SERMON IX.

OF THE GOODNESS OF GOD.

PSALMS Xxxiv. 8.

O taste and fee that the Lord is good. Blef fed is the man that trufteth in him.

N a former difcourfe from these words,

I endeavoured to explain and prove to you the goodness of God. I then infifted, among other arguments, on the traces of goodness, as well as of wisdom, which we see in the works of God. Happiness, I obferved, prevails in nature; and all that we know of its conftitution and laws fhews, that the power which gave birth

to it, and which prefides in it, is benevolent.

There is one objection to this argument which I will juft take notice of, before I proceed to what I principally 'intend at this time.-It may occur to fome" that, fince what we fee of nature "is comparatively nothing, it cannot "afford fufficient ground for any certain "conclufion. A malevolent being may "fometimes be the cause of happiness, as "a benevolent being may of fufferings. "A fingle act cannot be enough to give "a proof of the character of an agent,

otherwife totally unknown to us. From "what takes place in a point and a mo

ment, no judgment can be formed of "what takes place univerfally and eter"nally."

In answer to this objection, I would defire

you to confider,

First, That in all cafes, it is most

reasonable to judge of what we do not know by what we do know. We are

fure,

fure, that happiness prevails in all that we fee of nature; and however little that is, it affords a fair prefumption that happiness prevails likewife in the rest of

nature.

But fecondly, This evidence from fact is confirmed by arguments, taken from the reasons of things and the nature of the firft caufe, as reprefented in my former difcourfe: And, however unfatisfactory this evidence might otherwise have been, it amounts, when taken in this con nexion, to one of the ftrongest proofs.

But

Thirdly, The truth is, that this evidence, even when taken by itself, is in a high degree fatisfactory, and that the objection I have stated has no tendency to leffen its weight.-The following obfervation will, I think, fhew this.-Whatever the character of the Deity may be, his works muft, upon the whole, correspond to it. Particular exceptions to this correfpondence

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respondence may poffibly take place at particular times in particular districts; but they muft, without doubt, be fingular and extraordinary. If mifery, therefore, is the end of the Deity, there muft have been the greatest chance against our being caft into that part of the creation in which mifery is not prevalent. And this chance is the fame whether the creation be more or lefs extenfive.-For this reafon, I cannot help reckoning the improbability almost infinite, of our happening to have been brought into existence in that period of duration and district of the universe in which goodness is displayed, if, indeed, goodness is not the character of the Deity. This confideration, added to the other arguments on which I have infifted, make my thoughts fo eafy on this most interesting queftion, that I can fcarcely wifh for more fatisfaction.

I will now request leave to add a few obfervations to guard you against mis

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