stances exhibit shades of difference? Yet there are cases in which, at the risk of producing particular inconvenience, the general welfare requires that this uniformity should be preserved; which can only be done by directing that, whatever may be the opinion of the judge, his decree shall be rendered in conformity with the directions of the statute, whenever the evidence it, for public purposes, considers as conclusive, shall be produced. Without multiplying examples, that of the authentic act may sufficiently illustrate what has been said on this subject. The authentic act, as we have seen, is conclusive evidence of the truth of all that is certified by it to have been done in the presence of the public officer, before whom it has been passed. Different judges, from different views of the subject, might not receive an equal conviction of the truth of what is declared by it. To such it would not be conclusive evidence. There would, then, be no uniformity of decision on the validity of such instruments; but public convenience and utility require, that the holder of such an act should rely upon the faith of the officer's certificate; therefore, the law wisely declares, that it shall be conclusive testimony, although, in some instances, carelessness or ignorance may have consented to its execution, when it did not contain the stipulations that were intended. In this, however, as in all other cases where evidence is declared to be conclusive, provision is made for annulling the act whenever fraud, error or force has intervened. So the record of a judgment is conclusive evidence that the party in whose favour it was rendered, was entitled to the relief which it purports to give. Yet the judgment, in some particular case, may have been unjust, and the judge, before whom it is produced as evidence, may be convinced that it was so. But the individual interest, in this case, must be sacrificed to the stability of the general rule, it being more expedient that one unjust judgment should be carried into execution, than that all judgments should be open to contestation, whenever they were produced as evidence of the claims which they have sanctioned.

This code only refers for illustration to some enactments belonging to the Civil Code and other general laws, by which certain evidence is declared conclusive. It does not detail them, but it enforces their provisions; shows that the objects they are intended to attain are to diminish litigation and lessen the temptations to perjury; and divides. them into positive enactments for the purposes just mentioned, and those which are declaratory of the usual course of nature. Examples of the first are offered in the authority given to judgments, to authentic acts, and to judicial confessions; and of the last, in the provision of our existing law, that the birth of a child, more than three hundred days after the death of the husband, is conclusive proof that the child is not his.

In the enumeration of evidence, declared to be conclusive, the item of judicial decrees is the most important, both for the frequency of its occurrence, and the difficult questions to which it gives rise. A whole chapter is devoted to this subject. It contains few provisions entirely new; but, it is believed, that the several sections, directing what judgments are valid as res judicatæ-which cannot have that effect, and against whom they may be given in evidence, will obviate many of the difficulties that have hitherto attended this subject; and that, if adopted, a ready solution will be found to most of the questions to which it has given rise.

Another species of evidence which, under certain circumstances, is conclusive, arises from the confession of the party. Confession, in relation to the manner in which it is made, is either judicial or extra-judicial. The former, being that which is made in some writing forming a part of the judicial proceedings in a cause; or when it is made before a person authorized by law to receive the same, and reduced to writing in the manner prescribed by law. The latter, are confessions made in any other manner.

In relation to the matter, confessions are either full, or partial only. Full confession, is that which acknowledges the fact alleged with all its material circumstances, so as to leave nothing to be supplied by other evidence. Partial confession, is that which acknowledges some circumstance from which an inference may be drawn, so as to make it presumptive evidence.

In civil cases, where every proceeding made by the parties is in writing, and after full deliberation, a judicial confession is declared to be conclusive evidence, if not recalled, and after a reasonable term for deliberation shown to the satisfaction of the judge to be erroneous; but restrictions are added, to prevent vexation by making and capriciously retracting confessions.

In criminal cases, however, no confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, is conclusive testimony of guilt. The reason of this difference is evident. Insanity, promises, fear, hope of liberty or pardon, may produce a confession contrary to the fact; and therefore, although the confession is strong evidence, it is always open to be rebutted by any other that would lessen its force.

Even the answer of "guilty" to the arraignment is not a sufficient ground for passing sentence, until the necessary inquiries as to the sanity of mind in the prisoner and the existence of the other causes, have been made. When we reflect on the numerous instances in which men have confessed themselves guilty, not only of crimes which they had not committed, but which were impossible to be committed by any one, the necessity of these precautions will be admitted. The inexplicable state of mind which produced, in so many instances, confessions of sorcery and witchcraft, may take place in other cases, although those delusions are over.

By the declaration, that no evidence should be deemed conclusive but that which is declared to be such by law, that which operates as such by our present law under the title of estoppel, is of course abolished; but for greater certainty, that effect is declared by a special provision.

A concluding article contains the necessary notice, that nothing in the code chall be construed so as to dispense with the proof required by the Civil Code or other statutes, to give effect to certain contracts or testamentary dispositions, or to enforce the registry or recording of acts, or prove legitimacy, filiation or civil condition. A detail of the evidence, required in these and similar cases, did not form a part of this code, because they could not have been inserted without repeating the provisions of the laws of which they form a part, which would have intermixed two distinct branches of legislation, required by the policy of our law to be kept separate.

Before I close the report, it may be necessary to account for an omission in the work that of not designating the evidence required or permitted in each separate species of civil action and criminal procedure.

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It is easy, however, to show that this would have been unnecessary and injurious to the simplicity of the plan that has been adopted.

By our excellent system of civil law, a plaintiff can succeed only by stating such facts as entitle him to relief according to law; and by proving those facts. In these two operations he must be directed by two different codes. The Civil Code informs him what circumstances give him the right to recover; and it is the province of the Code of Evidence to direct in what manner the proof shall be made; not of the facts in that suit only, but of all facts in any action. To direct what facts are necessary to be proved, in order to be restored to a possession which is wrongfully withheld, to enforce the payment of a debt, or obtain damages for a wrong-could only be done by repeating the substance of the Civil Code, and would, therefore, be misplaced in the law of evidence, which ought to contain only general rules, applicable to the different species of evidence, not to particular actions in which that evidence may become proper or necessary. It is the same as regards the defence: the Civil Code directs what circumstances will justify an act that would otherwise be wrongful: and the Code of Evidence tells us, by the application of its general rules, how those circumstances are to be proved. So in criminal prosecutions; the acts or omissions which constitute an offence, are designated in the Code of Crimes and Punishment, and consequently we need no other guide to discover what is necessary to be proved in any particular prosecution. Why, then, should it be repeated in the Code of Evidence?

A contradictory practice on this point, together with the necessity of arranging and weighing the authority of the contradictory or explanatory decisions, in every controverted case, has rendered the English law of evidence so extremely voluminous and contributed to increase its uncertainty.

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INTRODUCTORY REPORT

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THE CODE OF REFORM AND PRISON DISCIPLINE.

IN offering to the legislature a system of penal law, the principal sanction of which is imprisonment, it is scarcely necessary to remark, that its whole efficacy must depend on the manner in which confinement is to be inflicted as a punishment, or used as a means of detention; in other words, on the wisdom of the Code of Prison Discipline. In preparing the plan now submitted, I kept in view, as the great objects to be attained-restraint, example and reformation. To discover what species of seclusion would best produce these ends, rigidly to direct every privation necessary to attain them, but to inflict no evil greater than was required to produce these consequences, would seem at first view a comparatively easy task; but the selection of proper means, and the details required for their application, presented difficulties in the execution only to be overcome by the closest attention to facts, and the most cautious calculation of consequences. A statement of these facts, and an exposition of the consequences drawn from them, will enable the House better to understand and decide on the plan which I have the honour to propose.

At a time when the penal law of Great Britain, still liable to the reproach of unnecessary severity in its enactments, and barbarity in its executions, had received none of those improvements which the true principles of jurisprudence have since produced, the benevolent heart and enlightened mind of the legislator of Pennsylvania, suggested the substitution of solitary imprisonment and labour for the punishment of death. The beneficial effects of this change were felt until they were counteracted by the intolerant and sanguinary system of the common law of England, enforced by the paramount authority of the mother country. But no sooner did independence confer the power of consulting the public good, than the people of Pennsylvania made the reformation of the penal code a constitutional obligation on their representatives; and, amidst the confusion produced by foreign invasion and civil discord in the Revolutionary war, a society worthy of the city of "brotherly love" was formed for the relief of distressed prisoners. With persevering benevolence, they not only relieved the victims of the inhuman system that then prevailed, but, by unceasing appeals to true principles, induced the legislature of that state to begin the great reform. In all but two or three cases, the punishment of death was