CHAPTER THIRD.

RELATION OF REASONING TO THE MORAL NATURE.

§. 230. Of the doctrine which confounds reasoning and conscience.

WE are now prepared in view of what has been said in the last Chapter, particularly in connection with the subject of the grounds or principles on which changes take place in moral emotions, to proceed to another subject not more interesting than it is practically important. The opinion has sometimes been advanced, that those moral decisions or judgments, which as moral beings we are capable of forming, are the direct results of REASONING. The advocates of this doctrine, rejecting the idea of a distinct moral principle or conscience, appear to regard the reasoning power as entirely adequate to the causation of all those results in the mind, which have a moral aspect. In a word they may be regarded, either as denying entirely the existence of conscience, or what is philosophically if not practically the same thing, as identifying it with mere ratiocination.

It is not surprising on the whole, that this mistake, which is certainly a very serious and prejudicial one, should have been committed, when we consider, how close the relation is, which reason sustains to conscience. It will be noticed, that we speak without any hesitation of the doctrine referred to, as a mistaken one. We do not suppose it to be necessary, after what has already been said, to attempt to show, that reasoning and conscience are not identical, and that the moral nature has a distinct and substantive existence. Nevertheless we freely admit the intimate and important relation, which they sustain to each other. A relation so important in a practical, as well as in a philosophical point of view,

that we shall delay here for the purpose of entering into some explanations of it.

§. 231. Of the close connection between conscience and reasoning.

Reasoning, it will be recollected, is purely an intellectual process; consisting of successive propositions arranged together, and a succession of relative suggestions or perceptions; but, in itself considered, involving nothing, which is properly called an emotion or desire. This single circumstance separates the reasoning power entirely from the moral nature; which, in its appropriate action, never originates, like the reasoning power, perceptions or new intellectual views, but merely moral emotions and feelings of moral obligation. Probably every one can say with confidence, that he is conscious of a difference in the moral emotions of approval and disapproval, and the mere intellectual perceptions of agreement and disagreement, which are characteristic of reasoning. In the view of consciousness, there can be no doubt, that they are regarded as entirely diverse in their nature, and as utterly incapable of being interchanged or identified with each other. The moral feeling is one thing; and the intellectual perception or suggestion, involved both in the process and the result of reasoning, is another.

Although the reasoning power and the conscience or moral being are thus distinct from each other in their nature, they are closely connected in their relations, as has been intimated already; inasmuch as the intellect, particularly the ratiocinative or deductive part of it, is the foundation or basis of moral action. We must first know a thing; it must first be an object of perception, before we can take any moral cognizance of it. And this is not all. The moral cognizance, as we have already had occasion to explain, will conform itself with great precision to the intellectual cognizance. That is to say, it will take new ground in its decisions, in conformity with new facts perceived. Consequently we cannot rely perfectly on a moral decision, which is founded upon a premature or imperfect knowledge. The more carefully and judiciously we reason upon a subject, the more thoroughly we understand it in itself and its relations, the more confidently may we receive the estimate, which the voice of conscience makes of its moral character.

§. 232. Illustration of the preceding section.

The views of the preceding section may be easily illustra ted. When, for instance, one man is alledged to have stolen the property of another, we find the conscience, as a general thing, ready to discharge the duty, which the Author of our nature has assigned to it; but it is sometimes the case, that its decisions are arrested and postponed, in order to give time for the inquiries and conclusions of the reasoning power. Such inquiries inform us perhaps, that the theft was long and coolly premeditated; and was committed, not only without any special temptation to it, but with a full knowledge of the aggravation of the crime. In view of this state of things, conscience immediately passes its decision. Perhaps our inquiries inform us, that the theft was committed at a time of extreme want and consequent great temptation; and furthermore, was committed upon a species of property in respect to which the right of individual possession is regarded by common consent as less strict and exclusive than in other cases. The conscience here, as in the former instance, condemns the criminal; but probably with a mitigated sentence. On further inquiry we learn, that although the property was taken, and that too, much to the damage of the owner, it was taken wholly by mistake; it was a thing entirely accidental. In this case, conscience, adapting itself to the newly discovered circumstances, pronounces the supposed thief altogether guiltless.

The conscience, therefore, however distinct the two may be in themselves, is aided and supported by the various powers of perception and comparison, particularly by the reason. The reasoning power, however high the rank which we justly ascribe to it, sustains, in this case at least, a subordinate position; and is to be regarded, as the servitor and handmaid of the moral power. And, moreover, the latter will vary in exact accordance, if there are no collateral disturbing influences, with the new facts and the new relations, which are from time to time presented by the former.It is in consequence of this close connection and the important assistance rendered to conscience by reason, that they have sometimes been confounded together. But it is very essential to right views of the mind, that this erroneous notion

should be corrected, and that the precise relation, existing between these two distinct parts of our mental nature, should be fully understood.

§. 233. Further illustrations of the same subject.

We may perhaps further illustrate the subject of the connection existing between the perceptive nature, particularly the reasoning power, and the moral nature, by the interesting case of Caius Toranius, which Dr. Paley, in a translation from Valerius Maximus, has introduced in his Moral Philosophy, in nearly the following terms.-The father of Caius Toranius had been proscribed by the Roman Triumvirate. Caius Toranius, coming over to the interests of that party, discovered to the officers the place, where his father had concealed himself, and gave them withal a description, by which they might distinguish his person, when they found him. The old man, more anxious for the fortunes and safety of his son, than about the little, that might remain of his own life, began immediately to inquire of the officers, who seized him, Whether his son was well? Whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of his generals? That son, replied one of the officers, so dear to thy affections, betrayed thee to us; by his information thou art apprehended and diest. The officer with this struck a poniard to his heart, and the unhappy parent fell, not so much affected by his own fate, as by the means to which he owed it.

"Now the question is, (says Dr. Paley,) whether, if this story were related to the wild boy caught some years ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without experience, and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and, consequently, under no possible influence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit, whether, I say, such a one would feel, upon the relation, any degree of that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius's conduct which we feel, or not?

They who maintain the existence of a moral sense, of innate maxims, of a natural conscience, that the love of virtue and hatred of vice are instinctive, or the perception of right and wrong intuitive, (all which are only different ways of expressing the same thing,) affirm that he would. They,

who deny the existence of a moral sense, &c. affirm that he would not. And upon this, issue is joined.”

§. 234. Remarks upon the case stated in the foregoing section.

Upon the case as thus stated, and upon the diverse opinions which are said to be entertained in connection with it, one or two remarks are to be made, which are naturally suggested by the train of thought in this chapter. First, the supposition, that a Savage, who is entirely ignorant, (which we understand to be the condition of his mind in the statement given,) is able in any case whatever to pronounce a moral judgment, is an impossibility. It is arranged in great wisdom, that the Moral Sensibilities, as well as the Natural, are placed behind the Intellect; that is to say, they are subsequent in action, and are conditioned upon the antecedent existence of intellective acts. It is in view of this state of things, in particular, we make the assertion, that a negation of all knowledge, an intellect, which like a fragment of perfectly white paper is entirely free from any delineations of thought, necessarily involves the impracticability of any moral judgment. It is impossible, therefore, that the wild boy of Hanover, or any other Savage, cut off in infancy from all intercourse with his species, without sympathy, experience, or instruction of any kind, should pronounce a moral judgment upon the case of Caius Toranius, or upon any other case of morals. And the reason is what has just been referred to, that the antecedent condition is wanting, viz.knowledge.

We remark further, however, that it is not meant to be implied in what has been said, that the wild boy or Savage must necessarily possess a wide extent of knowledge. We may suppose it possible, that he is absolutely ignorant of every thing else; yet if he has a full knowledge of the facts and relations of the thing under consideration, there is a foundation laid in his mind for a moral movement. In the case of Caius Toranius, if the Savage, however ignorant he might be on other subjects, were made fully acquainted with the relation existing between the father and the son, with the nature and degree of the acts of kindness, which are always implied in the history of those, who sustain the parental relation, he would be in a situation to pronounce a moral de