Psychology of the Moral SelfMacmillan and Company, limited, 1897 - 132 |
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abstract accompanied æsthetic altruism Apperception appercipient masses Aristotle Association Atomism attention become BERNARD BOSANQUET bodily body Brit character cognition conception connection consciousness constitutes course Crown 8vo definite desire discriminated distinction doctrine effect egoism element emotion Ency Ethics experience explain fact Genesis given groups Hedonism Hegel Herbert Spencer Human Mind idea ideal identical element identity ideomotor action individual instance interesting James JAMES MARK BALDWIN James's LECTURE Logic means mental event merely Moral Philosophy Münsterberg nature ness not-me object organised perception person Phaedo Philosophy Plato pleasure and pain point of view positive presentation Princeton College principle Professor psychical continuum Psychology pure Feeling purpose question realisation reality reasonable action recognise reflex action reflex movements regard relation seems self-consciousness sensation sense simply social soul speaking spiritual stimulus suggestion Text-book theory thing tion volition Ward whole
Popularne fragmenty
Strona 14 - ... in my opinion perfectly decisive, let him weigh the following reasoning, which is still closer and more immediate. It is evident that the identity which we attribute to the human mind, however perfect we may imagine it to be, is not able to run the several different perceptions into one, and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference, which are essential to them.
Strona 15 - As to the first question, we may observe that what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.
Strona 19 - Actions, sensations, and states of feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together or cohere in such a way that when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea.
Strona 75 - No object can catch our attention except by the neural machinery. But the amount of the attention which an object receives after it has caught our mental eye is another question. It often takes effort to keep the mind upon it. We feel that we can make more or less of the effort as we choose. If this feeling be not deceptive, if our effort be a spiritual force, and an indeterminate one, then of course it contributes coequally with the cerebral conditions to the result.
Strona 113 - That which constitutes the measure of morality seems to be the actual . . . surrender of the will to the greater will of the system to which we belong.
Strona 17 - Working backwards from this as we find it now, we are led alike by particular facts and general considerations to the conception of a totum objectivum or objective continuum which is gradually differentiated, thereby becoming what we call distinct presentations, just as with mental growth some particular presentation, clear as a whole, as Leibnitz would say, becomes a complex of distinguishable parts. Of the very beginning of this continuum we can say nothing: absolute beginnings are beyond the pale...