§. 46. Of utility as an element of associated beauty. Another element of associated beauty is the perception of utility. Some writers, among others Mr. Hume, have imagined, that they were able to discover the origin or foundation of all emotions of beauty in this perception; understanding, by the term utility, a fitness or adaptation of the beautiful object, to some beneficial purpose. And it is undoubtedly true, that we contemplate this quality, whenever we discern it, with a degree of complacency and approbation. Many objects, when their use or adaptation to some beneficial purpose has become known to us, have at once been clothed with an interest, which they did not before possess. We do not hesitate, therefore, to admit that a share of our emotions of associated beauty may be traced to this source. But when the perception of utility, (that is to say, of the fitness of the object for some profitable ends,) is proposed, as the ground and origin of all emotions of beauty, including those that are original as well as those that are associated, the doctrine evidently cannot be sustained.

Mr. Burke, in his Treatise on the Sublime and Beautiful, has paid some attention to this doctrine. He rejects it altogether, considered as the universal basis of beauty. If it be admitted to be true, he considers it a fair inference from it, that the wedge-like snout of the swine, with its tough cartilage at the end, and the general make of its head, so well adapted to digging and rooting, are extremely beautiful; and that hedge-hogs and porcupines, which are so admirably secured against all assaults by their prickly hides, can justly be considered creatures of no small elegance.

On the theory, therefore, which proposes the perception of utility, as the true ground of all emotions of beauty, both associated and original, it is enough for us to say, that it goes too far. It does, indeed, in connection with the laws of association, suggest a happy explanation of many such emotions, coming under the class of associated; but, by no means, of all even of these.

§. 47. Of proportion as an element of associated beauty.

There are some, who imagine, they find the source of beauty, in a certain symmetry and determinate proportion of

parts. This idea has been particularly advocated by artists, who seem to have supposed, that the elements of beauty might not only be discovered, but even measured in the great models of architecture, statuary, and painting. They assign perhaps to the height of a column the measurement of six or seven of its own diameters, and designate to an inch the length and breadth, which constitute the beautiful in other cases. Mr. Burke has examined this opinion also; directing his inquiries to vegetables, the inferior animals, and man. He has shown, that, in all cases, there are no certain measures, on which the beautiful can justly be said to depend.

For instance, in the vegetable creation we find nothing more beautiful than flowers, but there is a very great variety in their shape, and in the disposition of their parts, which pertain to them. In the rose, the stalk is slender but the flower is large. The flower or blossom of the apple, on the other hand, is very small, but the tree large. Now if one of these be in proportion, the other wants it; and yet, by general consent, both the rose and the apple blossom possess beauty; and the bush of the one, and the tree of the other allowedly present a very engaging appearance.If again we inquire in respect to man, and in respect to the inferior animal creation, we are brought to the same result, viz. that beauty does not depend upon a fixed relative size of the parts, that is, upon proportion.

It is proper to remark, however, that the word proportion is sometimes used, not to signify something, which is definite, fixed, and invariable, but as synonymous with a fitness or propriety, which is gathered up from the general relations and aspects of the object, and is represented by a state of the mind itself. This subject we have already briefly considered. And we readily admit, wherever there is a distinct suggestion of such an idea of fitness, there is also an additional sentiment of the beautiful; and wherever there is a perception of unfitness or want of propriety there is a diminution of it.

"The sense of propriety, (says Kaimes in some remarks on Gardening and Architecture,) dictates the following rule, That every building ought to have an expression correspon

ding to its destination. A palace ought to be sumptuous and grand; a private dwelling, neat and modest; a play-house, gay and splendid; and a monument, gloomy, and melancholy." And it is entirely obvious, whenever this sense of propriety is violated, whether in these cases or in others like them, we fail to experience that pleasure, or to regard the object with that degree of complacency, which we otherwise should.

§. 48. Relation of emotions of beauty to the fine arts.

The remarks of the last section lead us further to observe, that the study of this part of our constitution is exceedingly important in its applications to the fine arts. As a general statement, the true measurement of beauty in outward objects is the amount of pleasure or satisfaction, which is caused within ourselves. The fine arts are outward representations, addressed in the first instance to the senses of sight and hearing in particular, and through them to that susceptibility of the beautiful, which exists in the interior of the soul; and we can judge of their excellence, only by their effects in relation to that susceptibility. How great ignorance, therefore, must we discover in all inquiries, where the fine arts are concerned, if we are not thoroughly acquainted with this part of our sentient nature!

Perhaps these remarks should be accompanied with a precautionary suggestion. The observation we wish to make is this. We are not at liberty, as a general thing, to pass a positive judgment on works of art, founded on our own emotions merely, and wholly exclusive of any consideration of the feelings of others. Some accidental circumstance, or some casual association of a more permanent kind may either unduly increase or diminish the precise effects, which would otherwise have been produced; and we shall not be likely to be sensible of this perversion of feeling, if we rely on ourselves alone. Although, therefore, it is important, that we should correct our own judgments, by comparing them with the emotions and judgments of others, it will still remain true, that the great grounds of decision, in all cases of beauty or deformity in the works of art, will be found in ourselves.

§. 49. Differences of original susceptibility of this emotion. Supposing it to be true, that we possess an original sus

ceptibility of emotions of beauty, independently of what we derive from association, it seems however, to be the fact, that this susceptibility is found existing in different degrees in different persons. Let the same beautiful object be presented to two persons, and one will be found to be not only affected, but ravished, as it were, with feelings of beauty; while the other will have the same kind of emotions, but in a very diminished degree.A great degree of susceptibility of emotions of beauty, with a somewhat restricted import of the word, is usually termed SENSIBILITY.

The differences of men in this respect may justly be thought, where we cannot account for it by any thing in their education or mental culture, to be constitutional. Nor is it more strange, that men should be differently affected by the same beautiful objects, in consequence of some difference of constitution, than that they should constitutionally have different passions; that one should be choleric, another of a peaceable turn; that one should be mild and yielding, another inflexible.

§. 50. Objection to the doctrine of original beauty.

We stop here to notice one of the objections, which may occur, to the views, which have been given on the subject of beauty. Supposing, as we do, that the mind has originally certain tendencies to emotions of beauty, we readily admit the power of various circumstances in modifying, and in some cases, of overcoming such original tendencies. Nor, in point of fact, can it be denied, that the character of our feelings of beauty sometimes changes; that is, what is regarded by us, as beautiful at one time, is not at another; what is beautiful in the eyes of one age or of one nation, sometimes loses its lustre in the view of another. The objection is, that such changes of feeling in regard to the beautiful are inconsistent with an original susceptibility of such emotions.

(1) In answer to this difficulty, we would suggest, in the first place, that we experience analogous variations in other parts of the mind.Take, for instance, the susceptibility of Belief; that power by which we are led to regard any thing as true or false. It will surely be admitted, that there is in the mind an original tendency to assent to certain proposi

tions, rather than others of an opposite kind. It cannot be supposed, that the characteristic of mind, which leads us to regard one thing as true, and another as false, is something, which is wholly superinduced, the result merely of accidental circumstances. But that, which is felt by us to be true to-day, may be felt by us to be false to-morrow; because we have then new facts before the mind, and new sources of evidence are disclosed.

(2) It is also well known, that our estimates of subjects in a moral point of view, frequently alter. Those objects, which appeared just and worthy in youth, have sometimes a different appearance in manhood, and again have a different aspect in old age. This is not because the mind, particularly the moral susceptibility, in its intrinsic nature, alters; but because objects are seen by us under different lights. Changes of opinion, similar to what may be noticed in individuals, may also be clearly noticed in the moral and religious history of different ages and nations.

(3) Again, we find the same tendency to frequent fluctuations in the feelings of cheerfulness and melancholy, of mere pleasure and pain, of desire and aversion, as well as of beauty, and grandeur, and sublimity. The reason is, we take different views of objects. And this is much the same as to say, that truly different objects are presented to the mind from what we had contemplated before; which is a cause amply sufficient for the changes we sometimes notice in these feelings.

It is the same in regard to the objects, addressed to the susceptibility under consideration. To-day we regard some work of art as beautiful; and if we find that it appears different to us to-morrow, it is because we have discovered in it some new touches, some new relations, which escaped our notice before, and which justly have the effect to diminish our estimate of the merit of the whole work. These considerations go no little ways in explaining the changes that sometimes take place, so far as intrinsic or original beauty is concerned. But we are to recollect, furthermore, that a considerable portion of beauty is confessedly built upon association; and for this portion no one ever claimed an absolute permanency or uniformity.