shall endeavour to shew in the sequel of this Essay, that if there exist a difference of soil amongst mankind, that that difference is NOT mental but physical, and that experience offers us every encouragement for its improvement: that it asks for cultivation, and leaves no apology to any one for not becoming a Genius.

But mankind, who complain of the want of Genius, expect to perform without industry, what others, whom they call men of Genius, have executed after long and laborious application; after years of study and infinitely varied experiment: and would thus, in reality, become more clearly possessed of a gift from heaven, than those whom they now extol. Hear the description given by Persius* of one of these murmurers against the bounty of nature. I will quote it in the translation of Dryden :

"With much ado his book before him laid,
And parchment with the smoother side display'd;
He takes the papers; lays 'em down agen,
And with unwilling fingers tries the pen.
Some peevish quarrel straight he strives to pick;
His quill writes double, or his ink's too thick;
Infuse more water-now 'tis grown so thin
It sinks, nor can the characters be seen.

*The classical reader may not be displeased at seeing the coincidence of expressions, and more particularly of sentiment, between the third satire of the second book of Horace, and the third satire of Persius, from which last the above extract

Oh! wretch! and still more wretched every day,
Are mortals born to sleep their lives away?

has been taken. They appear to be too striking to be accidental; and as I have never seen any allusion to them before, I have introduced them in this note.

Contemnere miser. Vitanda est im- Inque manus chartæ,-venit→

proba Siren

Desidia

Tunc quæritur, crassus calamo quod pendeat humor.

Nam, mala re gesta, cum vellem O miser, inque dies ultra miser.

The introduction of the patient and his "Medicus," and the use of the word "Helleborus," together with a similarity of reflection through much of the two Satires, render it highly probable that Persius borrowed something from his predecessor Horace. The motto to the Satire of the former, might have been the line of the latter

"Vitanda est improba Siren

Desidia."

No more accuse thy pen; but charge the crime
On native sloth, and negligence of time;
Think'st thou thy master, or thy friend to cheat?
Fool! 'tis thyself, and that's a worse deceit.

But to conclude this part of my subject, I would thus address myself to any one who ascribed his want of success, in intellectual pursuits, to a want of Genius. Have you read much, eight hours a day, at least, like Swift, and thought more? Has your diligence been greater as the difficulties you have met with have increased, like Herschel ? Have you been content to advance in knowledge as men of Genius have advanced, "by little and little, always keeping the subject before you," like Newton? Have you pined, and lost a relish for all other objects, when you lost a communion with your books, like Petrarch? Has not a single day passed by without a line to your labours, like Apelles? Have you kept your composition nine years under your eye, as advised by Horace; and all that time, by day and by night, examined and meditated upon the best writings of those who have lived before you? Have you laboured to conquer physical defects, and struggled, as it were, against nature, like Demosthenes?

If after these questions honestly answered in the affirmative, you complain you cannot learn, why then I will admit, without further proof, that you have no Genius. And if you wish to be thought to have one, would advise you, without delay, to

follow the prescription of Persius, and steep cummin seeds liberally in your wine. It would be useless to send such an one to Anticyra.

Conclusive as the preceeding reasoning appears to me, in answer to the specious arguments upon which the opinion of Genius is founded; still, agreeably to the plan proposed, I shall proceed to consider the manner in which knowledge is acquired; what distinguishes learning; and, lastly, what are the circumstances which concur to constitute Genius. And if I can shew, that all the variety of talent which the world ever produced, every instance of intellectual excellence which mankind ever admired, can be satisfactorily explained upon physical principles, we may, and we ought to dismiss the unsupported hypothesis of Genius. Genius, it is true, cuts the gordian knot at once, but then it is an instrument invisible, and incomprehensible. The evidence of its existence I have never yet seen; the evidence upon which the adequacy of a physical organization depends, I shall now endeavour to produce.

The mind of man at his birth resembles, as Aristotle observes, a dark chamber, the former of which through the senses, as the latter through an aperture, lets in a variety of images of objects: and, were it possible to cut off all communication between mind and matter, as the aperture may be completely closed, a perpetual darkness would exist in both. This is a most important consideration,

inasmuch as it lowers at once the vaunted claims of Genius to a dependence upon sense.

Genius, if such a power exist, would dwell in unexcited solitude, wholly unacquainted with the things of this world, if the eye, and the ear, and the other senses, did not introduce the cheering ray of knowledge. It would be a genius without a name. The beau ideal of intelligence.

Monsr. Trembley, speaking "des idées innées," a subject closely allied to Genius, though seldom perhaps considered in such affinity, truly says, "I' experience dement ce systeme," and then adds, what none will dare to deny, "la privation d'un sens emporte avec elle la privation des idées attachées a ce sens;" the fair conclusion from which is, that if there were no senses, there would be no ideas, and consequently no knowledge; and, a fortiori, no Genius.

As I may be misinterpreted here, for Locke has not escaped censure, I will take the liberty of declaring, and briefly explaining my fixed opposition to the fatal doctrine of materialism, which, whilst it has a close, and almost necessary connexion with the notions entertained concerning Genius, is, as might be inferred, diametrically opposed to the reasoning and conclusion of this Essay. If Genius, which is the noblest evidence of the existence of something sublimely wonderful within us, may be vigorous or weak, have growth, maturity, and decay; it seems then to make the soul partake so