mankind, whenever caprice or pride, ambition or avarice, shall prescribe? And are there no fixed laws founded in the nature of things which ordain bounds to the fell spirit of revenge, the mad fury of domination, and the insatiable thirst of cupidity? Mankind have, not only in their individual character, but in their collective capacity as nations, recognized and avowed in their opinions and actions, a system of laws calculated to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. And it may be safely asserted, that it is a fundamental article of this code, that a nation ought not to go to war until it is evident that the injury committed is highly detrimental, and that it emanated from the will of the nation charged with the aggression, either by an express authorization in the first instance, or by a recognition of it when called upon for redress, and a refusal in both cases to give it. A demand of satisfaction ought to precede an appeal to arms, even when the injury is manifestly the act of the sovereign; and when it is the act of a private individual, it is not imputable to his nation, until its Government is called upon to explain and redress, and refuses; because the evils of war are too heavy and serious to be incurred without the most urgent necessity; because remonstrance and negotiation have often recalled an offending nation to a sense of justice, and a performance of right; because nations, like individuals, have their paroxysms of passion, and when reflection and reason resume their dominion, will extend that redress to the olive-branch which their pride will not permit them to grant to the sword; because a nation is a moral person, and as such is not chargeable with an offence committed by others, or where its will has not been consulted, the unauthorized conduct of indivi

duals being never considered a just ground of hostility until their sovereign refuses that reparation for which his right of controlling their actions, and of punishing their misconduct, necessarily renders him responsible. These opinions are sanctioned by the most approved elementary writers on the laws of nations. I shall quote the sentiments of some of them.

Vattel says: "Two things, therefore, are necessary to render it (an offensive war) just. First, a right to be asserted; that is, that a demand made on another nation be important and well grounded: 2d, That this reasonable demand cannot be obtained otherwise than by force of arms. Necessity alone warrants the use of force. It is a dangerous and terrible resource. Nature, the common parent of mankind, allows of it only in extremity, and when all others fail. It is doing wrong to a nation to make use of violence against it before we know whether it be disposed to do us justice, or to refuse it. They who, without trying pacific measures, on the least motive run to arms, sufficiently show that justificative reasons, in their mouths, are only pretences; they eagerly seize the opportunity of indulging their passions, and of gratifying their ambition, under some color of right." It is subsequently stated by this admired writer, that "it is demonstrated in the foregoing chapter, that to take arms lawfully, 1. That we have a just cause of complaint. 2. That a reasonable satisfaction has been denied us, &c."

Burlamaqui says: "However just reason we may have to make war, yet as it inevitably brings along with it an incredible number of calamities, and often injustices, it is certain that we ought not to proceed too easily to a dangerous extremity, which may perhaps prove fatal to the

conqueror himself. The following are the measures which prudence directs sovereigns to observe in these circumstances: 1. Supposing the reason of the war is just in itself, yet the dispute ought to be about something of great consequence to us; since 'tis better even to relinquish part of our right, when the thing is not considerable, than to have recourse to arms to defend it. 2. We ought to have at least some probable appearance of success; for it would be a criminal temerity, and a real folly, wantonly to expose ourselves to certain destruction, and to run into a greater, in order to avoid a lesser evil. 3. Lastly, there should be a real necessity for taking up arms: that is, we ought not to have recourse to force but when we can employ no milder method of recovering our rights, or of defending ourselves from the evils with which we are menaced. These measures are agreeable not only to the principles of prudence, but also to the fundamental maxims of sociability, and to the love of peace; maxims of no less force with respect to nations than individuals. By these a sovereign must, therefore, be necessarily directed; even the justice of the Government obliges him to it, in consequence of the very nature and end of authority. For as he ought always to take particular care of the state, and of his subjects, consequently he should not expose them to all the evils with which war is attended, except in the last extremity, and when there is no other expedient left but that of arms." In addition to these great authorities, permit me to refer severally to the opinions of two more modern writers, Martens and Paley. The former says that amicable means for redress must be tried in vain before an appeal to arms, unless it is evident that it would be useless to try such means; and the latter is of opinion

that the only justifying causes of war are deliberate invasions of right, and maintaining the balance of power. It is not necessary to decide upon the justice of the last observation, because it does not apply to the case before us. But can any man lay his hand upon his heart and declare that he believes the present case a deliberate invasion of right by the Spanish Government? Can any man say, that it would be fruitless to attempt amicable means of redress, and that the sword alone can restore us to our rights?

The opinions of these celebrated writers are corroborated by the general usage of nations. A demand of redress before the application of force, has been almost uniformly practiced by the most barbarous, as well as the most civilized nations. Instances may indeed be found to the contrary; but they are to be considered as departures from established usage. The ancient Romans, who were a military nation, and who marched to empire through an ocean of blood, always demanded satisfaction from the offending nation before they proceeded to war; and fixed upon a certain time in which the demand was to be complied with, at the expiration of which, if redress was still withheld, they then endeavored to obtain it by force. It has been the general practice of the civilized nations of Europe to promulge manifestos, justificatory of their conduct in resorting to arms. These manifestos contain a full statement of their wrongs, and almost always declare that they had previously endeavored by negotiation to obtain a friendly adjustment of their complaints. What is this, but a declaration that the law and the sense of nations demand this course? What is it, but an appeal to the intuitive sense of right and wrong which exists in every

human bosom? The reign of the present King of Great Britain has been emphatically a war reign. In 1760 he ascended the throne, and found the nation at war with France. Besides his wars in the East and West Indies, almost half of his reign has been consumed in wars with this country, and some of the nations of Europe. He has been three times at war with France; three times with Spain; twice with Holland, and once with the United States. The most strange events-events which have pleased and dazzled, astonished and terrified mankindhave passed upon the theater of the world in his time. The ordinary maxims of policy, and the cardinal principles of action have been reversed and prostrated. The world has seen the revival of the crusades, and all the great powers of Europe in arms, and a destroying and desolating spirit go forth, unknown to past times. Portentous as a portion of this reign has been, when a deviation from the established laws of nations might naturally be expected, and degraded as the power and condition of Spain is represented to be, I am willing to stake the whole controversy upon the reciprocal conduct of these Governments to each other. Of all wars, one with Spain is the most popular in England, from the opportunities it affords for maritime spoliation, and lucrative enterprise: for the same reasons it is anxiously deprecated by Spain; and it has even grown into a Spanish proverb, "Peace with England, and war with the world." Notwithstanding the preponderating force of Great Britain, the allurements of popularity and cupidity, her great and extraordinary acquisition of maritime power, and the martial temper which has marked her character during the present reign, we find the very power with whom we are now called upon