in this refpect by the example of the Duke of Marlborough ; who, in his youth, was led by the fame motive to serve under the great Marshal Turenne. Of any partiality to Jacobinism we are difpofed most completely to acquit Colonel Money; for, when he accepted a commiffion in France, that country had a king at its head it had received a conftitution which was viewed in a most favourable light by a great majority of the people of England, as in a marked degree friendly to the cause of liberty; and the man, therefore, who gave it his countenance by becoming a commander in the conftitutional army of France, could not be faid to be a friend to the principles that characterize the reign of Jacobinifm. The Colonel tells us that he ferved with the unfortunate King's commiffion; that he never received any commiffion from the republic; that, on the contrary, he refused that of Lieutenant-general, which, he fays, is now in the war-office at Paris; and that he acted with Generals attached to monarchy, moft of whom have loft their heads for their adherence to that cause.

Colonel Money was well qualified for the task of giving an accurate hiftory of the campaign of 1792; he being an experienced officer, who had feen much fervice. He had himself been engaged in most of the military tranfactions which he defcribes, and he acted as a commander in many of them. We could have wifhed, however, that he had made lefs ufe, in his hiftory, of French expreffions;-fuch as grande chauffée, cidevant, à portée, avant garde, &c. the ideas conveyed by them could have been as well expreffed in English, and we ought not to borrow from our neighbours, while we have a fufficient fupply of words from our own language; "the main or high road," "formerly," ""within reach," "the advanced guard,' are terms fully as expreffive, and more intelligible to the majority of English readers. We think alfo that he might just as well have defcribed his rank in the late King of France's fervice by the name of Major General, as by that of Maréchal de Camp, which correfponds with it; for the Maréchal de Camp, (or, rather, M. des Camps et Armées, as fuch an officer is ftyled in his commiffion,) ftands next above a Brigadier, and next below a Lieutenant-General.

The Colonel gives a fhort account of the proposal which he had made for raifing a legion for the French King's service, and of his promotion to the rank of Major-general, notified to him by M. Lajard, then minifter at war, in a letter dated 19th of July, 1792. He then relates briefly the tranfactions of the 10th of Auguft, and proceeds to inform us that a letter from the minifter ultimately determined him to continue in the fervice, which the barbarity of the tranfactions of that day had nearly induced

him to quit; and that he found fo much weight in the reafons urged by Lieut. Gen. Arthur Dillon (fince beheaded) against his quitting France, that he refolved to accept the offer, made to him by that General, of the command of the advanced guard of the army lately deferted by La Fayette, to whom Gen. Dillon expected to fucceed. Gen. Dumourier, however, having been appointed commander in chief, Dillon, though his fuperior in rank, was directed to ferve under him, and was therefore himfelf obliged to put up with the command of the advanced guard; and Colonel Money was employed under him as a Major-General. As the public opinion has been divided about the character of La Fayette, we will lay before our readers the conjectures of our author respecting that officer, formed after a view of the pofition in which he found the army immediately after the defertion of its General:

I must not here omit a circumftance which deferves attention. La Fayette had drawn back his army from Longwy to Sedan, on the approach of the Duke of Brunfwick's forces. Whoever obferves this manoeuvre with the eye of a foldier, will be inclined to fufpect either that La Fayette meant to betray the caufe in which he was engaged, or that his profeffional knowledge may be called in queftion: he ought to have retreated towards Verdun, difputing every inch of ground with his light troops, and when the enemy approached Verdun, he fhould have paffed that town, when he was no longer able to lay before it. After croffing the Meufe at Verdun, he should have occupied the camp of Sivry la Perche, which is a very strong pofition, and a fafe retreat to the Gorge of Clermont; but instead of this, he retired to a camp near Sedan, leaving the route open to Paris. The fubfequent conduct of La Fayette leaves on my mind at least, but little doubt that he meant to favour the operations of the Duke of Brunswick. He was here encamped while his procefs was going on at Paris; there being an accufation against him in the National Affembly. This questionable movement of his army did not efcape the obfervation of the military men in the Affembly; but his party, or rather the King's, then prevailed by a majority of near two to one, and he was acquitted. To make this appear more clear, this trial of La Fayette was merely a trial of the ftrength of party. His acquittal proved, that the decheance of the King could never be effected if brought on at this period in the Affembly, which was the grand object of the Jacobins; they therefore determined to oblige the King to throw himself on the Affembly for protection, by an affault on the palace; then followed the affair of the 10th of Auguft. Commiffaries of the National Assembly were immediately fent to the different armies to foften and explain the malacre of the Swifs, and the neceflity of taking the Pouvoir Executif from the King.

The commiffaries fent to the army of La Fayette were through his influence arrefted by the municipality of Sedan. La Fayette then endeavoured to prevail with his army to march to Paris; not fucceeding in this, he faw his ruin was inevitable, if he continued any longer

with the troops; he therefore emigrated with feveral other genera officers.

I have faid thus much to give an idea how matters flood wher 1 never coul we arrived at Sedan, and I must fay one word more. account for La Fayette's being detained a prifoner and confined in dungeon, as he never committed any crime in the dominions of the Auftrians or the Pruffians; but these things are better understood in Berlin and Vienna than in London. If he had committed any crime in France, he was endeavouring to atone for his offence, and other Emigrés were in the fame predicament. If the enemy wished to punish him for overturning the ancient defpotic government, why did they not immediately fend him back? his head in that cafe would not have been long upon his fhoulders; and what has a man to forfeit in this world more than his life? Some probably may think, and with reafon, that death is not fo fevere a punishment, as to deprive a man of his liberty."

Col. M. gives an account of a council of war holden by Dumourier, after Longwy had fallen into the hands of the Duke of Brunswick; in which Gen. Dillon argues ftrongly for marching the whole army to the frontiers of Flanders, then but flenderly provided for a defence, and which he was fure the French would be able to conquer in time to return and cover Paris. This opinion was adopted by Dumourier, and fupported by all the other Generals except our author; who, however, agreed to fign with the reft a letter to the executive council recommending the meafure, and afking leave to carry it into execution: but he took care that the executive council fhould know that his fignature and his opinion were at variance, and that his brother officers fhould be convinced that he figned the letter only from complaifance.

The executive council rejected the advice given in this letter; and fubfequent events determined Dumourier to remain in Champaign, and make head againft the Duke of Brunswick. The fequel of this Hiftory fhews that the most important events often depend on the flighteft circumftance; that the character of a General may be expofed to ruin, and that the fate of a campaign may be decided, by the intelligence which he receives, or does not receive. Our author was appointed by Gen. Dillon to the command of a camp and pafs at Cote de Bienne, in the foreft of Argonne, within five or fix miles of St. Menehould. This pafs was of great importance; and, had the Duke taken poffeffion of it before the French arrived, he probably might have accomplished his object of driving them before him to the walls of Paris.

We must refer our readers to the original work for the particulars of the operations of this important campaign, and of the repulfe given by our author to the Heffians, who advanced

in

in two columns against his post at the pass already mentioned; the account of which he gives with as much modefty as precifion; lamenting, however, that neither Gen. Dillon nor Gen. Dumourier made any mention of his name, in ftating that event in their dispatches to government. Col. M. is of opinion that the Duke of Brunfwick intended, even after the junction of Kellerman and Dumourier, to, give the enemy battle inftead of retreating, for he began to throw up works, which could not be neceflary if he meaned to retreat. The Colonel therefore concluded that his defign was to hold the army of Kellerman in check, while he threw his whole force against Dumourier's right.' He thinks that the Duke, by amusing the latter with the idea of an alliance between France and Pruffia, which was thrown out after he began to feel the neceffity of retreating, completely over-reached him, and thus facilitated the efcape of the allied army. Some people have been aftonished at the inaction of the French main army for a confiderable time after the departure of the Pruffians; the Colonel thinks that this was owing to the apprehenfion of the French Generals that the Duke only wished to draw them into a leís advantageous pofition, and would then give them battle.

This, it feems, was not the only occafion on which the Duke had recourse to artifice for the purpose of extricating his troops from a perilous fituation. The reader will find, by confulting p. 140-145, that, after the French had fairly begun the purfuit, his Highnefs was indebted to artifice for the prefervation of 12,000 of his men, whom the French Generals might have eafily cut off.

⚫ General Valence arrived in the evening, and took the command of the army. We were here informed, that the enemy was encamped at Pillon, about five English miles from us; the route they had taken was through a deep clay, where they must have experienced every poffible difficulty, infomuch that General Dietman, who was ordered the next day to follow them, after having been all night fet faft, without having been able to proceed with his artillery, was obliged to return to the camp. By the information of the peasants, we took another route by Romane; but the avant guard, commanded by General Neuilly and General La Marche, followed the enemy in the direct route, and attacked their rear guard at Mangine, and prevented them from cutting the bridge down over the Artain, which they ought to have done many hours before, and which they had just begun to do, when our avant guard fired on them; this neglect might have occafioned the lofs of the whole of the rear guard of the Pruffians, if the French generals had not been duped, as will appear by the pofition the army of Valence and Kellerman occupied that night. Generals Neuilly and La Marche paffed the bridge at Mangine, and followed the enemy. As foon as they knew we were near enough to fupport them; they came up with the Pruffians again at

Pillon,

Pillon, and there began to cannonade the rear guard. General Manftein came forward with a trumpet, to inform La Marche and Neuilly, that an arrangement was made with General Valence and Kellerman, that the Pruffian troops fhould retire unmolefted out of France, and Longwy was to be given up. General La Marche told him, that he knew of no fuch agreement, and fhould not ceafe firing. General Manftein then defired to know, if he would allow time for the Duke of Brunswick to come forward, and confirm what he had afferted. To this La Marche affented; the Duke came and assured La Marche, that the arrangement was made, and that Longwy should be given up. General Valence arrived at this time, and the three generals, Valence, Neuilly, and La Marche, went back with the Duke of Brunswick, dined with him, and the capitulation for the furrender of Longwy was foon after figned: that place was to be delivered to the arms of the Republic, on the 22d of October.

There is fcarcely an inftance in the annals of military history, where two generals were fo completely impofed upon, as events fince manifeftly proved. Thefe generals fo deceived, or rather duped, declared the Pruffians no longer the enemies of France. The rear guard of the Pruffians, confifting of about 12,000 men, were in a deplorable fituation, as I have before obferved, from fickness, from the starved condition of their artillery horfes, and from the pofition in which we overtook them in the route from Pillon to Longwy; that is, through a wood and a deep clay, as bad as that through which we had attempted to follow them from the camp at Chamont. The army of Kellerman, confifting of 25,000 men, was at this time on their left flank about a league, and there was no impediment to Kellerman reaching Longwy that night, and entirely cutting off the retreat of the Duke of Brunfwick from Longwy.

• Valence's army was within fpeaking distance of their grand guard; in short, our army confifting at this time of about 18,000 men, were within cannon-fhot of the Duke of Brunfwick's headquarters. Carra and Sillery, two of the commiffaries from the National Convention, were with us, and affented to the arrangement made by General Valence, and Kellerman, and were probably the chief promoters of it. It is likely that the fanction they gave to this treaty, is the reafon why the Convention took fo little notice of it.

Carra flept in my room, and fupped with me that night. I had a tête-à-tête with him for two hours; I reprobated the measures taken; he faid, the general of the Republic had more at heart the advantage the country would derive from this arrangement, than their own glory; that they wished to gain the friendship of the Pruffians, and hoped by this lenity effectually to do fo; that there was nothing they wished for more, than an alliance with Pruffia, and to crush the house of Auftria. A chimerical fpeculation; but it is natural for people to believe what they moft defire.'

Omitting the particulars of the purfuit of the Pruffians, and of the campaign in Flanders, (in which, by the way, our author had opportunities of diftinguishing himself, and of receiving the applaufe of the troops under his command,) we