puts a premium on convicting the defendant. What shadow of justice will raise its head where such a system rules.

"Section 611a: General Regulations concerning subpoenas.

Whenever any magistrate shall issue any subpoena in any criminal proceeding or trial, he shall endorse upon the back thereof a memorandum showing whether the same was issued for the prosecutor, or for the prisoner; and every officer or other person who shall insert the names of witnesses in a subpoena issued for the people, intended for the prisoner, with intent thereby to deceive any person, or to obtain any pay as for services in subpoenaing witnesses for the people, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor; and no such magistrate shall charge or be allowed for more than six subpoenas in any one criminal case, nor shall any board of supervisors allow any charge for issuing any subpoena in any criminal case or proceeding issued on behalf of a defendent."

It is seen, then, (1) that witnesses for the people may be subpoenaed by the magistrate; (2) that if the magistrate does issue a subpoena for the people he will be allowed a fee: "no such magistrate shall charge or be allowed for more than six subpoenas;" (3) that since the magistrate is paid for issuing subpoenas up to the number of six, beyond which he cannot go, he is apt to issue subpoenas on behalf of the people with alacrity; (4) that the magistrate may issue subpoenas for the defendant; (5) that the magistrate, if he issue such subpoenas for the defendant, will not be paid-there is no provision of law for payment; (6) that since the magistrate cannot make any charge for his services in issuing subpoenas to the defendant, and on his behalf, he is not likely to trouble himself to issue them. Theoreticians had better take notice. Idealism may rule the world, but it surely does not goven in the myriad humdrum affairs of life.

In all this is there equality? Is there fairness to a person accused? Section 614 provides "that a peace officer must serve any subpoena delivered to him for service, either on the part of the people, or on the part of the defendant." But this section is not existent, so far as its execution is concerned, in large cities. It will have to be an officer of heroic mould who will condescend to serve a subpoena for a defendant. The theory and the practice do not correspond. And the remedy in case of refusal to serve-what may it be? A report to the Commissioner of Police—who, in the ordinary administration in a large city, will pay no attention to it. The complainant, you see, is poor, helpless, and ignorant. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred

there is not even a report to the Commissioner of the neglect of duty on the part of the officer. But how about the lawyer for the poor person. Well, suppose he is an assigned lawyer, what will happen? Suppose he goes so far as to make a complaint-a thing which is not likely for a number of reasons-will he after complaint press the complaint? He will not take that trouble. But the attorney because he does not wish to make any trouble, because he is not much interested, because he is afraid of the "system," will not complain. The privately retained lawyer will not go much farther unless he is well paid. But the situation is almost an impossibility since, if the prisoner can retain a lawyer for complaint in such circumstances, he can retain him to defend him against the charge brought against him.

Section 616 provides for the payment by the State of witnesses on behalf of the people.

Secion 617 provides that "in any such (criminal) action, the Court may also, in its discretion, by order, direct the County treasurer to pay a reasonable sum, to be specified in the order, to any witness attending on behalf of the defendant, not exceeding the amount payable to a witness in a civil action in the same Court," (which amount is exactly the same as in the case of the people's witnesses) (see section 616).

Finally, section 615a provides that "whenever it shall become necessary to send subpoenas into another county for witnesses on criminal process, the district attorney is hereby empowered to send them to the sheriff of the County in which the said witnesses reside, whose duty it shall be to serve the same, and make his return without delay to the district attorney." This means that the district attorney issues his own subpoenas, while the defendant must go to the Court Clerk for his, and in addition has the advantage of the power of sending these subpoenas to the sheriff of the county in which the witnesses he wants reside, and that sheriff must make his return without delay to the district attorney.

But section 618 shows how different the case is with the defendant who wants to serve a subpoena on a witness outside his county. "No person is obliged to attend as a witness upon a subpoena, issued by any person or court other than a judge of a court of record, a court of record, a district attorney, or a county clerk, out of the county where the witness resides or is served with the subpoena, unless the county judge of the county where such subpoena is returnable, a justice of the supreme court, or a court of record, upon an affi

davit of the prosecutor, or of the defendant or his counsel, stating that he believes that the evidence of the witness is material, and his attendance at the trial or examination necessary, shall indorse on the subpoena an order for the attendance of the witness."

Section 618b adds to the list of inequalities. It provides that whenever a judge of a court of record is satisfied that "a person residing or being in this state is a necessary and material witness for the people in a criminal action, he may-order such person to enter into a written undertaking in such sureties, and in such sums as he may deem proper, to the effect that he will appear and testify at the court in which such action or proceeding may be heard or tried, and upon his neglect or refusal to comply with the order for that purpose, the judge must commit him to such place other than a state prison, as he may deem proper, until he comply or be legally discharged."

What provision is there for the securing of material witnesses for the defense?

ROBERT FERRARI.

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ILLINOIS STATE SOCIETY.

At the annual meeting of the Illinois Branch of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology in Chicago, on May 31 and June 1, 1916, the following officers were elected:

President JESSE L. DECK, State's Attorney, Decatur.

Vice President-F. EMORY LYON, Sup't. Central Howard Association, Chicago.

Secretary-WILLIAM G. HALE, Professor of Law, University of Illinois, Urbana.

Treasurer-ROBERT W. MILLAR, Professor of Law, Northwestern University, Chicago.

Executive Council-O. A. HARKER, Chairman, Dean of the College of law, University of Illinois (Urbana). WILLIAM N. GEMMILL, Judge Municipal Court, Chicago. THOMAS M. KILBRIDE, Clerk State Board of Pardons, Springfield. JACOB M. LOEB, of the Chicago Bar. WILLIAM C. GRAVES, Sup't. State Reformatory, Pontiac.

The following program was presented:

FIRST SESSION-3 P. M. THURSDAY, JUNE 1. 1-Address by the President-Judge Albert C. Barnes, Appellate Court, Chicago. "Causes of Delay in Criminal Cases."

2-"Vocational Education in Relation to the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency"-William N. Gemmill, Judge Municipal Court, Chicago; William C. Graves, Superintendent Illinois State Reformatory, Pontiac; William J. Bogan, Principal Lane Technical High School, Chicago; Professor Frank M. Leavitt, School of Education, University of Chicago.

3-"A Brief Review of the Criminal Cases in the Supreme Court for the Past Year"-William G. Hale, Professor of Law, University of Illinois, Urbana.

Discussion-Robert W. Millar, Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School, Chicago.

DINNER-6:30 P. M. WEDNESDAY, MAY 31, HOTEL LA SALLE. Members of the Bar Association, the State's Attorneys' Association, their wives and friends, joined with the State Society in this dinner.

SECOND SESSION-8:00 P. M. THURSDAY, JUNE 1.

Joint Session of the Illinois State Society and the Illinois States Attorneys' Association. 1-"Probation and Parole in Their Relation to Crime"-Hayden Bell, Ass't State's Attorney, Chicago, and Thos. M. Kilbride, Clerk State Board of Pardons, Springfield.

Discussion-John W. Houston, Chief Probation Officer Cook County, Chicago; F. Emory Lyon, Superintendent Central Howard Association, Chicago; Lowell B. Smith, State's Attorney, Sycamore: Jesse L. Deck, State's Attorney, Decatur; Edmund Burke, State's Attorney, Springfield.

THIRD SESSION-8:00 P. M. FRIDAY, JUNE 2.

Joint Session of the Illinois State Society and the Illinois State Bar Association.

1-"Practical Phases of Medico-Psychological Work for Courts”— Dr. William J. Hickson, Director Psychopathic Laboratory, Municipal Court, Chicago, and Dr. William Healy, Director Psychopathic Institute, Juvenile Court, Chicago.

Discussion-Harry Olson, Chief Justice, Municipal Court, Chicago; Robert H. Gault, Editor Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology and Associate Professor of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, and Nathan William MacChesney, President Illinois State Bar Association, Chicago.

ALBERT C. BARNES.2

Much has been said and written on this subject in recent years. Nothing new can be added. The only excuse for further discussing it is the hope that repeated insistence on needed changes may lead to their adoption. Agitation must precede legislation, but should be directed with organized and intelligent effort, such as may come from Bar Associations and societies like this. To effect such changes, however, requires co-operation of the Bar and overcoming the conservation of both lawyers and legislatures. Little can be expected of the latter that is not approved by the former. In this state we encounter a formidable obstacle-a divided bar. The country lawyer faces no such conditions as suggest the necessity for swift procedure in populous centers. He loves the game as he was taught it and sees no benefit or profit in changing its rules. As he shapes much of our legislation, we must break through the crust of his conservatism before we can hope for any marked changes in our criminal practice and procedure.

Another difficulty in dealing with the subject is the prevailing fear of destroying some safeguard to personal liberty. Vigilant attention to its preservation is enjoined by the constitution, and in our deep concern for it we touch at the same time the strength of our substantive and weakness of our adjective law respecting crime. We proudly differentiate our system that jealously guards the liberty of the accused at every step of procedure from that whereby he may be dragged at once before a magistrate and compelled to answer any question and prove his innocence. Viewed from results, however, it is probable each system might borrow features from the other with benefit to society and no loss to the principles of human liberty. We point with justifiable pride to those tireless sentinels, 'presumption of innocence' and 'reasonable doubt' but admit under our breath that at times they are grievously overworked and assume undue proportions. On occasions they become so awe-inspiring as to obscure the jury's vision of a whole army of facts and circumstances, and when panoplied with the grace of oratory and paraded with impressive dignity through reiterated written instructions, there is little wonder that they cap

1 Presidential address before the annual meeting of the Illinois Branch of the Institute, Chicago, May, 1916.

2Justice of the Appellate Court, Chicago.