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"High honour is not only gotten and born by pain and danger, but must be nursed by the like, else it vanisheth as soon as it appears to the world.

Remark.

"A French philosopher hath said, that "admiration is a kind of fanaticism, which expects miracles ;" and there never was a hero that could not subscribe to the verity of this observation. Popular admiration is a microscope, which so magnifies its object, that he who cannot contravene the order of nature, and master impossibilities, can hardly hope to accomplish its extravagant expectations. The favourite of the people is one who is expected to govern Fortune, as absolutely as that insolent directress of human affairs rules over others. Let him shew all the courage and good con. duct in the world, yet if against fear ful odds, he prove not invariably victorious, he fails! let him effect more than ever man, under like circumstances, achieved; yet, if he do not every thing, he does nothing. If he controul not fate like a god, he is degraded from the dignity of a hero, despoiled of every wellearned laurel, and stripped of every attribute of praise. He is reviled by the multitude of illiberal censurers, who can form no adequate idea of the difficulties of his situation, or of the limited scope of mortal agency. Each arrogant idiot fancies he could have conquered where Hannibal was subdued; and thus the

disasters of great men become palms to

adorn fools!"

troduction of apt anecdotes and historical facts-one example we shall select.

"Confidence in one's self, is the chief dence, notwithstanding, doth not leave nurse of magnanimity. Which confithe care of necessary furnitures for it; and, therefore, of all the Grecians, Hoarmed. mer doth ever make Achilles the best

Remark.

"Had Sir Philip Sidney remembered this just sentiment, on the fatal morning in which he received his death, he might, perhaps, have spared England the sudden loss of its chief glory. When the stand was to be made before Zutphen, he entered the field, as was his custom, completely armed; but meeting the marshall of the camp in slighter ar mour, the emulation of his heart to do all that man dare do, made him disdain the inequality of his hazard to that of his officer, and he threw off his cuirass: by which act, as his friend Lord Brook says, "it seemed by the secret influence of destiny, that he disarmed the very part where God had resolved to strike him." A musket ball from the trenches broke the bone of his thigh; and of that wound. he died."

Miss Porter in her preface, intimates her intention of publishing memoirs of Sir Philip Sidney. We hope she will persevere in her design: such a work from her pen is likely to prove a valuable addition to the literature of the country.

In some instances the editor has enlivened her remarks by the inART. VI. An analytical Abridgment of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding

12mo.

"THE Essay on human underStanding" (it is stated in the preface of this volume)" forms part of that course of study which is appointed for students of the se, cond year in Trinity College, Cambridge. This abstract of that cele brated work was made about twelve years since by an undergraduate of that society, solely with a view to his own improvement. Yet upon a re-perusal of the original,

he cannot but think that the reason which induced him to compose, may excuse him for publishing it."

The preface is very sensible, and fully shows the competency of the writer to his task; and the present abridgment, we are persuaded, will prove a useful introduction to the original work, which, notwithstanding its great merit, cannot fail of being somewhat repulsive to the

student when he first engages in metaphysical enquiries, by the diffuseness of its style, and its fre

quent circumlocution and repetitions.

ART. VII. Enquiries, Historical and Moral, respecting the Character of Nations, and the Progress of Society. By HUGH MURRAY. 8vo.

IF the proper study of mankind be man, no sciences should seem to possess a greater dignity and importance than those whose object it is to delineate his powers, to point out their proper application, and to trace, if possible, those steps by which individuals and society may be gradually conducted to the state most nearly approaching perfection which the limitation of the human faculties will admit. No subjects of speculation can certainly be more pleasing to a philosophic and benevolent mind, and even the very errors to which they may possibly lead, will at least exert no unfriendly influence in the principles and conduct of him who entertains them. It is indeed highly probable, as Mr. Murray justly observes, that such speculations do not in a practical view, possess, all that importance which we may be apt to ascribe to them. The influence of the most enlightened philosopher and of the most sagacious statesman on the progress of human sentiments and manners, is probably little when compared with that of the general principles which operate with a slow perhaps and silent, but a powerful effect on society.

The present volume completes but a part of Mr. Murray's design, which is to trace, by constant reference to historical facts, the progress of the human species through every form of society, and to delineate the state of manners and morals naturally connected with each stage. The first book, preparatory to the general enquiry, treats on the circumstances which regulate the progress and the moral condition of society. As the foundation of his subsequent reasoning, Mr.

Murray assumes "that between any two great portions of the human species, whatever be the age or country to which they belong, there exists no radical distinction; that the total amount of moral and intellectual endowments originally conferred by nature, is altogether or very nearly the same; and that the wide differences which we observe, arise wholly from the influence of external circumstances.' This is a most important proposition in the philosophy of morals and politics, and appears to us to be sufficiently verified by experi ence. The more we examine into human nature the more we shall probably perceive its pliability to the influence of circumstances, and the less importance shall we be disposed to attribute to any supposed peculiarities of original conformation, or varieties of climate and soil. Another most important question which respects the progress of society, occurs as to the probable connection of virtue and happiness with the improvements of arts and sciences, and the conveniences of civilized life. Poor and rude nations, it is said, are of ten more virtuous than the opulent and polished; as nations advance in wealth and prosperity, their morals are usually found proportionally to decline. Mr. Murray's deduction from the facts which he investigates, is, that there is in human society a process of corruption, previous to the process of improvement, and arising from the same causes, but that the ultimate effects of the progressive principle of society will be greatly beneficial. The circumstances which thus operate, to produce corruption in the

first instance, and ultimate im provement, form the next subject of enquiry. To these the author gives the name of progressive principles, and the following are those, whose influence he deems most remarkable; I. Numbers collected into one place: II. Free communication between different societies, and different members of the same society. II. Wealth. IV. Great public events. The immediate and ultimate influences of these circumstances on manners and morals are ably traced.

The circumstances which act in opposition to these Mr. Murray styles repressing principles, which he reduces to two. 1. The necessity of labour. II. Coercion. He then traces some modifications of the progressive principles, and some relations which subsist between them, and the circumstances of opposite tendency. The relation of knowledge to the progress of society forms the subject of an interesting chapter, and the book concludes with an examination of certain circumstances which have been supposed to exert an important influence in the formation of national character; climate, race, the vicissitude of progress and decline, which Mr. Murray terms the Oscillatory tendency in human affairs, and the mode of subsistence, including some remarks on the principle of population.

The second and third books contain views of man in the primitive and the savage state. The reasoning of the author on these subjects is founded on a copious induction of facts, selected with industry and judgment from historians and travellers, and skilfully arranged. In the primitive state, men are considered in the condition of solitary individuals, of separate families, and a few families united.

The savage state is traced at large, and with ample illustration

from historical documents, through the following states, imperfect division into tribes, small free nations, small despotisms.

If Mr. Murray's design had been nothing more than to supply a clear and well arranged statement of authentic facts respecting the progress of the human species, his object would have been both interesting and important. That part of his volume which relates to this subject will not fail to engage the attention of every class of readers. We cannot help thinking also that the great doctrine, which he founds upon the basis of these facts, which has sometimes been stiled the per. fectibility of the human race, but which we should rather represent as its tendency to indefinite improvement, is a principle not less philosophical than it is animating. Various objections have been urged against this expectation. The hu man faculties, it is said, are limited, and what mind is able to comprehend the mass which is already accumulated of general principles and particular facts? To this it is replied, that knowledge is the soul of civilized society, and for its vivifying influence to be felt, it is not necessary that all knowledge should reside in every individual mind. The influence of any par ticular branch of knowledge on the welfare of society is sufficiently se cured by its existence in particular classes, with that freedom from prejudice in the rest of the community, which is requisite for its operation. In one view, indeed, it is certain that the knowledge to which the human species under the most favourable circumstances can ever attain, will necessarily be very limited. Our ideas and apprehensions can only be modifications of the elements from which they are formed. They result from our impressions, and we can only communicate with the external objects

which excite them, by organs limited in number and power of operation. It is not the universal nature of things that we are capable of examining, but only that small part of it which comes into contact with our scanty powers. Yet it is difficult even with this limitation, to fix any determinate boundaries to the extent of human knowledge. We are told "that Sir Isaac Newton and Dr. Bentley met accidentally in London, and on Sir Isaac's enquiring what philosophical pursuits were carrying on at Cambridge, the doctor replied-Nonefor when you go a hunting, Sir Isaac, you kill all the game; you have left us nothing to pursue: Not so, said the philosopher, you may start a variety of game in every bush, if you will but take the trouble to beat for it."* So numerous in fact are the objects of knowledge, and so unbounded the variety of relations in which they may be placed, that no investigation, it may easily be supposed, will ever exhaust all the possibilities of discovery. The progress of truth may often indeed be impeded by precipitate conclusion, prejudice, or interest, yet truth possesses many advantages in the conflict over error. The foundation of the latter is precarious, that of the former perpetual and immutable. If error is supported by the strength of prejudice, truth rests on the better strength of its own evidence. If we are indisposed against its reception, others may not be subject to the same obliquitics of judgment. If error is firmly entrenched behind the prejudices of one generation, mortality comes in aid of truth, and posterity contemplates with wonder, the illusions of their forefathers.

As the objects of knowledge are multiplied, the means of apprehend

ing them

are often facilitated. Truths which have long been known, in the course of repeated transmis sion are rendered more familiar and easy, the readiest means of displaying them to apprehension gradually occur, what is useful is retained, what is superfluous is thrown aside, and the processes of knowledge are in this manner abbreviated and smoothened.

It might we think be shewn, had we time or room for the investigation, that virtue and happiness are likely in an ultimate and sensible, if not invariable and exact proportion, to attend the prevalence of knowledge. On the whole it appears that the limitation of the individual faculties presents necessary impediment to the extensive improvement of the species.

no

Others argue from analogy, that as in every past age, man has been actuated by selfish principles and base desires, it is chimerical to look for any change which shall contradict the experience of so many successive generations. It may perhaps be replied, that analogy affords a useful argument where no better can be obtained, but that i this case we have some access to the internal springs by which the machinery is governed, and from a knowledge of its powers, may be capable in some degree of predicting its future operation. It seems to be principally by the influence of external circumstances that men are rendered what they are; we know that at present many individuals are wise and virtuous; under such a change of circumstances, as in the course of events may perhaps necessarily be accomplished, what may not the species itself be come?

One paradoxical writer has main tained that the savage is prefera.

Watson's Chemical Essays, IV.257.
Eee

ANN. REV. VOL. VII.

ble to the civilized state, and that the human race, so far from inproving, has only been gradually declining from its original happiness, independence, and dignity of character, to what he deems its present degradation and imbecility. They however, who have read the most authentic accounts of barbarous nations, both by ancient and modern writers, will not conclude that there is much to envy in the savage state, or much cause for lamentation, that we are at present so remote from it.

Some suppose that there is in human nature a perpetual conflict of opposite causes, which will for ever prevent mankind from passing beyoud some fixed points in the scale of improvement or decline. On one side, they say, with the progress of refinement, luxury makes its inroads, and corrupts mankind in their civilized state, till they sink of their own accord into decrepitude, or become an easy and inviting prey to surrounding barbarians, who pour in the tide of invasion, and arts and knowledge are swept away before the deluge. On the other side, evil in many cases produces its own remedy; men cannot sink to a certain state

of misery and depression without exerting themselves for its remo val, and with re-animated exertion, a new career of improvement is commenced. To this supposed balance of alternate good and evil, Mr. Murray gives the name of the oscillatory tendency in human affairs.

It may be observed in reply, that greater security is now afforded than ever before existed, for the preservation of knowledge, by its more extensive diffusion, and espe cially by the invention of the art of printing. There seems to be no necessary connection between refinement of arts, and corruption of morals; and the political state of the principal nations of the earth appears to prevent the danger of any future inroads of barbarians the circle of the civilized on

world.

We have on the whole read Mr. Murray's work with much pleasure, and hope that he will be encouraged to proceed. The facts which in the course of his enquiry he collects are numerous and interesting, and the conclusion which he draws from them, in our opinion, accurate and important.

ART. VIII. A most pleasant, fruitful and witty Work of the best Stale of a Publ Weal, and of the New Isle called Utopia; written in Latin by the Right Wor by and Famous Sir Thomas More, Knight, and translated into English by Raphe Robinson, A.D. 1551. A new Edition, with copious Notes, (including the whole of Dr. Warner's) and Biographical and a Literary Introduction, By the Rev. T. F. DIBDIN, F. S. A. 2 vols. 8vo.

IT has been more than once observed that the Romance of Utopia has a common fate upon it, to be more known and admired all the world over than here at home. "Whether this may have arisen from the want of curiosity, (says Mr. Dibdin,) or discernment in our ancestors, is a point too delicate and weighty for iny determination: certain it is, that almost all editors have complained of the backwardness of our countrymen to notice

and commend the Utopia of sir Thomas More."

Like the colloquies and letters of Erasmus, it will be found to contain abundance of materials which illustrate the history of that singular peiod in which its authors lived. For, although an imaginary republic is erected, and its society arranged in a form apparently new, the principal object of the work was obliquely to satyrize the vices of the age.

"It was my original intention to have

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