It certainly, so far as we c the mere enactment

ist or not exist at plies something upon his mere

without incur for his exal

make six.

whether

equal

there

out

be

ere is a moral obligatable. Here, undoubtedposite system, which makes mere enactment or volition, the may cease, whenever he wills it his law, his moral excellencies may

ther, and the Being, whom we worship

and holy, may become a Spirit of un

mitigated evil.

in various parts of the Scriptures.

51 'the proofs of this doctrine from the appeals which are made

Finally, if we rightly understand the Revelation,

God in his great goodness has made to the children of principles of rectitude are eternal and immutable, but that men. He has himself taken the ground, not only that the He himself, with all his transcendent excellencies, is amenable, and desires to be considered as amenable to them. He

speaks

of his throne not only as established, but as established in righteousness. He speaks of himself not merely as the Creator, not merely as a God of wisdom and power, but as a just, a holy, a righteous God. And these expressions are employed so frequently, and in such connections, as to place it beyond all doubt, that they have a distinct and substantive meaning, and are not identical in their import with expressions, which intimate his ascendency, power, or greatness. And not only this, he seems to have authorized the whole universe of moral and intelligent beings, (the human race in particular among others,) to act as arbiters and judges in the case, whether his character and conduct are not in all respects in perfect accordance with the requisitions of that fixed and immutable rectitude, which exists interwoven and imbedded in the very nature and constitution of things. He does not in moral things impose mere arbitrary commands, but only such commands as he can support by an appeal to their own moral judgments. And such appeals are actually made in a number of instances, as in the following passages. "Oh, my people, what have I done unto thee? And wherein have I wearied thee? testify against me!" "Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord." And again he says in a tone

And again he says,

y and rebuke. "Yet ye say, the way of the Lord Hear now, oh house of Israel, is not my way are not your ways unequal ?" He then goes on to e great principles of his moral government, in their cation to the wicked and the righteous, and appeals to em as judges, whether he is not just. "And now, O inhabitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard. What could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes ?" And in another passage, "Thus saith the Lord, what iniquity have your fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me, and have walked after vanity, and are become vain ?"*

From these among other passages of Scripture it appears, that God does not require his rational offspring to approve his enactments on the ground solely of their proceeding from himself, but is willing that they should exercise their own powers of examination, and judge for themselves whether they are right or not. But this implies that justice on the one hand, and command or law on the other, are different; and that, whenever the law is just, it is not so merely because it is commanded, but for other reasons. And we may here with propriety inquire, whether there is not much satisfaction in the thought, that the foundations of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, are thus deeply and immutably laid? If it were true, that God himself could overthrow or demolish them, would it not be a source and occasion of great perplexity and dismay? For such a supposition would necessarily involve the possibility of an utter change in his own character. If, in our contemplations of the Supreme Being, it should occur to us as a thing merely possible, that those high perfections, which we now reverence and adore, could be transmuted into vices, it would certainly diminish our reverence, disturb our confidence, and fill us with unspeakable alarm. But this certainly is possible, if the distinction of right and wrong is not fixed and immutable, but depends wholly on the Divine Will.

Ezekiel 18: 29. Micah 6: 8. Isaiah 1: 18. 5: 3, 4. Jeremiah 2: 5.

an incident to this right and wrong, there is a moral obligation, a duty, which is firm and immutable. Here, undoubtedly, is firm footing; but on the opposite system, which makes right and wrong depend on a mere enactment or volition, the obligation to keep his word may cease, whenever he wills it to be so; and his word, his law, his moral excellencies may all suddenly sink together, and the Being, whom we worship as perfectly spotless and holy, may become a Spirit of unmixed and unmitigated evil.

§. 295. Of the proofs of this doctrine from the appeals which are made in various parts of the Scriptures.

(VIII.) Finally, if we rightly understand the Revelation, which God in his great goodness has made to the children of men, He has himself taken the ground, not only that the principles of rectitude are eternal and immutable, but that He himself, with all his transcendent excellencies, is amenable, and desires to be considered as amenable to them. He speaks of his throne not only as established, but as established in righteousness. He speaks of himself not merely as the Creator, not merely as a God of wisdom and power, but as a just, a holy, a righteous God. And these expressions are employed so frequently, and in such connections, as to place it beyond all doubt, that they have a distinct and substantive meaning, and are not identical in their import with expressions, which intimate his ascendency, power, or greatness. And not only this, he seems to have authorized the whole universe of moral and intelligent beings, (the human race in particular among others,) to act as arbiters and judges in the case, whether his character and conduct are not in all respects in perfect accordance with the requisitions of that fixed and immutable rectitude, which exists interwoven and imbedded in the very nature and constitution of things. He does not in moral things impose mere arbitrary commands, but only such commands as he can support by an appeal to their own moral judgments. And such appeals are actually made in a number of instances, as in the following passages. "Oh, my people, what have I done unto thee? And wherein have I wearied thee? testify against me!" "Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord." And again he says in a tone

of authority and rebuke. "Yet ye say, the way of the Lord is not equal. Hear now, oh house of Israel, is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal ?" He then goes on to state the great principles of his moral government, in their application to the wicked and the righteous, and appeals to them as judges, whether he is not just. And again he says, "And now, O inhabitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard. What could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?" And in another passage, "Thus saith the Lord, what iniquity have your fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me, and have walked after vanity, and are become vain ?"*

From these among other passages of Scripture it appears, that God does not require his rational offspring to approve his enactments on the ground solely of their proceeding from himself, but is willing that they should exercise their own powers of examination, and judge for themselves whether they are right or not. But this implies that justice on the one hand, and command or law on the other, are different; and that, whenever the law is just, it is not so merely because it is commanded, but for other reasons. And we may here with propriety inquire, whether there is not much satisfaction in the thought, that the foundations of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, are thus deeply and immutably laid? If it were true, that God himself could overthrow or demolish them, would it not be a source and occasion of great perplexity and dismay? For such a supposition would necessarily involve the possibility of an utter change in his own character. If, in our contemplations of the Supreme Being, it should occur to us as a thing merely possible, that those high perfections, which we now reverence and adore, could be transmuted into vices, it would certainly diminish our reverence, disturb our confidence, and fill us with unspeakable alarm. But this certainly is possible, if the distinction of right and wrong is not fixed and immutable, but depends wholly on the Divine Will.

Ezekiel 18: 29. Micah 6 8. Isaiah 1: 18. 5: 3, 4. Jeremiah 2: 5.

§. 296. Remarks in conclusion of what has been said on this subject. Such are some of the considerations, which are commended to the attention of the reader. There are others, which we shall not particularly notice. For instance, the doctrine that right and wrong depends wholly upon law or enactment, even that of the Supreme being, implies of course a knowledge of that Being. And yet there can be no doubt of the fact of our being so constituted, that tribes of men, who are destitute of any correct knowledge of the Supreme Being, and also atheists, who deny and disbelieve in his existence, are capable of forming the notions of right and wrong, of believing in a standard of right and wrong, and of conforming their ordinary conduct to that standard, much in the same way and degree as the great mass of mankind. But we do not consider it necessary to remark further; evidence more than enough has already multiplied upon us.

In view of what has been said we leave the subject in the hand of the reader with this single practical remark, That uprightness or virtue is an object to be contemplated in itself, and to be loved and practised for its own sake.-It is to be loved and honored and practised, not simply because it is commanded, not simply because it may in its results be beneficial, but solely for itself, and out of a regard to its own exalted nature. This is a great practical truth, and one which strikes at the root of certain systems of moral philosophy, that have too long had an influence in the halls of education. There can be no question, that it has a very injurious effect to teach youth, that a certain thing is virtuous or vicious, right or wrong, merely because it is commanded, or because it is beneficial. It is pernicious, because it lowers the standard of moral excellence; and it is as false, as it is pernicious. Virtue is not secondary to something else, but is primary; it has an entity and a character of its own; of all the objects in the universe it is highest in rank; it is the great illuminating point of mind as the sun is the illuminating centre of matter. And youth, instead of being permitted to gaze upon the IGNIS FATUUS of expediency or any other false fire of earth, should be taught to fix their eye upon that great and heavenly light, to contemplate it, to honor it, to love it. They should be so imbued with the love of virtue, as to inquire as it were by a sort of instinct, not whether