[1799.]

whose dictates can alone preserve us against the delusions of reason, which in the end would leave us nothing to believe: and maintains, that without a belief in God, virtue must perish; since virtue means force, a force exerted over ourselves, and which requires a God, if not as a judge, at least as a witness, of its achievments. With respect to the first position, if Rousseau means, as he appears to do, by a "sentiment intérieur" a blind instinctive principle of belief, a principle which may be felt but cannot be stated, the admission of such a ground of credence, it is evident, would give the privilege of sanctuary to every prejudice of which we had forgotten the origin. With respect to the second, though, in extreme cases, a belief in a supreme Being, potent to reward and to avenge, or at least sympathising in omniscience with the secret struggles of the human heart, may be necessary to support Virtue from sinking under temptation or yielding to despair, this quality, I conceive, in the popular and just acceptation of the term which denotes it, is, in its nature and essence, entirely distinct from all such considerations; and, whatever succour it may occasionally derive from their aid on extraordinary emergencies, is perfectly capable of subsisting and flourishing to a large extent without them. Rousseau proceeds to combat the doctrine of necessity, as abhorrent, in its consequences on morals, to the same "sentiment intérieur"; and then vindicates the superior character of Christ as a moral Teacher. He seems to have been seized, on this occasion, with one of those fits of piety, to which his erratic genius was casually subject, and into which it might at any time be exasperated by opposition.—In a subsequent Letter, à M. D'Offreville, he formally examines the motives to virtue. He admits that we must in all cases be actuated by self interest; but then he distinguishes this interest into a higher and a lower, a spiritual and a sensual interest, the former of which is, the latter is not, compatible with virtue: and to decide the question, whether there is not an interest immediately attached to virtue, which makes it amiable for its own sake, or whether, according to the doctrines of" la nouvelle philosophie" as he calls it, "nul ne peut faire aucun bien que par le profit qu'il en attende d'autrui, quil n'y a, par conséquent, que des sots qui croient à la vertu, et des dupes qui la pratiquent", proposes, as an experimentum crucis, the case of the juryman, who was resolved to perish rather than convict another of a murder which himself had perpetrated.-Swift observes in his Detached Thoughts, "the self-love of some men inclines them to please others; the self-love of others inclines them to please themselves; and this makes the great difference between virtue and vice."-The difficulty which appears to have perplexed both Rousseau and Swift on this subject, seems solved by the principle of sympathy:-by sympathy we are interested in the interests of others, ipso facto, and antecedently to all reflection on conse

quences.

[1799.]

NOV, the 29th.

Finished the perusal of Rousseau's Miscellaneous Letters. The two a M. le Maréchal de Luxembourg, are admirably descriptive, the former of the manners of the inhabitants, the latter of the aspect of the country, of the Val-de-Travers in the Compté de Neufchâtel: nothing can be more finished and exquisite than the painting in both. The last sentence but one in the latter, breathes precisely the same sentiment which occurs in Tooke's Dedication of his Diversions of Purley: " comment pourrois-je n'être pas touché des bontés qu'on m'y témoigne, moi qui dois tenir à bienfait de la part des hommes tout le mal qu'ils ne me font pas". I confess I have learnt to lend a dull ear to these complaints of persecution from authors; and to suspect, where they are not mere rhetorical flourishes to conciliate and allure-- (for "pity melts the soul to love"),—that there is, at the bottom, something wrong, in those who make them;-some addiction to what, though plausible, is really culpable; or some perversity, at least, in pursuing what is right. There is a fund of good sense and honest sympathy in the Public, which costs nothing in the exercise, and can scarcely fail to render their moral judgments, on these occasions, in general as just as they are conclusive.—In a Letter dated, Motiers, le 4 Mars, 1764, he combats a disciple of the New Philosophy, who endeavoured to deduce virtue from the love of order; and maintains, that it must be founded on-an instinctive belief in a superintending providence the immortality of the soul-and the freedom of the will: take the two first of these considerations away, "je ne vois plus dans la vertu qu'une folie à qui l'on donne un beau nom"; take away the last, and "ce'st un son qui bat l'oreille, et rien de plus". Self-love, he admits, is the sole principle of action in man; but how virtue can be founded intrinsically on this principle, he declares, passes his conception.-Rousseau frequently vents his spleen against the doctrines and the professors of "la nouvelle philosophie" as he terms it; and when tolerably at ease in his own mind, strongly inculcates on others a spirit of accommodation to the opinions and sentiments of mankind, especially with regard to religion-(see, particularly, the preceding and two succeeding Letters): but there is no reliance to be placed on him; and we feel that the slightest and most unfounded disgust, would exasperate his irritable spirit into a consuming fire against the cause, which a kindlier humour had led him to espouse with all the warmth and earnestness of a decided votary." A mon avis", says he, in a Letter dated, Wootton, Sep. 27th, 1767, "le sang d'un seul homme, est d'un plus grand prix que la liberté de tout le genre-humain." What a sentiment to have flashed upon his deluded followers in France, in the midst of their atrocities!

[1799]

DECEMBER the 6th.

Read Jackson's (of Exeter) Four Ages. He inverts the usual order; and promises halcyon days, from the improvement of every art and every science, in the golden age to which we are rapidly advancing:-a more consolatory and a more plausible fallacy, certainly, than the prevalent one, of looking with regret on the past, and disinay to the future. Many of his remarks are ingenious and acute; but they are delivered in a very desultory form.

Looked through the 3d. Book of Warburton's Divine Legation. It is impossible to pursue this eccentric Genius steadily, through the mazy curves along which he wheels his airy flight; "fetching in and inclosing" (as Bacon expresses it) "by a winding expatiation, matter which speaks nothing to the purpose". He contends (sect. 2.) that the genius of their religion taught the antient sages to conclude, that utility, not truth, is the end of religion; that utility and truth, consequently, do not coincide; and that it is lawful and expedient to deceive for the public good: he, himself, (sect.6) on the contrary maintains, from a petitio principii, I think, That truth is nothing but that relation of things which is attended with universal benefit; That truth and utility must, therefore, necessarily coincide; That truth is productive of utility, and utility indicative of truth; and, consequently, That religion, or the idea of the relation between the creature and the Creator, as useful, must be true. He afterwards observes, very justly, that there never was a great conqueror, legislator, or founder of religion, who had not a mixture of enthusiasm and policy in his composition;-of enthusiasm to influence the public mind, and of policy to direct it.

DEC. the 8th.

Read Balguy's nine Discourses. They are all masterly; but the first four, and the 8th., tower above the rest in excellence. In the 7th. he says "To live without government, belongs only to savages; to be governed by will, is the condition of slaves: the freest of men, are those who live by settled rules, under the influence of authority prudently constituted, and temperately used". This nearly coincides with Mackintosh's definition of Liberty in his Preliminary Dissertation.

Looked into Warton's Edition of Milton's Minor Poems. I am surprised that in enumerating (in a note on Lycidas) the proofs of Shakespear's attachment to the figure of the canker and the rose, he should have omitted the celebrated passage— "But let concealment, like a worm 'ith bud,

Feed on her damask cheek".

[1799.]

"Sere", or "dry", which he mentions as one of the most uncommon of the obsolete words employed by Milton, is surely now very customary as applied to wood for

fuel.

DEC. the 9th.

Read Balguy's seven Charges, appended to his Sermons. In the last, he grows mystical: it is a most unfortunate close: though, indeed, there appears to me something very like inconsistency in the preceding part of the Volume; and that what the Author seems to grant very liberally with one hand, one moment, he with-holds very tenaciously with the other, the next. I should say of the whole Volume, that it is the product of a stout, well-furnished, reflecting mind; too vigorous to bear the trammels of prejudice, and thinking originally and deeply on whatever subject occurred; but which perhaps had not very curiously collated its opinions, and moulded them into one consistent system. In the 2d. Charge, Balguy explicitly maintains, That Christianity, did not promulge a new system of morals, which was unnecessary; but merely gave an additional sanction to the rules which previously existed on this subject.—In the 6th. he observes, "That a heart which has hardened itself against all impressions of gratitude to God, will be equally insensible of human kindness; and that all the charities of neighbourhood, and kindred, and friendship, will be sunk and stifled in a cool philosophical selfishness."

DEC. the 11th.

Looked into some of Dryden's Prefaces and Dedications. He is surely the most rambling and desultory writer that ever wielded pen! I take it, he never meditated before he committed his thoughts to paper, or corrected a syllable afterwards: yet, such are the exuberant stores of his mind, he weaves, as he goes along, a rich and enchanting tissue.

Read the 1st. Vol. of Sully's Memoirs. They open a scene of manners, which, to modern conception, appears perfectly romantic:--what a strange mixture of ferocity and gallantry, generosity and treachery, cruelty and courtesy, heroic virtues and the meanest vices! Sully insists upon it, that Henry the IVth's conversion from the Protestant to the Roman Catholic faith, was conscientious and sincere. Though far from thinking that other motives, besides a preponderance of argument, may not operate in producing belief, such a momentous change, so exactly synchronising and quadrating with the dictates of policy, staggers, I confess, all my dispositions to

[1799.]

be charitable on the occasion. It is curious, that these Memoirs should have been written by a French Protestant, and translated by an English Papist.

DEC. the 21st.

Looked over the 1st. and 2d. Parts of Watts' Logic. In recommending us (c. 4, P. 2.) to cast away all our former prejudicate opinions, and form them afresh on an impartial examination, he seems to feel the danger of following this advice to its full extent; and therefore more than once observes, that this is not proposed to be practised at once, as men of business or religion, as friends or neighbours, as fathers or sons, as magistrates, subjects, or Christians, but merely as philosophical searchers after truth.--Watts, when he does not bewilder himself and his readers in scholastic subtleties (for Locke had not quite purged him from the taint of the Schools)—but follows the dictates of his own sense, is very judicious. He may be regarded, I believe, as the last of that race of primitive divines, who united, in an eminent degree, sanctity with learning.

DEC. the 23d.

Looked over the 3d. and 4th. Parts of Watts' Logic. In the former, on "reasoning and syllogism", I was in hopes of meeting with something which might throw light on the principles of ratiocination; but was disappointed. He defines reasoning, "the joining several propositions together, and making a syllogism, i. e, an argument whereby we are wont to infer something that is less known, from truths which are more evident." This more evident truth, forms the premises of a syllogism; the less evident, the conclusion: now the presiding principle, he observes, which governs all syllogisms, is, that what is generally true, is true in all the particular instances included in the general idea; and the grand rule which he lays down as the test of a true syllogism, is, that the premises contain the conclusion, or, that one of the premises contain the conclusion, and that the other shew it is contained in it—c. 2, sect 1. and c. 3, sect 2:-directly the inverse, I apprehend, of the method which the mind really pursues in the advancement of its knowledge.

Pursued Sully's Memoirs. I blush when I read the account he gives of his Embassy to our Court, on the accession of James the 1st. How much more respectable do we appear in Henry the IVth's previous correspondence with Elizabeth! James should have worn the petticoat, and Bess the breeches.