that there is a difference in the sentiments of esteem, with which we contemplate different parts of our nature; some being regarded with higher, and some with less honor. In the graduation of our regard, it appears to be the fact, that we generally estimate the appetites, as in some degree higher than the instincts, and the propensities as higher than either. To the Affections, especially the Benevolent affections, which occupy in our estimation a still more elevated position, we look with increased feelings of interest. They obviously stand at the head of the list; and when we shall have completed their examination, nothing more will remain to be said on the regular or ordinary action of the Natural Sensibilities.We shall then be at liberty to proceed to another and still more important class of subjects.

§. 152. Of the complex nature of the affections.

The Affections, unlike the Appetites and Propensities as they exist in their primitive or original developement, are not simple states of mind, but complex. Accordingly the term AFFECTION denotes a state of mind, of which it is indeed true that some simple emotion is always a part, but which differs from any single simple emotion, in being combined with some form of that state of the mind called DESIRE. "As to every sort of passion, (says Kaimes,) we find no more in the composition, but an emotion pleasant or painful, accompanied with desire"

The affections are susceptible of being divided, although it may not be in all respects easy to carry the arrangement into effect in its details, into the two classes of Benevolent and Malevolent. The malevolent affections, as a general thing, include a painful emotion, accompanied with a desire of evil to the unpleasant object. The benevolent affections, on the contrary, include, for the most part, a pleasant emotion, accompanied with the desire of good to the pleasing object. But what distinguishes and characterizes the two classes is probably not so much the nature of the emotion, as the desire of good or evil which attends it.It is on the basis of this division that we propose to proceed in the examination of this subject.

It is proper to remark here, that the term PASSIONS, in

conformity with the authorized usage of language, is susceptible of being employed, as entirely synonymous with AFFECTIONS. In this sense we shall sometimes have occasion to use it; although it is frequently the case, that it is employed also as expressive not merely of the existence of the affections, but as implying their existence in a raised or eminent degree.

§. 153. Of resentment or anger.

The first of the MALEVOLENT affections, which we propose to consider, (that which may be termed the foundation or basis of all the others,) is Resentment or Anger. This affection like all others is of a complex nature, involving an unpleasant or painful emotion, accompanied with the desire of inflicting unpleasantness or pain on the object, towards which it is directed.

In its original or natural state, the desire appears to be, to some extent, the counterpart of the emotion; that is to say, having experienced an unpleasant or painful emotion, in consequence of the actual or supposed ill conduct of others, we naturally desire, in the exercise of the Resentment arising under such circumstances, a corresponding retribution of pain on the offending agent. But in saying, that they are reciprocally counterparts, we do not feel at liberty to assert, although there seem to be grounds for such a suggestion, that they possess to each other a precise and exact correspondence.

There are various modifications of Resentment, so distinct from each other as easily to admit of a separate notice and to be entitled to a distinct name, such as Peevishness, Jealousy, and Revenge. These will be considered, although in as brief a manner as possible, in their proper place. It is necessary to remark a little more at length upon the passion now before us, which may be regarded as in some important sense the foundation and the place of origin to all the others.

§. 154. Illustrations of instinctive resentment.

The AFFECTIONS, agreeing in this respect with what has been said of the Appetites and Propensities have a two-fold action, instinctive and voluntary; operating, in the one case, suddenly and without thought; in the other, operating on reflection and with deliberate purpose of mind.—Accor

that there is a difference in the sentiments of esteem, with which we contemplate different parts of our nature; some being regarded with higher, and some with less honor. In the graduation of our regard, it appears to be the fact, that we generally estimate the appetites, as in some degree higher than the instincts, and the propensities as higher than either. To the Affections, especially the Benevolent affections, which occupy in our estimation a still more elevated position, we look with increased feelings of interest. They obviously stand at the head of the list; and when we shall have completed their examination, nothing more will remain to be said on the regular or ordinary action of the Natural Sensibilities. We shall then be at liberty to proceed to another and still more important class of subjects.

§. 152. Of the complex nature of the affections.

The Affections, unlike the Appetites and Propensities as they exist in their primitive or original developement, are not simple states of mind, but complex. Accordingly the term AFFECTION denotes a state of mind, of which it is indeed true that some simple emotion is always a part, but which differs from any single simple emotion, in being combined with some form of that state of the mind called DESIRE. "As to every sort of passion, (says Kaimes,) we find no more in the composition, but an emotion pleasant or painful, accompanied with desire"

The affections are susceptible of being divided, although it may not be in all respects easy to carry the arrangement into effect in its details, into the two classes of Benevolent and Malevolent. The malevolent affections, as a general thing, include a painful emotion, accompanied with a desire of evil to the unpleasant object. The benevolent affections, on the contrary, include, for the most part, a pleasant emotion, accompanied with the desire of good to the pleasing object. But what distinguishes and characterizes the two classes is probably not so much the nature of the emotion, as the desire of good or evil which attends it.It is on the basis of this division that we propose to proceed in the examination of this subject.

It is proper to remark here, that the term PASSIONS, in

conformity with the authorized usage of language, is susceptible of being employed, as entirely synonymous with AFFECTIONS. In this sense we shall sometimes have occasion to use it; although it is frequently the case, that it is employed also as expressive not merely of the existence of the affections, but as implying their existence in a raised or eminent degree.

§. 153. Of resentment or anger.

The first of the MALEVOLENT affections, which we propose to consider, (that which may be termed the foundation or basis of all the others,) is Resentment or Anger. This affection like all others is of a complex nature, involving an unpleasant or painful emotion, accompanied with the desire of inflicting unpleasantness or pain on the object, towards which it is directed.

In its original or natural state, the desire appears to be, to some extent, the counterpart of the emotion; that is to say, having experienced an unpleasant or painful emotion, in consequence of the actual or supposed ill conduct of others, we naturally desire, in the exercise of the Resentment arising under such circumstances, a corresponding retribution of pain on the offending agent. But in saying, that they are reciprocally counterparts, we do not feel at liberty to assert, although there seem to be grounds for such a suggestion, that they possess to each other a precise and exact correspondence.

There are various modifications of Resentment, so distinct from each other as easily to admit of a separate notice and to be entitled to a distinct name, such as Peevishness, Jealousy, and Revenge. These will be considered, although in as brief a manner as possible, in their proper place. It is necessary to remark a little more at length upon the passion now before us, which may be regarded as in some important sense the foundation and the place of origin to all the others.

§. 154. Illustrations of instinctive resentment.

The AFFECTIONS, agreeing in this respect with what has been said of the Appetites and Propensities have a two-fold action, instinctive and voluntary; operating, in the one case, suddenly and without thought; in the other, operating on reflection and with deliberate purpose of mind. Accor

dingly we proceed to remark, in the first place, on the instinctive form of resentment. The occasions, on which this form of resentment arises, or is liable to arise, are all cases of harm or suffering, whether such harm or suffering be caused intentionally or not. The harm, which we experience, is followed by the resentment at once; the rapidity of the retributive movement may be compared to that of a flash of lightning; quick as the operation of thought is universally allowed to be, there is no opportunity for its interposition between the harm which has been experienced, and the resenment that follows. Under such circumstances it is of course impossible, that the resentment should be regulated by the consideration, whether the hurt, which we have experienced, was intentional or not. It is the harm, in itself considered, which arouses us; exclusive of any reference to the circumstances, under which it is inflicted.

We not unfrequently see instances of instinctive resentment, corresponding to what has been said. It is under the influence of this form of resentment, that the child, who has been accidentally hurt by a stone or a billet of wood, wreaks a momentary anger upon the inanimate object; that the Savage breaks and fiercely tramples upon the arrow, which has wounded him; and that men, in the first moments of their suffering, almost universally discover a sudden and marked displeasure with the cause of it.

§. 155. Uses and moral character of instinctive resentment.

The object, (or FINAL CAUSE as it is sometimes termed,) for which the principle of instinctive resentment is implanted in man, seems to be to furnish him with a degree of protection in the case of sudden and unforeseen attacks. The reasoning power is comparatively slow in its operation; and if the constitution of our nature were such as to require us always to wait for its results before acting, we might in some cases fail of that protection, which an instinctive effort would have given. Hence the practical importance of this form of the principle under consideration.

It may be added, that instinctive resentment has no moral character. It is the glory of the moral nature, that it lays back, if we may be allowed the expressions, of the intellec