approval or disapproval, as the case may be, of the thing to which the obligation relates. (See §. 14.)

§. 226. Changes in the moral emotions take place in accordance with changes in the antecedent perceptions.

If the emotions of approval and disapproval, which are the basis of the subsequent feelings of moral obligation, are naturally founded upon antecedent perceptions, we may expect, and such is the fact, that they will change in their character in accordance with changes in those perceptions. If, for instance, a statement of facts is made to us, clearly establishing in our view a case of great crime, our emotions of disapproval are prompt and decided. But if it should happen, that afterwards some new facts are mingled in the statement,throwing a degree of doubt and perplexity upon what was believed to have taken place, the feelings of disapproval would at once become perplexed and undecided, in a degree precisely corresponding to the perplexity and indecision, that under the new circumstances pervade the intellectual perception in the case. If still subsequently the introduction of other new facts should show, that what was supposed to be a crime was directly the reverse, our moral emotions would undergo a new change, and instead of condemning the transaction either more or less decidedly, would approve.

Nor is this changeableness in the character and the degree of the moral emotions to be regarded as implying any defect in the moral nature. On the contrary, it is unquestionably one of the most decisive indications of its value. If the moral nature were so constituted as not only to pronounce a thing right or wrong under certain given circumstances; but necessarily to adhere to that decision under essential changes in the circumstances, it certainly could not be regarded as a safe rule for men's guidance. A man kills another by means of the infliction of a heavy blow, and, as we suppose, with evil intention or malice prepense, and the action is at once disapproved and condemned by conscience. But it subsequently appears, that the blow, which had the appearance at first of being intentional, was entirely a matter of accident; and the conscience or moral nature immediately conforms its decision to the new aspect of the transac

tion, and annuls the disapproving and condemnatory sentence, which it had before pronounced. If it were otherwise, if it did not promptly and fully conform itself, by changes in its own action, to antecedent changes in the percipient or cognitive action, it would confound vice and virtue, guilt and innocence; and as a rule of moral conduct, would not only be without value, but absolutely and exceedingly injurious.

§. 227. Of objects of moral approval and disapproval.

We are not to suppose, that the sphere of that moral adjudication, which is involved in the existence of emotions of moral approval and disapproval, extends to all objects indiscriminately. It is a proper inquiry, therefore, and in some respects an important inquiry, what are the appropriate objects of approving and disapproving emotions.In answer to this question, we remark in the first place, that such objects are voluntary agents. The feelings in question, in their announcements of the right and the wrong of any case that comes before them, have nothing to do with things without life. And more than this, they require, as the objects of their exercise, something more than mere vegetable and animal life, viz. intellective, sensitive, and volitive life. In other words, they require in the appropriate objects of their adjudication those attributes of perceiving, feeling, and willing, which are necessarily implied in voluntary agency.

II. In the second place, the legitimate objects of approval and disapproval are not only voluntary agents, but MORAL agents. No being is the object of moral emotions, (that is to say, no being can by possibility be approved or disapproved in the moral sense of the terms,) except such as have a conscience or moral nature. It is impossible, that any others should have a knowledge of right and wrong; and of course impossible, that they should conform themselves to the rule of right. Hence no one regards brute animals, as the proper objects of these emotions.

III. -Again, moral agents, (this expression of course implies, that they are also voluntary agents,) are morally accountable, in other words are the proper objects of moral approval and disapproval, in respect to those things only, which are truly in their power. This remark, which limits

the sphere of moral approval and disapproval not only to moral agents, but to what is actually in the power of moral agents, is practically an important one. So far as we can regulate our outward actions, we are accountable; that is to say, we are the proper objects of the emotions of moral approval and disapproval. So far as we can regulate the action of the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will, we are accountable also. So far as the action, whether physical or mental, is either involuntary or instinctive, it is not an appropriate object of the notice and adjudication of conscience; for all such action, although it belongs to and is not separable from the agent, is nevertheless not under his control. Accordingly when the moral agent, in the exercise of all his various powers, does what he ought to do, he stands approved. When, in the exercise of the same powers, he fails to do what he ought to do, he stands condemned. The extent of his capability is the basis of his duty; and the law of conscience is the measure of its fulfilment. And this simple statement intimates both the rule, by which he is judged, and the vast amount of his responsibility.

§. 228. Of the original ground or basis of moral approbation and disapprobation.

If what has been said in the course of this chapter be true, we are so constituted that in all cases of actual right and wrong, which we are capable of understanding, we have the feelings, whenever such cases come to our knowledge, of approval and disapproval, corresponding both in kind and degree to the occasion, which excites them. But there remains another interesting inquiry. It has ever been, in the speculative and theoretical aspect of moral subjects, a much agitated question, what trait or quality it is in the thing approved or disapproved, which excites the corresponding emotion. To this question different individuals are found to give different answers. We approve of an action,

says one, because it is useful; because, says another, it is commanded by a higher power; because, says a third, it is agreeable to the fitness of things; because, says a fourth, it is in conformity to the will of God. But an answer of this kind does not appear to be satisfactory, because the question

may always return, with undiminished propriety and force, why utility, or the command of a superior, or the fitness of things, or conformity to the will of God, should, in themselves considered, excite within us feelings of moral approbation, more than any thing else.

The fact is, that this question, viz, what is the foundation or basis in the thing approved of the emotion of approval which we exercise towards it, lies, in all probability, upon the extreme boundaries of human knowledge. Whenever we touch that boundary, we must either rest satisfied, or return in the track of our own footsteps. Whatever efforts we may make to resolve and explain a question, which by the nature of things is placed in the outskirts and limits of human perception, we always find the train of thought moving, as it were, in a circle; and answering itself in a change of terms, and not in a change of position. If, for instance, we are asked why we approve the will of God, it may be answered with entire propriety, because it is morally right or virtuous. If we are asked, why we regard his will as morally right or virtuous, the answer is, because, considered in all its circumstances, it is approved by an enlightened moral sense. If we are asked why it is, that we thus put forth emotions of moral approval in relation to his will, then, instead of being able to take a new position and to give a new and distinct reason, we necessarily move round to a former one, and say, because his will is morally virtuous or right.--And the same in other similar cases. On being asked, why we approve of a particular action, we may give a different answer, and say with a degree of propriety, because it is beneficial or useful. On being further asked, why we approve of a useful or beneficial action, we may answer again, because such an action is morally right or virtuous. If we are still further asked, why an act of kindness or benevolence is to be regarded as morally right or virtuous, we answer, because, in its own nature it commends itself to our conscience, in other words excites within us emotions of moral approval. Which is the same as to say, in the assignment of reasons, that we approve, because we have emotions of approval. An instance, as well as the former one, of that sort of Paralogism or false reasoning, which is called reasoning in a circle.

§. 229. Emotions of moral approval are called forth in connection with the existence of right or rectitude in the things approved of.

It is unquestionable, however, when we take into view the necessarily limited nature of the human mind, that there is a suitable and satisfactory stopping-place in this successive announcement of reasons. The proper answer in all these cases, when we are asked why we morally approve of a thing is, because it is right. With the assignment of this reason, if the circumstances of the case obviously warrant us in assigning it, we may rest satisfied.

But then comes the question, what is RIGHT? We approve of a thing, because there is in that thing the trait or quality of RIGHT. What is Right? What is Right? The examination of this significant inquiry will more properly come up in another place. Nevertheless a word or two may be said here.— We admit that Right or Rectitude, like many other things, that are elementary and are intellectually revealed to us, cannot be defined. But can we define, what existence is; what identity is? Can we define intelligence, or power, or succession, or space, or time? From the nature of the case there must be some things elementary and ultimate. We are too apt to forget, that there are, and of necessity must be, limits, which the human mind cannot pass; and that there' are ultimate moral suggestions, as well as intellectual. When we say, an action is approved, because it is right, the expression not only has meaning; but proclaims a truth, which has nature for its basis. That is to say, the expression embodies in language a conviction, which in some way or other is necessarily attendant on the action, considered as the occasion of its origin, of the Moral Sensibilities, viz, that there is in fact such a thing as Right or Rectitude. At the same time, we do not hesitate to admit, as has already been intimated, our inability to explain what Right is. While we claim, that it is perceptible in the mind, we do not deny, that it is unexplainable, in the sense of being defined, in language. Nevertheless we have no hesitation on this account, either in asserting its existence, or in assigning it as a reason for whatever naturally depends upon it. (See Vol. I. §. §. 191, 2, and the subsequent Chapter on the Immutability of Moral Distinctions.)