a perfect reflection of Divine truth; but if it be broken and cloudy, it will still indeed reflect the truth, but imperfectly and obscurely.

ness.

2. The proposition is supported by the facts of consciousLet us consider it in the order of its three members. In the first place, men accept as true a doctrine which seems necessary to satisfy a primitive religious feeling or tendency. Do we not always, for the time being at least, believe that which, as we say, comes home to us, which awakens a response in our hearts, or fills up some sense of want? If we have ever the good fortune to hear a sermon or read a book which reaches the depths of the religious nature, does it not seem to touch a chord that else were silent, and to draw forth tones that tell us of a diviner world than that in which we have been living, and do we not express to ourselves our feeling in such words as these,

'Yes, it is all real; how blind I have been, and now I see; spiritual truth is after all the grandest, deepest truth; this is exactly what I wanted, the truth which I have long felt after, but never found before'? I believe that the first moment of conscious satisfaction, the inward meeting, as it were, of the want and its object, is always a moment of intense conviction, and that doubt arises only subsequently through the imperfection of the truth, and a consequent want of complete satisfaction, or through the suggestions of others or the difficulties of reason, or, it may be, through an inherent deficiency in the spiritual nature. We may notice also the converse of this fact. Men do not believe in any deep and living sense that which makes no appeal to their inward wants. No man can come to the truth unless the Father draw him. Doctrines may indeed be accepted on authority; but that doctrine is not believed, though it may not be denied, which is utterly inoperative in the life. It lies in the mind as a dead thing; and not till the soul recognizes the doctrine as an answer to its own earnest cravings is the lifeless assent changed into a kindling faith.

Coming now to the second member of our proposition, we find an equally strong disposition to reject any doctrine which virtually denies the legitimacy of some inward want. This disposition is manifested not only in the inability to receive a new doctrine which runs counter to the religious feelings, and the rejection of which might be due merely to prejudice, but also in the casting off of old beliefs which were supported by all the power of prejudice. It may be that old beliefs are more frequently relinquished under the influence of advancing knowledge, and that the contest is really one between feeling and reason; but the other case also exists, and perhaps more generally the two methods coincide. The belief in the modern origin of the human race has receded solely before evidence addressed to the understanding; for it is only through artificial association that it

affects our religious feelings at all. The doctrine of the infallibility of Scripture affords an example of the mixed method. The main advance has been along the line of facts and reasoning; but, although science has made some addition to the evidence, the facts have been substantially the same all along, and the mind has refused to accept the evidence of facts till it has embraced an idea of inspiration, not less, but more satisfying to the demands of the religious element than that which formerly prevailed. Paul's doctrine, the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life,' expresses not so much his more advanced understanding as his larger soul. The rejection of the doctrine of eternal torment is a purer example of the rebellion of the religious heart against a dogma which not only enjoyed the support of prolonged ecclesiastical sanction, but seemed to find an echo in the condemning conscience of the race. Here the rational conditions of the problem are quite unchanged. But it is becoming more and more impossible to accord an entire love to the creator of an eternal hell, and there is no deeper yearning of the soul than to be able to rest in God as worthy of a love which is absolutely without doubt and fear.

The third member of the proposition follows from a combination of the other two. So far as a doctrine satisfies the religious element, it seems to be true; so far as it opposes its satisfaction, it seems to have an element of error. To take as an example a doctrine mentioned under the last head, that of eternal torment, we speak in common usage as though this doctrine were simply denied by those who do not accept it. But this is not a correct representation of the The doctrines of retribution, and of the heinousness. of sin, are involved in this dogma; and these are impugned. We therefore have an approximation to the truth, something which answers to the sense of ill-desert, but something also which revolts the higher sensibilities. So the contrasted doctrine, if such really exist except in the fancy of controversialists, that the character of God is one

case.

of infinite good-nature, which rests on no moral basis, might give a kind of meagre satisfaction to the devout feeling, but is spurned as insufficient by our deeper moral needs. We may find further illustrations in our own experience. We sometimes are consciously feeling after a truth, beset with some profound emotion or struggling aspiration, the full meaning of which we do not yet know; and at such times we are aware that all our attempts to express this truth are imperfect, and yet we find it good to express as best we can our meaning, and to accept provisionally this representation of the truth, in order that, by holding it in a concrete form, we may make it available for the purposes of memory and thought. Then sometimes in our reading we meet with a passage which illumines, with the splendour of real insight, our dim experience, and we feel that this is what we have long wanted, but been unable, to say. Our own imperfect expressions seem to be approximations to the truth, while the newly discovered passage becomes the formula of our completed doctrine.

The above remarks may suffice to illustrate the internal experiences on which our proposition rests; and we must now review certain objections which readily present themselves.

1. Beliefs which maintain themselves in the manner described may be mere prejudices, and the rule seems to say that we are to believe exactly what we like. Now I think there are certain characteristics which broadly distinguish the beliefs in question from prejudices which result from the accidents of our early training.

(a) They are more persistent. A prejudice is often very difficult to get rid of; but when it has been overcome, there is a feeling of relief, and we seem to have passed from under a dark cloud. But a religious belief which answers to a permanent inward want clings to us; and if, through its defective form, it fall before the attacks of knowledge, it is not flung off as the burden of a cruel superstition, but it