THE SENSIBILITIES.

PART FIRST.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENSIBILITIES.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENTIMENTS.

CLASS SECOND.

THE DESIRES.

CHAPTER FIRST.

NATURE OF DESIRES.

§. 89. Of the prevalence of desire in this department of the mind.

We now proceed to enter upon a separate portion of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities; distinguished from that, which has hitherto received our attention, by the possession of its appropriate nature, and by sustaining its distinct and appropriate relations. The characteristic element of this region of the Natural Sensibilities, that which in fact constitutes the basis of its existence, is the state of mind, distinct from all others, which we denominate DESire. This state of mind not only stands at the threshhold of the department which we now enter upon; but diffuses abroad its influence, and run through, and gives a character to all the subordinate divisions, into which this part of the Pathematic nature will be found to resolve itself. No appetite, no propensity, or affection exists in fact, nor can we suppose it possible for them to exist, exclusively of any intermixture of the ingredient of DESIRE.It is for this reason that we denominate this portion of the sensitive nature, Desires, as we called the other, Emotions; and as we sometimes speak of the EMOTIVE sensibilities, so we might, with no impropriety, speak of the DESIROUS OF DESIRING sensibilities.

§. 90. The nature of desires known from consciousness.

AS DESIRES Occupy so prominent a place in those principles of the mind, which we now propose to give some account of, it is proper to delay here, in order briefly to attempt some explanation of their nature. And in doing this, we are obli

ged, in the first place, to repeat the remark already often made, that we must turn the acts of the mind inward upon itself, and consult the intimations of our own consciousness. We do not suppose, that any definition of desire, inasmuch as it is obviously a simple state of the mind, could possibly throw any such light upon it as to preclude the necessity of an internal reference. It is the light of the mind, if we will but turn our eyes to behold it, and that alone, which can truly indicate what may be called the essentiality of its nature. At the same time, while we must obviously consult consciousness for a knowledge of its distinctive character, we may probably render our conceptions of it more distinct and perfect, by considering some of the circumstances or incidents of its origin, and some of the relations it sustains.

§. 91. Of the place of desires in relation to other mental states.

It is important to possess a well settled and definite idea of the place of Desires, considered in relation to other mental states; especially as a thorough understanding of this point throws light upon the important subject of the philosophy of the Will.-(1) And the first remark to be made here is, that desires never follow, in direct and immediate sequence, to intellections or the cognitive acts of the mind. There is a distinct department or portion of the mind, located, if we may be permitted to use that expression, between the intellect and the mental states under consideration. It requires no further proof than the simple statement itself, when we say, that we never desire a thing, simply because we perceive it or have a knowledge of it. The mere perception of a thing is of itself no adequate reason, why we should make the thing an object of pursuit. There must obviously be some intermediate state of the mind, existing as the proximate and causative occasion of desires, viz, an emotion. Accordingly, the prerequisite condition to desire is some antecedent feeling, generally of a pleasurable nature, which intervenes between the desire, and the perception or knowledge of the desired object.

(2) In illustration of what has been said, it is the fact, that whenever we desire the presence or possession of an object, it is because we are in some way pleased with it. Whenev

er, on the other hand, we desire its removal from our presence, it is because we are in some way displeased with it. And these expressions, indicative of pleasure or displeasure, obviously involve the existence of that distinct state of the mind, which we denominate an EMOTION; a state of feeling entirely different both from the perception of the object which goes before such emotion, and the desire of the object, which follows after it. Accordingly we may feel at liberty to state in general terms, that no man ever desired an object, or could by any possibility desire it, in regard to which he had experienced no emotion, but had always been in a state of perfect indifferency. Such, in the matter under consideration, is obviously the fixed law of the mind.

(3) In this connection, and in view of what has now been said, we may properly recur a moment to the mind's general structure. The general division of the Mind, it will be recollected, is into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. The External Intellect is first brought into action; followed, in greater or less proximity of time, by the developement of the Internal. The subsequent process of the mental action, when carried through in the direction of the Pathematic sensibilities, is from intellections to emotions, and from emotions to desires, and from desires to acts of the will. When carried through in the direction of the Moral sensibilities, it is from intellections to emotions, (not natural but moral emotions ;) and then diverging into a different track and avoiding the appropriate domain of the Desires, passes from emotions to feelings of moral obligation, and from the Obligatory feelings, like the corresponding portion of the sensibilities, to the region of the Voluntary or Volitive nature.

§. 92. Of an exception to the foregoing statement.

The statements of the last section to this effect, that emotions are the prerequisite condition of desires, and that the latter never exist, except in connection with the fulfilment of this condition, is probably subject to an exception, which, although it may be of no great importance, it is proper to notice in this place. We have reference to those modifications and acts of desire, which are instinctive. It is worthy of inquiry, whether some instincts, and some mental