which analysis had collected, proved, and accumulated, from Socrates down to Plotinus.

But a synthesis is of no greater value than its relative analysis; and as the analysis of the earlier Greek philosophy was not complete, the synthesis of the Alexandrian school was necessarily imperfect.

In the scholastic philosophy, analysis and observation were too often neglected in some departments of philosophy, and too often carried rashly to excess in others.

The Scholastic Philosophy.

Philosophy from

the revival of letters.

tes.

Bacon and Descar

After the revival of letters, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the labors of philosophy were principally occupied in restoring and illustrating the Greek systems; and it was not until the seventeenth century, that a new epoch was determined by the genius of Bacon and Descartes. In Bacon and Descartes our modern philosophy may be said to originate, inasmuch as they were the first who made the doctrine of method a principal object of consideration. They both proclaimed, that, for the attainment of scientific knowledge, it is necessary to observe with care, that is, to analyze; to reject every element as hypothetical, which this analysis does not spontaneously afford; to call in experiment in aid of observation; and to attempt no synthesis or generalization, until the relative analysis has been completely accomplished. They showed that previous philosophers had erred, not by rejecting either analysis or synthesis, but by hurrying on to synthetic induction from a limited or specious analytic observation. They propounded no new method of philosophy, they only expounded the conditions of the old. They showed that these conditions had rarely been fulfilled by philosophers in time past; and exhorted them to their fulfilment in time to come. They thus explained the petty progress of the past philosophy;- and justly anticipated a gigantic advancement for the future. Such was their precept, but such unfortunately was not their example. There are no philosophers who merit so much in the one respect, none, perhaps, who deserve less in the other.

Result of this historical sketch of philosophy.

Of philosophy since Bacon and Descartes, we at present say nothing. Of that we shall hereafter have frequent occasion to speak. But to sum up what this historical sketch was intended to illustrate. There is but one possible method of philosophy, a combination of analysis and synthesis; and the purity

and equilibrium of these two elements constitute its perfection. The aberrations of philosophy have been all so many violations of the laws of this one method. Philosophy has erred, because it built its systems upon incomplete or erroneous analysis, and it can only proceed in safety, if from accurate and unexclusive observation, it rise, by successive generalization, to a comprehensive sys

tem.

LECTURE VII.

THE DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.

I HAVE already endeavored to afford you a general notion of what Philosophy comprehends: I now proceed to say something in regard to the Parts into which it has been divided. Here, however, I must limit myself to the most famous distributions, and to those which, as founded on fundamental principles, it more immediately concerns you to know. For, were I to attempt an enumeration of the various Divisions of Philosophy which have been proposed, I should only confuse you with a multitude of contradictory opinions, with the reasons of which you could not, at present, possibly be made acquainted.

Expediency of a division of Philosophy.

Seneca, in a letter to his young friend Lucilius, expresses the wish that the whole of philosophy might, like the spectacle of the universe, be at once submitted to our view. "Utinam quemadmodum universi mundi facies in conspectum venit, ita philosophia tota nobis posset occurrere, simillimum mundo spectaculum." But as we cannot survey the universe at a glance, neither can we contemplate the whole of philosophy in one act of consciousness. We can only master it gradually and piecemeal; and this is in fact the reason why philosophers have always distributed their science, (constituting, though it does, one organic whole,) into a plurality of sciences. The expediency, and even necessity, of a division of philosophy, in order that the mind may be enabled to embrace in one general view its various parts, in their relation to each other, and to the whole which they constitute, is admitted by every philosopher. "Res utilis," continues Seneca, "et ad sapientiam properanti utique necessaria, dividi philosophiam, et ingens corpus ejus in membra disponi. Facilius enim per partes in cognitionem totius adducimur."

But, although philosophers agree in regard to the utility of such a distribution, they are almost as little at one in regard to the parts, as they are in respect to the definition, of their science; and, indeed, their differences in reference to the former, mainly arise from their

discrepancies in reference to the latter. For they who vary in their comprehension of the whole, cannot agree in their division of the

parts.

The most ancient division into Theoretical and Practical.

The most ancient and universally recognized distinction of philosophy, is into Theoretical and Practical. These are discriminated by the different nature of their ends. Theoretical, called likewise speculative, and contemplative, philosophy, has for its highest end mere truth or knowledge. Practical philosophy, on the other hand, has truth or knowledge only as its proximate end,this end being subordinate to the ulterior end of some practical action. In theoretical philosophy, we know for the sake of knowing, scimus ut sciamus: in practical philosophy, we know for the sake of acting, scimus ut operemur. I may here notice the poverty of the English language, in the want of a word to express that practical activity which is contradistinguished from mere intellectual or speculative energy,

The term Active.

what the The want of

Greeks express by πрáσσew, the Germans by handeln. such a word occasions frequent ambiguity; for, to express the species which has no appropriate word, we are compelled to employ the generic term active. Thus our philosophers divide the powers of the mind into Intellectual and Active. They do not, however, thereby mean to insinuate that the powers called intellectual are a whit less energetic than those specially denominated active. But, from the want of a better word, they are compelled to employ a term which denotes at once much more and much less than they are desirous of expressing. I ought to observe that the term practical has also obtained with us certain collateral significations, which render it in some respects unfit to supply the want. But to return. This distinction of Theoretical and Practical philosophy, was first explicitly enounced by Aristotle; and the attempts of the later Platonists to carry it up to Plato and even to Pythagoras, are not worthy of statement, far less of refutation. Once promulgated, the division was, however, soon generally recognized. The Stoics borrowed it, as may be seen from Seneca: - "Philosophia et contemplativa est et activa; spectat, simulque agit." It

History of the distinction of Theoretical and Practical.

3

ή ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητική. Cf. Metaph. x. 7; Top. vi. 6, viii. 3. But the division had been at least intimated by Plato: Politicus, p. 258: Ταύτῃ τοίνυν, συμπάσας ἐπιστήμας διαίρει, τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν προσειπών, τὴν δὲ μόνον γνωστικήν. - ED.

4 Ep. xcv. 10.

was also adopted by the Epicureans; and, in general, by those Greek and Roman philosophers who viewed their science as versant either in the contemplation of nature (pvoký), or in the regulation of human action (ký);1 for by nature they did not denote the material universe alone, but their Physics included Metaphysics, and their Ethics embraced Politics and Economics. There was thus only a difference of nomenclature; for Physical and Theoretical, Ethical and Practical Philosophy, - were with them terms absolutely equivalent.

I regard the division of philosophy into Theoretical and Practical as unsound, and this for two reasons.

The division of Philosophy into Theoretical and Practical unsound.

The first is, that philosophy, as philosophy, is only cognitive, only theoretical; whatever lies beyond the sphere of speculation or knowledge, transcends the sphere of philosophy; consequently, to divide philosophy by any quality ulterior to speculation, is to divide it by a difference which does not belong to it. Now, the distinction of practical philosophy from theoretical, commits this error. For, while it is admitted that all philosophy, as cognitive, is theoretical, some philosophy is again taken out of this category on the ground, that, beyond the mere theory, the mere cognition, · it has an ulterior end in its application to practice.

But, in the second place, this difference, even were it admissible, would not divide philosophy; for, in point of fact, all philosophy must be regarded as practical, inasmuch as mere knowledge, that is, the mere possession of truth, is not the highest end of any philosophy, but, on the contrary, all truth or knowledge is valuable only inasmuch as it determines the mind to its contemplation,that is, to practical energy. Speculation, therefore, inasmuch as it is not a negation of thought, but, on the contrary, the highest energy of intellect, is, in point of fact, preeminently practical. The practice of one branch of philosophy is, indeed, different from that of another; but all are still practical; for in none is mere knowledge the ultimate, the highest end.

Among the ancients, the principal difference of opinion regarded the relation of Logic to Philosophy and its branches. But as this controversy is of very subordinate importance, and hinges upon distinctions, to explain which would require considerable detail, I

1 Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. vii. 14: Tŵv dè διμερῆ τὴν φιλοσοφιάν ὑποστησαμένων Ξενοφάνης μὲν ὁ Κολοφώνιος, τὸ φυσικὸν ἅμα καὶ λογικόν, ὡς φασί τινες, μετήρχετο, Αρχέλαος δὲ ὁ Αθηναῖος τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν μεθ ̓ οὗ τινὲς καὶ τὸν Επίκουρον

τάττουσιν ὡς καὶ τὴν λογικὴν θεωρίαν ἐκβάλλοντα. Seneca, Ep. lxxxix.: “Epicurei quas partes philosophiæ putaverunt esse, Naturalem, atque Moralem: Rationalem removerunt."-ED.