narrow circle of those who hear our words, but, by means of written characters, we can send our thoughts abroad, and propagate them through the world; we can lift our voice, so as to speak to the most distant regions of the earth. More permanent also; as it prolongs this voice to the most distant ages; it gives us the means of recording our sentiments to futurity, and of perpetuating the instructive memory of past transactions. It likewise affords this advantage to such as read above such as hear, that, having the written characters before their eyes, they can arrest the sense of the writer. They can pause, and revolve, and compare, at their leisure, one passage with another: whereas, the voice is fugitive and passing; you must catch the words the moment they are uttered, or you lose them for ever.

But although these be so great advantages of written Language, that Speech, without Writing, would have been very inadequate for the instruction of mankind; yet we must not forget to observe, that spoken Language has a great superiority over written Language, in point of energy or force. The voice of the living speaker, makes an impression on the mind, much stronger than can be made by the perusal of any Writing., The tones of voice, the looks, and gesture, which accompany discourse, and which no Writing can convey, render discourse, when it is well managed, infinitely more clear, and more expressive, than the most accurate Writing. For tones, looks, and gestures, are natural interpreters of the sentiments of the mind. They remove ambiguities; they enforce impressions; they operate on us by means of sympathy, which is one of the most powerful instruments of persuasion. Our sympathy is always awakened more, by hearing the speaker, than by reading his works in our closet. Hence, though Writing may answer the purposes of mere instruction, yet all the great and high efforts of eloquence must be made, by means of spoken, not of written Language.

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LECTURE VIII.

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STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE.

AFTER having given an account of the Rise and Progress of Language I proceed to treat of its Structure, or of General Grammar. The Structure of Language is extremely artificial; and there are few sciences, in which a deeper, or more refined logic, is employed, than in Grammar. It is apt to be slighted by superficial thinkers as belonging to those rudiments of knowledge, which were inculcated upon us in our earliest youth. But what was then inculcated before we could comprehend its principles, would abundantly repay our study in maturer years; and to the ignorance of it, must be attributed many of those fundamental defects which appear in writing.

Few authors have written with philosophical accuracy on the principles of General Grammar; and, what is more to be regretted, fewer still have thought of applying those principles to the English Language. While the French Tongue has long been an object of attention to many able and ingenious writers of that nation, who have considered its construction, and determined its propriety with great accuracy, the Genius and Grammar of the English, to the reproach of the country have not been studied with equal care, or ascertained with the same precision. Attempts have been made, indeed, of late, towards supplying this defect; and some able writers have entered on the subject; but much remains yet to be done.

'I do not propose to give any system, either of Grammar in general, or of English Grammar in particular. A minute discussion of the niceties of Language would carry us too much off from other objects, which demand our attention in this course of Lectures. But I propose to give a general view of the chief principles relating to this subject, in observations on the O

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several parts of which Speech or Language is composed; remarking, as I go along, the peculiarities of our own Tongue. After which, I shall make some more particular remarks on the Genius of the English Language.

The first thing to be considered is, the division of the several parts of Speech. The essential parts of Speech are the same in all Languages. There must always be some words which denote the names of objects, or mark the subject of discourse; other words, which denote the qualities of those objects, and express what we affirm concerning them; and other words, which point out their connexions and relations. Hence, substantives, pronouns, adjectives, verbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, must necessarily be found in all Languages. The most simple and comprehensive division of the parts of Speech is, into substantives, attributives, and connectives.* Substantives, are all the words which express the names of objects, or the subjects of discourse; attributives, are all the words which express any attribute, property or action of the former; connectives, are what express the connections, relations, and dependencies, which take place among them. The common grammatical division of Speech into eight parts; nouns, pronouns, verbs, participles, adverbs, prepositions, interjections, and conjunctions, is not very logical, as might be easily shewn; as it comprehends, under the general term of nouns, both substantives and adjectives, which are parts of Speech generically and essentially distinct : while it makes a separate part of Speech of participles, which are no other than verbal adjectives. However, as these are the terms to which our ears have been most familiarized, and, as an exact logical division is of no great consequence to our present purpose, it will be better to make use of these known terms than of any other.

Quintilian informs us, that this was the most ancient division. "Tum "videbit quot & quæ sunt partes orationis. Quanquam de numero parum "convenit. Veteres enim, quorum fuerant Aristoteles atque Theodictes, ver"ba modo, & nomina, & convinctiones tradiderunt. Vidclicet, quod in verbis "vim sermonis, in nominibus materiam, (quia alterum est quod loquimur, al"terum de quo loquimur) in convinctionibus autem complexum corum esse "judicarunt; quas conjunctiones a plerisque diçi scio; sed hæc videtur ex "ovideμa magis propria translatio. Paulatim a philosophicis acmaximè a stoicis, auctus est numerus, ac primùm convinctionibus articuli adjecti; post "præpositiones; nominibus, appellatio, deinde pronomen; deinde mistum ver"bo participium; ipsis verbis, adverbia,” Lib. 1. cap. iv.

We are naturally led to begin with the consideration of substantive nouns, which are the foundation of all Grammar, and may be considered as the most ancient part of Speech. For, assuredly, as soon as men had got beyond simple interjections, or exclamations of passion, and began to communicate themselves by discourse, they would be under a necessity of assigning names to the objects they saw around them, which in Grammatical Language, is called, the Invention of substantive nouns. And here, at our first setting out, somewhat cuThe individual objects which surround us, are

rious occurs. infinite in number. A savage, wherever he looked, beheld for ests and trees. To give separate names to every one of those trees, would have been an endless and impracticable undertaking. His first object was to give a name to that particular tree, whose fruit relieved his hunger, or whose shade protected him from the sun. But observing, that though other trees were distinguished from this by peculiar qualities of size or appear ance, yet that they also agreed and resembled one another, in certain common qualities such as springing from a root, and bearing branches and leaves, he formed in his mind some general idea of those common qualities, and ranging all that

pos

*I do not mean to assert, that among all nations, the first invented words were simple and regular substantive nouns. Nothing is more difficult and uncertain, than to ascertain the precise steps by which men proceeded in the formation of Language. Names for objects must, doubtless, have arisen in the most earliest stage of Speech. But, it is probable, as the learned author of the Treatise, On the Origin and Progress of Language, has shown (vol. i. p. 371.395.) that, among several savage tribes, some of the first articulate sound's that were formed denoted a whole sentence rather than the name of a par ticular object; conveying some information, or expressing some desires or fears suited to the circumstances in which that tribe was placed, or relating to the business they had most frequent occasion to carry on; as, the lion is coming, the river is swelling, &c. Many of their first words, it is likewise probable, were not simple substantive nouns, but substantives, accompanied with some of those attributes, in conjunction with which they were most frequently accustomed to behold them; as, the great bear, the little hut, the wound made by the hatchet, &c. Of all which, the Author produces instances from several of the American Languages; and it is, undoubtedly, suitable to the natural course of the operations of the human mind, thus to begin with particulars the most obvious to sense, and to proceed, from these, to more general expressions. He likewise observes, that the words of those primitive tongues are far from being, as we might suppose them, rude and short, and crowded with consonants: but, on the contrary, are, for the most part, long words, and full of vowels.

This is the consequence of their being formed upon the natural sounds which the voice utters with most ease, a little varied and distinguished by articulation; and he shews this to hold, in fact, among most of the barbarous Lan-guages which are known..

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sessed them under one class of objects, he called that whole class, a tree. Longer experience taught him to subdivide this genus into the several species of oak, pine, ash, and the rest, according as his observation extended to the several qualities in which these trees agreed or differed.

But, still he made use only of general terms in Speech. For the oak, the pine and the ash, were names of whole classes of objects; each of which included an immense number of undistinguished individuals. Here then it appears, that though the formation of abstract, or general conceptions, is supposed to be a difficult operation of the mind; such conceptions must have entered into the very first formation of Language. For, if we except only the proper names of persons, such as Cæsar, John, Peter, all the other substantive nouns which we employ in discourse, are the names, not of individual objects, but of very extensive genera, or species of objects; as man, lion, house, river, &c. We are not however to imagine, that this invention, of general, or abstract terms, requires any great exertion of metaphysical capacity: for, by whatever steps the mind proceeds in it, it is certain, that, when men have once observed resemblances among objects, they are naturally inclined to call all those which resemble one another, by one common name; and, of course, to class them under one species. We may daily observe this practised by children in their first attempts towards acquiring Language.

But now, after Language had proceeded as far as I have described, the notification which it made of objects was still very imperfect: for, when one mentioned to another in discourse, any substantive noun; such as, man, lion, or tree, how was it to be known which man, which lion, or which tree he meant, among the many comprehended under one name? Here occurs a very curious, and a very useful contrivance for specifying the individual object intended, by means of that part of Speech, called the article.

The force of the article consists in pointing or singling out from the common mass, the individual of which we mean to speak. In English we have two articles, a and the; a is more general and unlimited; the more definite and special. A is much the same with one, and marks only any one indi