2. Sove

raigne Power

cannot be

that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if
he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or
punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own
punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his
Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do
any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority,
he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men
have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new
Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is
unjust for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation
of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth
but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God.
But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye,
even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not onely an
act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.
Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them
all, is given to him they make Soveraigne, by
Covenant onely of one to another, and not of
him to any of them; there can happen no breach
of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and forfeited.
consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture,
can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is made
Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects before-hand,
is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole
multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make
a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one
party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person:
and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men,
those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, be-
cause what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for
breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest,
because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of
them in particular. Besides, if any one, or more of them,
pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraigne at
his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or
himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in
this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns there-
fore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right
of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the
designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to

grant Sovereignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by them [90] all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the gover[n]ment of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

3. No man can without injustice protest against

the Institution of the Soveraigne declared by the major part.

Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and Judgments of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of

4. The

Soveraigns be justly accused by the Subject.

Actions cannot

them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification.

5. What soever the Sove

Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by

himselfe.

raigne doth, is unpunishable by the Subject.

6. The Soveraigne is judge of what is necessary for the Peace and Defence of his Subjects.

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home, and [91] Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,

And Fudge of what Doctrines are fit to be taught

Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the well governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions, in

them.

order to their Peace, and Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace. For Doctrine repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive: Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but only somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace; therby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.

7. The Right of making Rules, whereby the Subjects may every man

know what is so his owne, as no other Subject can without injustice take it from him.

Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men call Propriety. For before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the Act of that Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull, and Unlawfull in the actions of Subjects, are the Civil Lawes; that is to say, the Lawes of each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civil Law be now restrained to the antient Civil Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts the Civil Law.

Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all

8. To him

also belongeth the Right of all Judicature and decision

versi[es]:

Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civill, or Naturall, or concerning Fact. For without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition [92] of Warre; and contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.

making War, 9. And of and Peace, as

he shall think best:

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expences thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.

Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the all Counsellours, Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in Peace, and War. For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Rewarding with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Law he hath formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.

choosing of

choosing all
10. And of

Counsellours, and Ministers, both of Peace, and Warre:

Power of

11. And of Rewarding, g, and that (where no former Law

and Punish

hath determined the measure of it) arbitrary: