Jerome observeth, that nature guideth the very reasonless creatures to a kind of magistracy.1

Eighthly, If the Scripture hold forth the same derivation or origination of magistracy in the Christian magistrate and in the heathen magistrate, then it is not safe to us to hold that the Christian magistrate holds his office of and under Christ as Mediator; but the Scripture doth hold forth the same derivation or origination of magistracy in the Christian magistrate and in the heathen magistrate; therefore the proposition hath this reason for it, because the heathen magistrate doth not hold his office of and under Christ as Mediator. Neither doth Mr Hussey herein contradict me, only he holds the heathen magistrate and his government to be unlawful, wherein he is anabaptistical, and is confuted by my first argument. As for the assumption, it is proved from divers scriptures, and namely these, Rom. xiii. 1, "The powers that be are ordained of God," which is spoken of heathen magistrates; Dan. ii. 37, "Thou, O King, art a King of kings; for the God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom, power, and strength, and glory;" so saith Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, an idolatrous and heathen king. See the like, Jer. xxvii. 6; Isa. xlv. 1. God sent his servant the prophet to anoint Hazael king over Syria, 1 Kings xix. 15. Read to this purpose Augustine, de Civit. Dei, lib. 5, cap. 21, where he saith, that the same God gave a kingdom and authority both to the Romans, Assyrians, Persians, Hebrews; and that he who gave the kingdom to the best emperors, gave it also to the worst emperors; yea, he that gave it to Constantine a Christian, did also give it, saith he, to Julian the apostate. Tertullian, Apol., cap. 30, speaking of the heathen emperors of that time, saith, that they were from God, à quo sunt secundi, post quem primi ante omnes: that he who had made them men, did also make them emperors, and give them their power. Ibid., cap. 33, Ut merito dixerim noster est magis Caesar, ut a nostra Deo constitutus: So that I may justly say, Cæsar is rather

ours, as being placed by our God, saith he, speaking to the pagans in the behalf of Christians; wherefore, though there be huge and vast differences between the Christian magistrate and the heathen magistrate, the former excelling the latter as much as light doth darkness, yet, in this point of the derivation and tenure of magistracy, they both are equally interested, and the Scripture showeth no difference as to that point.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE POWER AND PRIVILEGE OF THE MAGISTRATE IN THINGS AND CAUSES ECCLESIASTICAL; WHAT IT IS NOT, AND WHAT IT IS.

The new notion that the Christian magistrate is a church officer, and magistracy an ecclesiastical as well as a civil administration, calls to mind that of the wise man, "Is there anything whereof it may be said, See, this is new? it hath been already of old time, which was before us." Plato, in his Politicus (a little after the middle of that book), tells me, that the kings of Egypt were also priests, and that, in many cities of the Grecians, the supreme magistrate had the administration of the holy things. Notwithstanding, even in this particular there still appeareth some new thing under the sun. For Plato tells me again, epist. 8, that those supreme magistrates who were priests, might not be present, nor join in criminal nor capital judgments, lest they (being priests) should be defiled. If you look after some other precedent for the union of civil and ecclesiastical government, secular and spiritual administrations in one and the same person or persons, perhaps it were not hard to find such precedents as our opposites will be ashamed to own.

I am sure heathens themselves have known the difference between the office of priests and the office of magistrates. Aristotle, de Repub., lib. 4, cap. 15, speaking of priests, saith, roûro yàp erepov тí пaρà ràs ToλITIκὰς ἀρχὰς: For this is another thing than civil magistrates. He had said before, oλλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία deira: For a civil society hath need of many rulers, but every eriorárns who is made by election or lot, is not a civil magistrate; and the first instance he giveth is that of the priests; and so Aristotle would

have the priest to be énorárns a ruler, but not a civil magistrate. So, de Repub., lib. 7, cap. 8, he distinguisheth between the priests and the judges in a city.

But to the matter. I will here endeavour to make these two things appear: 1. That no administration, formally and properly ecclesiastical (and, namely, the dispensing of church censures), doth belong unto the magistrate, nor may (according to the word of God) be assumed and exercised by him. 2. That Christ hath not made the magistrate head of the church, to receive appeals (properly so called) from all ecclesiastical assemblies. Touching the first of these, it is no other than is held forth in the Irish Articles of Faith (famous among orthodox and learned men in these kingdoms), which do plainly exclude the magistrate from the administration of the word and sacraments, and from the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven. It is the unhappiness of this time, that this and other truths, formerly out of controversy, should be so much stuck at and doubted of by some.

Now, that the corrective part of church government, or the censure of scandalous persons, in reference to the purging of the church and keeping pure of the ordinances, is no part of the magistrate's office, but is a distinct charge belonging of right to ministers and elders; as it may fully appear by the arguments brought afterwards to prove a government in the church distinct from magistracy (which arguments will necessarily carry the power of church censures, and the administration of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, into other hands than the magistrate's); so I shall here strengthen it by these confirmations:

First, Church censures must needs be dispensed by ministers and elders, because they are heterogeneous to magistracy: For, first, The magistrate by the power which is in his hand, ought to punish any of his subjects that do evil, and he ought to punish like sins with like punishments. But if the power of church censures be in the magistrate's hands, he cannot walk by that rule; for church censures are only for church members, not for all subjects; 1 Cor. v. 10, 12. Secondly, Church censures are to be executed in the name of Christ, Matt. xviii. 20, with ver. 17, 18; 1 Cor. v. 4; and this cannot be done in his name, by any other but such as have commission from him to bind and loose, forgive and retain sins. But where

is any such commission given to the civil magistrate, Christian more than heathen? Thirdly, Church censures are for impenitent, contumacious offenders; but the magistrate doth and must punish offenders (when the course of justice and law so requireth), whether they appear penitent or impenitent. Fourthly, The magistrate's power of punishing offenders is bounded by the law of the land. What then shall become of such scandals as are not crimes punishable by the law of the land? such as obscene rotten talking, adulterous and vile behaviour, or the most scandalous conversing and companying together (though the crime of adultery cannot be proved by witnesses), living in known malice and envy, refusing to be reconciled, and thereupon lying off (it may be for a long time) from the sacrament, and the like, which are not proper to be taken notice of by the civil judge. So that, in this case, either there must be church censures and discipline exercised by church officers, or the magistrate must go beyond his limits. Or, lastly, Scandals shall spread in the church, and no remedy against them. Far be it from the thoughts of Christian magistrates, that scandals of this kind shall be tolerated, to the dishonour of God, the laying of the stumbling-blocks of bad examples before others, and to the violation and pollution of the ordinances of Jesus Christ, who hath commanded to keep his ordinances pure.

A second argument may be this, In the Old Testament God did not command the magistrates, but the priests, to put a difference betwixt the profane and the holy, the unclean and the clean; Lev. x. 10; Ezek. xxii. 26; Ezek, xliv. 23, 24; Deut. xxi. 5; 2 Chron. xxiii. 18, 19. And, in the New Testament, the keys of the kingdom of heaven are given to the ministers of the church: Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18; John xx. 23, but no where to the civil magistrate. It belongeth to church officers to censure false doctrine, Rev. ii. 2, 14, 15; to decide controversies, Acts xvi. 4; and to examine and censure scandals, Ezek. xliv. 23, 24, which is a prophecy concerning the ministry of the New Testament; and elders judge an elder, 1 Tim. v. 19, or any other church member, 1 Cor. v. 12.

Thirdly, The Scripture holdeth forth the civil and ecclesiastical power as most distinct; insomuch that it condemneth the spiritualising of the civil power, as well as the secu

larising of the ecclesiastical power; state papacy, as well as papal state. Church officers may not take the civil sword, nor judge civil causes, Luke xii. 13, 14; xxii. 25; Matt. xxvi. 52; 2 Cor. x. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 4. So Uzzah might not touch the ark; nor Saul offer burnt-offerings; nor Uzziah burn incense. I wish we may not have cause to revive the proverb which was used in Ambrose's time: "That emperors did more covet the priesthood than the priests did. covet the empire." Shall it be a sin to church officers to exercise any act of civil government, and shall it be no sin to the civil magistrate to engross the whole and sole power of church government? Are not the two powers formally and specifically distinct? Of which before, chap. 4.

It is to be well noted, that Maccovius and Vedelius, who ascribe a sort of papal power to the civil magistrate, to the great scandal of the reformed church, do notwithstanding acknowledge that Christ hath appointed church discipline and censures, and the same to be dispensed by church officers only; and that the magistrate, as he may not preach the word and administer the sacraments, so he may not exercise church discipline, nor inflict spiritual censures, such as excommunication. Though Erastus, p. 175, hath not spared to say, that the magistrate may, in the New Testament (though he might not in the old), exercise the ministerial function, if he can have so much leisure from his other employments.

But

Fourthly, The power of church discipline is intrinsical to the church; that is, both they who censure, and they who are censured, must be of the church, 1 Cor. v. 12, 13; they must be of one and the same corporation; the one must not be in the body, and the other out of the body. if this power were in the magistrate, it were extrinsical to the church; for the magistrate, quatenus a magistrate, is not so much as a church member; far less can the magistrate, as magistrate, have jurisdiction over church members, as church members; even as the minister, as minister, is not a member of the commonwealth or state, far less can he, as minister, exercise jurisdiction over the subjects, as subjects.

The Christian magistrate in England is not a member of the church as a magistrate, but as a Christian; and the minister of Jesus Christ in England, is not subject to the magistrate as he is a minister of Christ,

but as he is a member of the commonwealth of England. He was both a learned man and a great royalist in Scotland, who held that all kings, infidel as well as Christian, have equal authority and jurisdiction in the church, though all be not alike qualified or able to exercise it. John Weymes, de Reg. primat., p. 123. Let our opposites loose this knot among themselves; for they are not of one opinion about it.

Fifthly, Church officers might, and did freely, and by themselves, dispense church censures, under pagan and unbelieving magistrates, as is by all confessed. Now the church ought not to be in a worse condition under the Christian magistrate than under an infidel; for the power of the Christian magistrate is cumulative, not privative to the church; he is a nursing-father, Isa. xlix. 23, not a step-father. He is keeper, defender and guardian of both tables, but neither judge nor interpreter of Scripture.

Sixthly, I shall shut up this argumentation with a convincing dilemma. The assemblies of church officers being to exercise discipline, and censure offences (which is supposed, and must be granted in regard of the ordinances of parliament), either they have power to do this jure proprio, and virtute officii, or only jure devoluto, and virtute delegationis, such authority being derived from the magistrate. If the former, I have what I would; if the latter, then it followeth, 1. That where presbyteries and synods do exercise spiritual jurisdiction, not by any power derived from, or dependent upon, the civil magistrate, but in the name and authority of Jesus Christ, and by the power received from him, as in Scotland, France, and the Low Countries, &c., there all ecclesiastical censures, such as deposition of ministers, and excommunication of scandalous and obstinate persons, have been, are, and shall be, void, null, and of no effect; even as when the prelatical party did hold, that the power of ordination and jurisdiction pertaineth only to prelates, or such as are delegated with commission and authority from them, thereupon they were so put to it by the arguments of the anti-episcopal party, that they were forced to say, that presbyters, ordained by presbyters in other reformed churches, are no presbyters, and their excommunication was no excommunication. 2. It will follow, that the magistrate himself may excommunicate, for nemo potest aliis delegare plus juris quam ipse

habet: No man can give from him, by delegation or deputation to another, that right or power which he himself hath not. 3. If the power of excommunication come by delegation from the magistrate, either the magistrate must in conscience give this power to church officers only, or he is free, and may, without sin, give this power to others. If the former, what can bind up the magistrate's conscience, or astrict the thing to church officers, except it be God's ordinance that they only do it? If the latter, then, though this parliament hath taken away the old high commission court, which had potestatem utriusque gladii, yet they may lawfully, and without sin, erect a new high commission court, made up of those who shall be no church officers, yea, having none of the clergy in it (as the other had), with commission and power granted to them to execute spiritual jurisdiction and excommunication, and that not only in this or that church, yea, or province, but in any part of the whole kingdom. So much of the first point. Now to the second, concerning appeals to the magistrate, as to the head of the church.

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It is asked, what remedy shall there be against the abuse of church discipline by church officers, except there be appeals from the ecclesiastical courts to the civil magistrate which if it be, church officers will be the more wary and cautious to do no man wrong, knowing that they may be made to answer for it and if it be not, there is a wide door opened, that ministers may do as they please.

Ans. 1. Look what remedy there is for abuses in the preaching of the word, and administration of the sacraments: the like remedy there is for abuses in church discipline. Mal-administration of the word and sacraments is no less sinful to the ministers, and hurtful to others, than mal-administration of discipline: and, in some respects, the former is more to the dishonour of God, and destruction of men, than the latter. Ministers have not an arbitrary power to preach what they will. Now, when the word is not truly preached, nor the sacraments duly administered by any minister or ministers, the magistrate seeketh the redress of these things (in a constituted church) by the convocating of synods, for examining, discovering, and judging of such errors and abuses as are found in particular churches. But if the synod should connive at, or comply with that same error, yet the magistrate taketh not

upon him the supreme and authoritative decision of a controversy of faith, but still endeavoureth to help all this by other ecclesiastical remedies-as another synod, and yet another, till the evil be removed. The like we say concerning abuses in church discipline: The magistrate may command a resuming and re-examination of the case in another synod; but still the synod ratifieth or reverseth the censure; in which case it is betwixt the magistrate and the synod, as betwixt the will and understanding; for Voluntas imperat intellectui quo ad exercitium, yet notwithstanding determinatur per intellectum quoad specificationem actus.

Take for instance this also: If it be a case deserving deposition or degradation; in such a case, saith learned Salmasius, Appar. ad lib. de Primatu, p. 298, the prince or magistrate cannot take from a minister that power which was given him in ordination, with imposition of hands, for he cannot take that which he cannot give; but if a prince would have a minister, for his offences, to be deprived of his ministerial power, he must take care that it be done by the ministers themselves, qui judices veri ipsius sunt, et auferre soli possunt quod per ordinationem dederunt: who are his true judges, and they only can take away what by ordination they have given. Thus Salmasius.

2. And further, if presbyteries or synods exceed the bounds of ecclesiastical power, and go without the sphere of their own activity, interposing and judging in a civil cause which concerneth any man's life or estate, the magistrate may reverse and make null whatsoever they do in that kind, and punish themselves for such abuse of their power, as Solomon punished Abiathar, and banished him to Anathoth, he being guilty of high treason, 1 Kings ii. 26. It was not a case of scandal only, or of delinquency, or mal-administration in his sacerdotal office, otherwise it had fallen within the cognisance, and jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical sanhedrim.

3. Though the case be merely spiritual and ecclesiastical, the Christian magistrate (by himself and immediately) may not only examine by the judgment of discretion the sentence of the ecclesiastical court, but also when he seeth cause (either upon the complaint of the party, or scandal given to himself), interpose by letters, messages, exhortations, and sharp admonitions to the presbytery or synod, who, in that case, are bound

in conscience, with all respect and honour to the magistrate, to give him a reason of what they have done, and to declare the grounds of their proceedings, till, by the blessing of God upon this free and fair dealing, they either give a rational or satisfactory account to the magistrate, or be themselves convinced of their mal-administration of discipline.

4. And in extraordinary cases, when the clergy hath made defection, and all church discipline is degenerated into tyranny, as under Popery and Prelacy it was, it belongeth to the magistrate to take the protection of those who are cast out or censured unjustly; for extraordinary evils must have extraordinary helps. And in this sense we are to understand divers of our Reformers and others, groaning under the pressures of the Roman clergy, and calling in the help of the civil magistrate for their relief.

But we deny that (in a well-constituted church) it is agreeable to the will of Christ for the magistrate either to receive appeals (properly so called) from the sentence of an ecclesiastical court, or to receive complaints exhibited against that sentence by the party censured, so as by his authority, upon such complaint, to nullify or make void the ecclesiastical censure.1 The latter of these two Vedelius pleadeth for, not the former. But Apollonius oppugneth the latter, as being upon the matter all one with the former. Now to ascribe such power to the magistrate is, 1. To change the Pope, but not the popedom; the head, but not the headship. For is not this the Pope's chief supremacy, to judge all men, and to be judged of no man; to ratify or rescind at his pleasure the decrees of the church, councils and all? And shall this power now be transferred upon the magistrate? Good Lord, where are we, if this shall be the upshot of our reformation? Oh for it! Shall we condemn the Papists and Anabaptists who give too little to the magistrate, and then join hands with the Arminians, who give as much to the magistrate as the Pope

1 Synops. pur. Theol. disp. 48, thes. 19.-Etsi vero hanc spiritualem potestatem a Christiani magistratus inspectione, tanquam utriusque tabulæ custode non eximimus, negamus tamen eam, aut ejus praxin a magistratus suprema auctoritate pendere, sicuti quidam recentiores contendunt, cum a Christo solo pendeat, et ab ipso immediate ecclesiæ sit concessa ut loci antea producti demonstrant. Ac proinde nec per appellationem, aut provocationem proprie dictam, potestas hæc ad magistratus aut principum tribunal deferri potest, quum ejus executio penes ipsos non sit.

hath formerlly usurped? 2. Appeals lie in the same line of subordination, and do not go de genere in genus; but the civil and ecclesiastical courts stand not in one line, neither are they of one kind and nature; they are disparata, non subordinata. 3. They who receive appeals have also power to execute the sentence, else the appeal is in vain; but the magistrate hath no power to execute the church censure, nor to shut out of the church, our opposites themselves being judges. It was not, therefore, without just cause that Augustine did very much blame the Donatists for their appealing from the ecclesiastical assemblies, to the emperors and civil courts, epist. 48, 162.

There are two examples alleged from Scripture for appeals from ecclesiastical to civil courts. One is the example of Jeremiah, Jer. xxvi; the other is the example of Paul, Acts xxv. But neither of the two prove the point. For, 1. Jeremiah was not censured by the priests with any spiritual or ecclesiastical censure (of which alone our controversy is) but the priests took him, and said to him, said to him, "Thou shalt surely die," Jer. xxvi. 8. 2. Would God that every Christian magistrate may protect the servants of God from such unjust sentences and persecuting decrees. When ecclesiastical courts are made up of bloody persecutors, that is an extraordinary evil which must have an extraordinary remedy. 3. Neither yet is there any syllable of Jeremiah's appealing from the priests to the princes; but the text saith, "When the princes of Judah heard these things, then they came up," &c. ver. 10; that is, the princes, so soon as they understood that the priests had taken Jeremiah, and had said to him, "Thou shalt surely die," ver. 8, and being also informed that all the people were gathered together tumultuously and disorderly against the prophet, ver. 9, they thought it their duty to rescue the prophet from the priests and people, that he might be examined and judged by the civil court, he being challenged and accused as one worthy to die.

As for Paul's appellation to Cæsar, First, It is supposed by our opposites, that he appealed from the ecclesiastical sanhedrim of the Jews, which is a great mistake, for he appealed from the judgment-seat of Festus to Cæsar; that is, from an inferior civil court to a superior civil court; which he had just cause to do: for, though Festus had not yet given forth any sentence against Paul, yet