moral judgments, which have been adduced in opposition to the doctrine of conscience. When among other things it is said, that the conscience of the heathen decides, on many points of a moral and religious nature, differently from that of a Christian people, it must be recollected, that the latter, through the medium of the Scriptures, have a vast amount of moral and religious knowledge, which the heathen have not. The objector to the doctrine of an original moral nature alledges, for instance, in support of his views, that the inhabitants of some countries, as is alledged to be the case in some parts of India, worship the sun; and that they appear to be conscientious in it; while the inhabitants of other countries, particularly those where the Christian religion prevails, condemn such worship as morally wrong. But if the worshippers of the sun, in the destitution of those sources of information which other nations possess, are fully convinced, that the orb of day is not only the source of light, as it obviously is, but the source of being also; that it not only has in itself the principle of vivification, but is also the quickening and vivifying spirit to all things that exist, it is no evidence against the existence of a Moral Nature, that they stand, in the view of their own conscience, morally approved in the matter of the worship which they render. The result, so far as the action of the conscience is concerned, is what might reasonably be expected. The difficulty is not in the operations of the conscience; but in the antecedent operations of the intellect, which, either from a want of facts or a false application of facts, have ascribed the attributes of Deity to a mere mass of matter. If the people referred to possessed the same amount of knowledge in relation to moral and religious subjects, which Christian nations generally possess, the probability certainly is, that there would be no diversity in their moral judgments. It will be noticed, we do not say, that the worshippers of the sun are to be regarded as guiltless in the course which they take. What we assert here has reference merely to the matter under consideration; and merely goes to show, that the conscience, in deciding in accordance with the facts before it, conforms to the principles of its own nature, and that the seat or ground of the error, whatever the amount of that error may be, lays somewhere else, than in the action of the moral sensibilities. §. 268. Of diversities in moral judgment in connection with differences in civil and political institutions. We may reasonably expect, in the third place, to find diversities, and occasional oppositions of moral judgment, in connection with differences of civil and political institutions. This statement might be illustrated by numerous instances from history. The objectors to a moral nature maintain, that theft or the unlawfully taking of the property of another is a crime; and that conscience, if it exists as a part of the mental constitution, will not fail to condemn it universally. And in connection with this, they bring forward the fact, that in some countries theft, instead of being condemned as it should be, prevails very much, and is scarcely regarded as a crime. They state, among other things that are brought forward in support of their views, that theft was not only permitted, but approved and rewarded by the laws of Sparta. The fact, that we may reasonably expect to find diversities of moral judgment in connection with differences of civil and political institutions, throws light upon the case last mentioned. The Spartans, it is well known, were trained up by their political institutions to regard property as of little value; their lands were equally divided; they ate at public tables; and the great end of all their civil regulations was to render the citizens athletic, active, patient, and brave. Every thing else was considered subordinate. The permission, which was given to the Spartan lads to steal, was a part of the public regulations. It was a sort of tax, which the citizens voluntarily imposed upon themselves, in order to encourage vigilance, endurance, and address in the younger part of the community; and hence, when they were detected immediately after the theft, they were severely punished for deficiency of skill. Accordingly the theft, which was permitted and approved by the Spartans, was a very different thing from what goes under that name with us. The mere act may have been the same, but there was no correspondence in the results and attendant circumstances, and in the degree of evil intention. Similar inquiries in moral judgments, which have been adduced in opposition to the doctrine of conscience. When among other things it is said, that the conscience of the heathen decides, on many points of a moral and religious nature, differently from that of a Christian people, it must be recollected, that the latter, through the medium of the Scriptures, have a vast amount of moral and religious knowledge, which the heathen have not. The objector to the doctrine of an original moral nature alledges, for instance, in support of his views, that the inhabitants of some countries, as is alledged to be the case in some parts of India, worship the sun; and that they appear to be conscientious in it; while the inhabitants of other countries, particularly those where the Christian religion prevails, condemn such worship as morally wrong. But if the worshippers of the sun, in the destitution of those sources of information which other nations possess, are fully convinced, that the orb of day is not only the source of light, as it obviously is, but the source of being also; that it not only has in itself the principle of vivification, but is also the quickening and vivifying spirit to all things that exist, it is no evidence against the existence of a Moral Nature, that they stand, in the view of their own conscience, morally approved in the matter of the worship which they render. The result, so far as the action of the conscience is concerned, is what might reasonably be expected. The difficulty is not in the operations of the conscience; but in the antecedent operations of the intellect, which, either from a want of facts or a false application of facts, have ascribed the attributes of Deity to a mere mass of matter. If the people referred to possessed the same amount of knowledge in relation to moral and religious subjects, which Christian nations generally possess, the probability certainly is, that there would be no diversity in their moral judgments. It will be noticed, we do not say, that the worshippers of the sun are to be regard`ed as guiltless in the course which they take. What we assert here has reference merely to the matter under consideration; and merely goes to show, that the conscience, in deciding in accordance with the facts before it, conforms to the principles of its own nature, and that the seat or ground of the error, whatever the amount of that error may be, lays somewhere else, than in the action of the moral sensibilities. §. 268. Of diversities in moral judgment in connection with differences in civil and political institutions. We may reasonably expect, in the third place, to find diversities, and occasional oppositions of moral judgment, in connection with differences of civil and political institutions. -This statement might be illustrated by numerous instances from history. The objectors to a moral nature maintain, that theft or the unlawfully taking of the property of another is a crime; and that conscience, if it exists as a part of the mental constitution, will not fail to condemn it universally. And in connection with this, they bring forward the fact, that in some countries theft, instead of being condemned as it should be, prevails very much, and is scarcely regarded as a crime. They state, among other things that are brought forward in support of their views, that theft was not only permitted, but approved and rewarded by the laws of Sparta. The fact, that we may reasonably expect to find diversities of moral judgment in connection with differences of civil and political institutions, throws light upon the case last mentioned. The Spartans, it is well known, were trained up by their political institutions to regard property as of little value; their lands were equally divided; they ate at public tables; and the great end of all their civil regulations was to render the citizens athletic, active, patient, and brave. Every thing else was considered subordinate. The permission, which was given to the Spartan lads to steal, was a part of the public regulations. It was a sort of tax, which the citizens voluntarily imposed upon themselves, in order to encourage vigilance, endurance, and address in the younger part of the community; and hence, when they were detected immediately after the theft, they were severely punished for deficiency of skill. Accordingly the theft, which was permitted and approved by the Spartans, was a very different thing from what goes under that name with us. The mere act may have been the same, but there was no correspondence in the results and attendant circumstances, and in the degree of evil intention.Similar inquiries in other instances will go far in explaining many apparent deviations from the permanent distinctions between vice and virtue, and will reduce the number of cases of supposed want of uniformity in moral sentiments. §. 269. Additional illustration of the same view of the subject. Under this head we may properly notice, in particular, the statement made by travellers, that some Savage tribes are very much given to theft. Captain Cook informs us, that, when he visited the Sandwich Islands in 1778, the inhabitants exhibited a thievish disposition, taking every thing which came within their reach. In explanation of this statement, it is to be remarked first, that the idea of theft involves the idea of property; and that the right of property is more or less strict and absolute in different countries, and under different political systems. In consequence of the richness of their soil and the favorable nature of their climate, there is no question, that the right of property was held by the Sandwich Islanders to be less strict and exclusive, than it is found to be in less productive countries. The familiar distinction of MEUM and TUUM, of our own and another's, was not so clearly drawn, and so strenuously adhered to, as it generally is in civilized nations; and the probability is, that nearly all the various forms of property were held in common. As the right of property was in their estimation less strict, the violation of it was less criminal; and they did not look upon the offender with that decided disapprobation, which in other places would attach to him, in taking the same articles. They probably regarded him with nearly the same feelings, with which we regard a man, who, in passing through an orchard that belongs to us, takes a few apples; or who occasionally draws water from our well. He takes our property, it is true; but as the right of property in those cases is held, by common consent, to be a loose or mitigated one, we do not call it theft, nor regard it as criminal. And further, in looking at Captain Cook's account a little more minutely, we see evidence in the narration itself of the correctness of this view. "At first, (he says,) on entering the ship, they endeavored to steal every thing they came near, or rather to take it openly, as what we either should not resent, |