and that the term itself is liable to erroneous applications.

This is owing to the fact, that the principle is not always, and perhaps we should say, is not generally regulated and restrained as it ought to be; but frequently degenerates into a perversion, which ought to be carefully distinguished from its innocent exercise. It is not self-love, but the perversion of self-love, which is properly called SELFISHNESS; and while self-love is always innocent, and under proper regulations is morally commendable, as being the attribute of a rational nature and as being approved by God himself, SELFISHNESS, on the contrary, is always sinful as existing in violation of what is due to others, and at variance with the will of God.

-It is due to the cause of morals and religion, as well as of sound philosophy, to make this important distinction. Self-love is the principle, which a holy God has given; selfishness is the loathsome superstructure, which man, in the moments of his rebellion and sin, has erected upon it.

§. 133. Modifications of selfishness; pride, vanity, and arrogance.

Selfishness, it will be kept in mind, is employed as the general name for any excessive or inordinate exercises of self-love whatever. But selfishness is susceptible of various modifications, and exhibits itself to the notice of others in different ways and under different aspects. One of the most marked and important of its modifications is Pride.

Pride not only implies an inordinate estimate and love of our own interests; but appears to be distinguished from the other forms of selfishness in being attended with a desire, that others, either for the sake of our own gratification or for the sake of humbling them, should be made sensible of what we suppose to be our superiority.Accordingly the feeling of pride is not to be considered as limited, in the occasions of its exercise, to the possession of any one object or quality, or to any single circumstance or combination of circumstances. It will be likely to attach itself to any object whatever, which becomes predominant in our affections, and in which we suppose ourselves to have the advantage over others. One is proud of his ancestry, another of his riches, a third of his intellectual ascendency, and a fourth of the beauty of his dress or person.

We may not only consider pride as one of the modifications of selfishness; but pride itself seems to be susceptible of some subordinate modifications, so distinct as to be known by appropriate names. When, for instance, it is very officious, and makes an ostentatious display of those circumstances, in which the subject of it supposes his superiority to consist, it is termed VANITY. When it discovers itself, not so much in the display of the circumstances, or supposed circumstances, of superiority, as in a contempt, and in sneering disparagements of the inferior qualities of others, it is termed HAUGHTINESS or ARROGANCE.

It may be further added, that we are always, if we would be exact in our discrimination of the sources of human action, to make a distinction between pride and a mere desire of esteem, which has already come under our notice. The desire of esteem may exist in all its forms, distinct from pride; and when properly regulated is not only useful, but is morally commendable. But pride, considered as distinct from the desire of esteem, and as essentially a modification of selfishness, is morally evil. Perhaps no state of mind, if we consider our numerous infirmities and wants, is less suited to our situation, or is more fitted to bring upon us the disapprobation and rebukes of our Maker.

§. 134. Reference to the opinions of philosophical writers.

It would be easy to introduce passages in support of the greater part of the views of this chapter, if it were deemed necessary, from writers, whose opinions are received with deference, and are justly entitled to be so. It appears from the recent Work of Dr. Chalmers on the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man, that he regards the desire of possession, (the possessory principle, as it may be conveniently designated,) as connatural to the human mind. (Vol. I, Ch. VI, §. §. 8—13.) Mr. Stewart takes the same view in regard to the principle of self-love or the desire of happiness. (Active and Moral Powers, Bk. II, Chap. I.) On this important subject, which in some of its aspects is closely connected with the requisitions and appeals of revealed religion, we find the following explicit statement in Dr. Wardlaw's recently published treatise, entitled_Christian Ethics.

"SELF-LOVE is an essential principle in the constitution of every intelligent creature; meaning by self-love the desire of its own preservation and well-being. By no effort of imagination can we fancy to ourselves such a creature constituted without this. It is an original law in the nature of every sentient existence. In man, it is true, in regard especially to the sources from which it has sought its gratification, it is a principle which, since his fall, has been miserably perverted and debased, degenerating, in ten thousand instances, into utter selfishness, and in all partaking of this unworthy taint. Between selfishness, however, and legitimate self-love, there is an obvious and wide discrepancy. The latter is not at all distinctive of our nature as degenerate, but was inwoven in its very texture, as it came from the Creator's hand. The former is properly the corruption of the latter. It leads the creature, who is under its dominant influence, to prefer self to fellow creatures and to God, so as to seek its own real or supposed advantage at the expense of the interests and the honor of both. So far, on the contrary, is self-love from being unwarrantable, that, in that part of God's law which prescribes our feelings and conduct towards our fellow creatures, it is assumed as the standard measure of the commanded duty, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as THYSELF." Take away self-love, or suppose it possible that the human heart should be divested of it, and you annihilate the command by rendering it unintelligible.

There is not, assuredly, any part of the divine word, by which we are required, in any circumstances, to divest ourselves of this essential principle in our constitution. That word, on the contrary, is full of appeals to it, under every diversity of form. Such are all its threatenings, all its promises, all its invitations."

CHAPTER FIFTH.

PROPENSITIES CONTINUED.

SOCIALITY OR THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY.

§. 135. The principle of sociality original in the human mind. In examining the propensive principles, it is a matter of but little consequence, either philosophically or practically, in what order they present themselves for consideration. The principle of sociality or desire of society is deferred to the present chapter, and is made the subject of a distinct consideration, not because the order of nature required it, but because its importance seemed to entitle it to a more detailed and extended notice, than the principles which have preceded. The doctrine, which we propose to maintain is, that men naturally, (not moved to it primarily by the influences of education or considerations of interest,) but of themselves and naturally have a desire of the company or society of their fellow-men; a tendency of the mind, expressed by the single term SOCIALITY or SOCIABILITY.

§. 136. The principle of sociality not selfish.

We are aware, that the desire of society, as well as some of the other original propensions, has sometimes been regarded, as a mere modification of selfism. It is the fact, however, that in its first operation the desire of society acts instinctively, being directed to its object as an ultimate end, wholly irrespective of any pleasure, which may subsequently be found attached to its attainment. It is one of the characteristics of Desire, as we have already seen, that the attainment of its object is attended with more or less pleasure. And this is as true of the successful issue of the principle of Sociality as of any other principle, involving as a part of its nature the desiring element. Accordingly after the experi

ence of pleasure attendant upon its successful exercise, even in a single instance, it is possible, that its subsequent action may be prompted rather by a regard to the concomitant enjoyment, than to the object, which originally called it forth. Such an exercise of the principle under consideration may with some appearance of propriety be termed a selfish one; but this is rather a secondary than an original exercise; and does not so much indicate what the principle is by nature as what it may become by subordinate, or by perverting influences. In itself considered, it is innocent and highly useful; it may indeed, after its first exercise, be indulged from a regard to personal or self-interested considerations; that is to say, from a regard to our own happiness or pleasure; but even the exercise of the principle from such considerations is not to be regarded, as some may suppose, as morally wrong, provided it is so regulated as not to conflict with the proper operation of other principles and with the claims of duty.

§. 137. Reference to the doctrine of Hobbes on this subject.

We shall enter a little more minutely into the consideration of this principle than of those which have preceded; for this reason among others, that the doctrine, which we propose to maintain, has not been universally received. We have reference in this remark to the opinions of those persons, who, in concurrence with the doctrine of Mr. Hobbes, the author of the political treatise of the Leviathan and of some philosophical writings, maintain, that men do not naturally seek, but rather avoid each other's society, being inspired with sentiments of aversion, and regarding their fellow-men as enemies, and not as friends. If the great fact,

which meets them at the first step in the inquiry, that men actually live in society, be objected to them, they answer, not by denying the fact, but by saying, that this is a matter of necessity; in other words, that men live in society, not because they love it, but because, in all the circumstances of the case, they had rather do this, painful as it is, than suffer other evils still greater. The weak, they say, found themselves in danger of being overrun and destroyed by the more powerful; and in order to protect themselves, were willing to enter into a companionship and union with their