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CHAPTER IV

GOD AS THE OBJECT OF WORSHIP

HAVING Considered the nature and attributes of God, we now proceed to regard him as the object of worship to all who are capable of the sentiments implied in worship; and we have to view the different aspects under which he appears to the mind of the worshipper.

First, he is the object of our highest veneration and love, because he has in himself supreme spiritual perfection. The feelings associated with worship, and the modes in which it is expressed, have undergone a long development as man's conceptions of God have slowly risen to higher levels, and the awe and terror of the savage before the tremendous and hostile forces of nature have gradually yielded to faith in a righteous government which is above nature. Christian worship recognizes no local or partial Deity, but the universal and eternal Spirit, who is to be worshipped in spirit and truth, not for anything that he has done for us in the past or is expected to do in the future, but simply for his own adorable perfection; and that is the highest moment of worship when all sense of time and place and accident is forgotten, when every thought of self is laid aside, and the rapt soul is filled only with the consciousness of God as the absolutely good.

Secondly, he reveals himself as the bounteous Giver; and therefore the pure admiration of worship must often yield to gratitude for the benefits which he has conferred upon ourselves. The injunction to be thankful we feel to be right and reasonable, and all murmuring and discontent

bring upon us a Divine rebuke; for how countless are the gifts of God, how constant the blessings by which he has sought our hearts. Accordingly, thanksgiving occupies, as it ought to do, an important place in our ordinary worship. Our third head requires a much longer treatment. God is the object of trust, as being the wise disposer of all things. This statement implies a doctrine of providence, which is so close to the deepest sources of religion in the human mind that it formed a subject for pious faith and earnest discussion in pre-Christian times, and not only Jews, but Greeks and Romans, believed that the world was under a Divine government, and made the difficulties which are suggested by the actual course of events a theme for philosophical reflection. According to Macpherson it was left for Christian theology . . . to work out the doctrine of providence in its application to the personal life of the individual man,' and 'the limitations of the ethnic philosophy of religion scarcely permitted this perception of anything further than a conception of God's care for the course of the world as a whole. "Magna dii curant; parva negligunt."" This, I think, is rather a misleading representation. The Latin words, which are quoted without a reference, are from a passage in Cicero's De Natura Deorum,2 where it is contended that if the gods care for the whole, they must care for the parts; if for Europe, then for Rome and Athens; and if for Rome, then for individuals, Fabricius, Gracchus, Cato. The words which are cited are introduced, not to show that God does not care for individuals, but, on the contrary, to prove that the trifling misfortunes which happen to men are not inconsistent with the regard bestowed by Divine providence on the welfare of individuals. Plato, however, rejects even this qualification of the minute care which is exercised by the gods, and, in arguing distinctly against the thesis which Macpherson quotes as characteristic of ancient philosophy, endeavours to show that the gods are no less careful of small

1 Christian Dogmatics, pp. 175 sq.

2 ii. 66.

things than of those distinguished by their size.1 On this question there were naturally different opinions,2 owing to the difficulties which arise when we attempt to adjust all the perplexing phenomena of nature and life within the limits of an intellectual scheme. But the fact that such problems were discussed, and that in spite of adverse appearances some of the noblest minds of antiquity confided in a supreme overruling goodness, shows how deeply the belief in Divine providence is rooted in the religious nature of man. Christianity assumes that this belief is incontrovertible, and proclaims the fatherly care of God in the minutest circumstances of life. Christ, resting not on the speculations of philosophy, but on the intuitions of faith, declares that God clothes the lilies and feeds the birds, that not a sparrow falls without him, and the very hairs of our heads are all numbered; and this view is associated with the trust that all is well which arises in every mind in proportion as it is penetrated with the Christian spirit.

In reducing the contents of this trust to an intellectual form the dogmatists have displayed a careful, if not always a very profitable power of analysis. Providence may be defined as that mode of the Divine agency by which all events are adapted to the supreme end of creation. According to Lutheran theologians it is exhibited in the three distinct forms of conservatio, concursus, and gubernatio. Of the preservation of the world we have already spoken. Concursus, or the co-operation of God with the agency of secondary causes, describes rather a method in which he carries on his government than a distinct and co-ordinate exercise of activity. The union of God's immediate with his mediate causation gives rise to subtle questions, into which we need not enter; but we may notice the part played by concursus in criminal actions. The murderer could not

1 Ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσὶ θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων Leg. X. 10, p. 900 C. sqq., referred to by J. B. Mayor in his note on Cicero. 2 See several references in Mayor.

strike his blow unless a power not his own enabled him to lift his arm and wield his weapon. In theological language it is said that God supplies the material element of the action, that is to say, the mechanical movements of which it consists, while the formal part, its sinful quality, proceeds from the man himself. Leaving this, we may confine our attention to gubernatio, the government of the world; and here we shall do well to remember that our point of view is limited to our own little planet, and that what we are able to observe or to believe is probably an insignificant part of a vast and incomprehensible scheme, which, if fully known, might relieve the difficulties which now prove a trial to our faith.

It has been pointed out that the providential government of the world implies foreknowledge, whereby God anticipates what is conducive to the well-being of creation; purpose, which is directed towards the fulfilment of the Divine end; and administration, which continually controls the course of events so that this purpose may be fulfilled. The highest purpose towards man which it is possible for us to conceive, and which reveals itself in the innermost depths of the Christian life, is to bring him into perfect filial union with God; and accordingly, in judging of the action of providence from our own experience, we must regard this as the controlling end, to which all else, including our happiness, must be subordinate. A difficulty is created by the existence of free will, by which the designs of God might be frustrated, and which in single instances does really act in contravention of the Divine will. In order to meet this difficulty providence has been analysed into four elements, permissio, impeditio, directio, determinatio. Permission relates to moral evil, which, as the necessary condition of moral and responsible life, is permitted, but not created, by God. By prevention God stops the occurrence of certain actions, and thereby obviates the results which would otherwise have followed. Direction is defined as the act whereby God so

directs the good deeds of his creatures that they conduce to the end at which he aims, and also gives to their bad deeds a tendency towards an end which is determined by him, but not perceived by the sinners, and often quite opposed to their purpose. Thus he brings good out of evil, and compels even the wicked to subserve his aims. Determination is the act by which God sets fixed limits to the activity of his creatures, both in regard to time and in regard to magnitude and degree, so that the effects of evil can never transgress certain bounds. Such considerations relieve the apparent contradiction between the two beliefs, that the world is governed by Divine providence and that men have the power of free self-determination. The fulfilment of human purposes, and still more the results which spring from the execution of these purposes, are subject to the control of God apart from any interference with the liberty of man. According to the proverb, which is an expression of human experience, man proposes, but God disposes; and, consequently, the results of the free activity of man may be confined within such narrow limits as not to prevent the ultimate realization of God's designs in the education of the world.

In regard to the means by which the government of the world is carried on it may be sufficient to say that providence has been divided into ordinary and extraordinary, the former referring to the prevalence of universal laws, the latter to the use of miracles. In relation to its objects it has been classified as general, special, and most special, the first referring to the world at large, the second to men collectively and individually, and the last to believers. This division is of no great value, and may even give rise to narrow and prejudiced views, unless it means that just in proportion as creatures come spiritually nearer to God they are more directly and consciously under the Divine influence. If it lead men to trust in themselves that they are righteous,

1 See Nitzsch, pp. 368 sq.; Grimm, p. 260, note 1.

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