A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY: CONTAINING FULL DEFINITIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL TERMS OF THE COMMON COMPILED ON THE BASIS OF SPELMAN'S GLOSSARY, AND ADAPTED TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH COPIOUS ILLUSTRATIONS, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL, By ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, COUNSELLOR AT LAW. Author of a Treatise on Voluntary Assignments, a Treatise on Circumstantial Evidence, and a Treatise on Practice, &c. Vocum origines rationesque [Labeo] percalluerat; eaque præcipue scientia ad enodandos plerosque juris laqueos utebatur. SECOND EDITION. Vol. 1. NEW YORK: BAKER, VOORHIS & CO., LAW PUBLISHERS, 1871. RR775-2 VI 114-57 Gov 507871 MARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY 1875 - Fril 26 98.00 (Vol. I., II.) Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1850, by ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, In the Clerk's office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1859, by In the Clerk's office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. 38-/63 TO THE DEAR SIR, HON. WILLIAM KENT, LL. D. I am sensible of a peculiar propriety in availing myself of your permission to inscribe to you the following work. It embodies (in however imperfect a form) the results of studies which received their earliest impulse and direction under the eye of your venerated father, and it is chiefly designed for use in a profession, in the practical duties of which I first received instruction from yourself. Knowing that, in you, professional eminence has ever been accompanied and adorned by the accomplishments of literature, I feel the less hesitation in offering to your notice a work which, in its general scope and bearing, belongs, perhaps, quite as much to the department of literature as to that of law. Knowing, too, that you are not one of those who, in their desire for improvement, would dissever the science of jurisprudence from its close dependence on the wisdom and learning of the past, I have hoped that you would not view with disapprobation or distaste the frequent references its pages contain to the lore of an almost forgotten age. But my highest satisfaction is in dedicating it to you, as a testimonial of personal esteem and regard, and as an expression of my sense of the unvarying kindness I have ever experienced at your hands. With every wish for your future happiness, and with sentiments of the greatest respect, I remain faithfully, Your friend and servant, ALEX. M. BURRILL. New-York, DEC. 20th, 1850. PREFACE. In the present edition of the following work, the author has merely endeavored to fill up more completely the outline of his plan, as explained in the original preface, preserving throughout the double character of Dictionary and Glossary. I. As a Dictionary, the work has been strictly confined, as before, to the province of definition; and, within this limit, ample materials for enlargement and improvement have been found to present themselves. Considerable additions have been made under both of the two leading divisions of subjects belonging to this department, namely, technical words, or law terms, properly so called, and common words which have been made the subjects of judicial definition, in the course of construing or expounding written instruments. In regard to the first of these, little occasion has been found for special remark in giving the appropriate definitions in each case,-technical words being almost invariably understood in technical senses, and in accordance with certain fixed rules, derived, in most instances, from a long and uniform course of professional usage. In regard to the definition of common words, however, the case has been somewhat different, for reasons which may be now explained. The two great standards of exposition, or guides to verbal interpretation, which have always been recognised and followed by lexicographers in all languages, are-first, etymology, as indicating the origin and composition of words, and secondly, usage, as determined by the example of the best authors. Etymology has always and deservedly been regarded as of the highest value and service in definition.. It presents on the faces of words, the ideas they were purposely framed to express, and exhibits, in most cases with clearness, the particular objects and reasons of their formation. It was said of the great Roman jurist, Antistius Labeo, that he was thoroughly versed in these "origins and reasons of words," and that he made effective use of this species of learning in unravelling many complicated law questions.* But the meaning of words, however clearly indicated by their etymology, is confessedly often affected and controlled by usage. Lapse of time, especially of very long periods, has constantly the effect of introducing new senses, or of modifying and extending the original and radical ones; and, in this way, words sometimes come to be used in senses entirely at variance with their strictly appropriate significations. These senses become legitimated by use, and pass as current without objection; but it is nevertheless true, as might (with some labor) be shown, that, in many instances, they are obvious perversions of language, originating either in ignorance or carelessness, and perhaps uncalled for by any real exigency. * See the title-page. |