slaved by his animal appetites exhibits humanity in one of its most miserable and contemptible forms."

§. 108. Of the prevalence and origin of appetites for intoxicating drugs.

There are not only natural appetites, but artificial or acquired ones. It is no uncommon thing to find persons, who have formed an appetite for ardent spirits, for tobacco, for opium, and intoxicating drugs of various kinds. It is a matter of common remark, that the appetite for inebriating liquors in particular is very prevalent, especially among Savage tribes. And it may be proper briefly to explain the origin of such appetites.

Such drugs and liquors, as have been referred to, have the power of stimulating the nervous system; and by means of this excitement they cause a degree of pleasure. This pleasurable excitement is soon followed by a corresponding degree of languor and depression, to obtain relief from which resort is again had to the intoxicating draught or drug. This results not only in a restoration, but an exhilaration of spirits; which is again followed by depression and distress. And thus resort is had, time after time, to the strong drink, the tobacco, the opium, or whatever it is which intoxicates, until an appetite is formed so strong as to subdue, lead captive, and brutalize the subject of it. So that the only way to avoid the forming of such a habit, after the first erroneous step has been taken, is quietly to endure the subsequent unhappiness attendant on the pleasurable excitement of intoxication, till the system has time to recover itself, and to throw off its wretchedness by its own efforts.

§. 109. Of occasional desires for action and repose.

Our occasional desires for action and repose are, in some respects, allied to our appetites. Although it has so happened, that these desires have not been marked by a separate and specific name, they may justly claim, as parts of our mental nature, some attention. Mr. Stewart remarks, that they have the three characteristics of the appetites, and proceeds to explain them as follows.

"They are common, too, to man and to the lower ani*Stewart's Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Bk. I, Chap. 1.

mals, and they operate, in our own species, in the most infant state of the individual. In general, every animal we know is prompted by an instinctive impulse to take that degree of exercise which is salutary to the body, and is prevented from passing the bounds of moderation by that languor and desire of repose, which are the consequences of continued exertion.

"There is something also very similar to this with respect to the mind. We are impelled by nature to the exercise of its different faculties, and we are warned, when we are in danger of overstraining them, by a consciousness of fatigue. After we are exhausted by a long course of application to business, how delightful are the first moments of indolence and repose! O che bella cosa di far niente! We are apt to imagine that no inducement shall again lead us to engage in the bustle of the world: but, after a short respite from our labors, our intellectual vigor returns; the mind rouses from its lethargy like a giant from his sleep, and we feel ourselves urged by an irresistible impulse to return to our duties as members of society."

§. 110. Of the twofold operation and the morality of the appetites.

So

In accordance with the remarks in the last section in the chapter on the Nature of desires, we may add here the general statement, that the operation of all the Appetites, of whatever kind, is twofold, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. far as they are directed to their objects as ultimate ends, without taking into consideration any thing else, their operation is obviously analogous to that of the pure instincts. But after the first instance of their gratification, they may be instigated to subsequent actions not so much by a view of the ultimate object, as of the pleasure accessory to its acquisition. And thus it sometimes happens, that their action in view of the enjoyment before them is turbulent and violent. Nevertheless, we may avail ourselves of the aid of other principles of the mind, to subject them to a degree of restraint, to regulate, and in a certain sense to cultivate them. And so far as this can be done, they are obviously susceptible of what may be called a VOLUNTARY action.

And here is the basis of the morality of the appetites. So

far as they are susceptible of a merely instinctive action, they cannot be said to possess any moral character either good or bad. They are greatly useful in their place; but, in a moral point of view, are to be regarded simply as innocent. It is only so far as they are voluntary, so far as they can be reached and controlled by the will; that they can by any possibility be morally good or evil, virtuous or vicious. So that virtue and vice, considered in relation to the appetites, is located, not in the appetites themselves in their intrinsic nature, but in their exercises. And in those exercises only, which are subordinate to the influence of the will.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

PROPENSITIES.

§. 111. General remarks on the nature of the propensities.

As we advance further in the examination of this portion of the natural or pathematic sensibilities, we meet with certain forms of Desire, which are different from any we have hitherto attended to; and which accordingly require a distinct consideration. There is certainly no danger of their being confounded with the Instincts; inasmuch as they do not exhibit that fixedness and inflexibleness of action, which is usually characteristic of those states of mind. They differ from the Appetites also, first, because they are much less dependent for their existence and exercise upon the condition of the body; and, secondly, because in that comparative estimation, which is naturally attached to the different active principles of our nature, they confessedly hold a higher rank. At the same time they evidently in the graduation of our regard fall below the Affections; besides being distinguished from them in some other respects. Hence we may, with entire propriety, not only assign them a separate and distinct position; but shall find a convenience in designating them

by a distinctive name. Among the Propensities, (for this is the name which we propose to attach to them,) may be mentioned the principle of self-preservation or the desire of continued existence, curiosity or the desire of knowledge, sociality or the desire of society, self-love or the desire of happiness, the desire of esteem, the propensity to imitate, and some others.

Although we have briefly indicated some of the circumstances, which separate the Propensities from the other leading principles coming under this general head, it will be noticed, that we have not attempted to give a statement of what they are in themselves. It is true, they are all based upon desire, and they all have some object. But whatever is intrinsic or specifically characteristic in their nature will be best learned from the considerations, that will necessarily arise, as they pass successively under review.

§. 112. Principle of self-preservation or the desire of continued existence.

The first of those original desires, which we shall proceed to notice, may be denominated the principle of SELFPRESERVATION, or the desire of a continuance of existence.-The proof of the existence of such a desire is not only so abundant in what we see around us, but is so intimate also to our own consciousness, that it can hardly be necessary to enter into details. "All, that a man hath, will he give for his life," was a sort of moral axiom in the earliest antiquity; and it stands as little in need of the verification of proof now, as it did then. It is true, that the principle may, in its practical operation, be overcome by the ascendant influence of other principles, by the mere desire of esteem, by the love of country, or by the sentiments of duty; but, though annulled in its results, it can hardly be said to be extinct in its nature. It still lingers, unextinguished and unextinguishable, in the foundations and depths of the mind. Even in cases of suicide, the desire of the extinction of life, which is supposed to exist, is not absolute but relative; the self-murderer would still cling to existence, if it could be possessed separate from the evils which attend it; it is not life, in itself considered, which he hates; but the variety of unpleasant circumstances, either actual or imagined, which are connected with it.

§. 113. Of the two-fold action of the principle of self-preservation. The principle of self-preservation or desire of the continuance of existence, as well as the appetites, has a two-fold operation, viz, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. These two aspects or methods of its operation are to be carefully distinguished from each other.. The instinctive operation takes place, when life is threatened or endangered on some sudden and unexpected emergencies. When a person is in danger of falling, he instinctively puts forth his hand to sustain himself; when a blow is suddenly aimed at him, he instinctively makes an effort to ward it off; and the operation of this instinctive form of the desire is exceedingly rapid, as well as effective. This instinctive action is highly important in all cases, where an effort for self-preservation, based upon inquiry and reasoning, would come too late. When the exercise of the desire under consideration exists in connection with inquiry and reasoning and of course is ultimately based upon decisions of the will, it is said to be VOLUNTARY. It is under the suggestions of this form of the principle in question, that we are led to make all those prospective calculations and efforts, which have particular reference to the continuance and protection of life. In either point of view, whether considered as instinctive or voluntary, it is a principle evidently adapted with great wisdom to man's situation. and wants. It is practically a powerful motive to action;. and in its voluntary exercise is always morally good, so far as it exists in entire conformity with the requisitions of an unperverted conscience.

§. 114. Of curiosity or the desire of knowledge.

Another of the leading Propensive principles is CURIOSITY, or the desire of knowledge; in respect to which it scarcely admits of a doubt, that it is to be regarded as one of the implanted and original characteristics of our mental constitution. Although it must be acknowledged, that this principle exists in very various degrees, from the weakest form of life and activity to almost irrepressible strength, yet a person utterly without curiosity would be deemed almost as strange and anomalous, as a person without sensation. If curiosity

be not natural to man, then it follows, that the human