(1) The organs denoted by these numbers:-ix. 7, Constructiveness; xx. 32, Mirthfulness or Wit; xxii. 19 (2), Individuality, Lower Individuality: xxiii. 20, Configuration, Figure; xxiv. 21, Size: xxv. 22, Weight, Resistance; xxvi. 2, Color; xxvii. 9. Locality; xxviii. 26, Calculation, Number; xxix. 25, Order; xxx. 19, (1) Eventuality, Upper Individuality; xxxi. 2, Time; xxxi. Melody, Tune; xxxviii. 29, Language - this organ Gall divides in two, to wit, into the organ of Language and the organ of Words: xxxiv. 30, Comparison; xxxv. 31, Causality. The order of the numbers in this table was taken from that of a more extensive and general table: so that whilst here xx. 32, has not been affected at all, there it was affected more frequently than ix. 7.

In the first place, that, as already noticed, while the developments of all the crania have been carefully marked, the presence of the frontal sinuses has been signalized only in one skull (the male No. 19, xiv.), in which they are, however, greatly below even the average.

In the second place, that the extent of the sinus varies indeterminably from an affection of one to an affection of sixteen organs.

In the third place, in this induction of thirty-seven male and thirteen female crania, the average proportional extent of the sinuses is somewhat less in the female than in the male skulls; the sinus in the former covering 4.4, and affecting 1.2 organs; in the latter covering 5, and affecting 2.1 organs. This induction is, however, too limited, more especially in the female crania, to afford a determination of the point, even were it not at variance with other and more extensive observations.

In the fourth place, the male crania exhibit at once the largest and the smallest sinuses. The largest male sinus covers 12, and affects 4; while the largest female sinus covers 7, and affects 3 organs; whereas, while the smallest male sinus affects only 1, the smallest female sinus covers 2 organs.

In the fifth place, so far from supporting the phrenological assertion that the sinuses are only found, or only found in size, in the crania of the old, this their collection tends to prove the very reverse; for here we find about the smallest sinuses in the oldest heads.

III. PERCEPTION.-FRAGMENTS.—(See p. 286.)

(Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR. STEWART. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn 1855.-ED.)

There are three considerations which seem to have been principally effective in promoting the theory of a Mediate or Representative Perception, and by perception is meant the apprehension, through sense, of external things. These might operate severally or together.

The first is, that such a hypothesis is necessary to render possible the perception of distant objects. It was taken as granted that certain material realities, (as a sun, stars, etc.), not immediately present to sense, were cognized in a perceptive act. These realities could not be known immediately, or in themselves, unless known as they existed; and they existed only as they existed in their place in space. If, therefore, the perceptive mind did not sally out to them, (which, with the exception of one or two theorists, was scouted as an impossible hypothesis), an immediate perception behooved to be abandoned, and the sensitive cognition we have of them must be vicarious; that is, not of the realities themselves, as present to our organs, and presented to apprehension, but of something different from the realities eternally existing, through which, however, they are mediately represented. Various theories in regard to the nature of this mediate or vicarious object may be entertained; but these may be over

passed. This first consideration alone was principally effectual among materialists on them the second had no influence.

A second consideration was the opposite and apparently inconsistent nature of the object and subject of cognition; for here the reality to be known is material, whereas the mind knowing is immaterial; while it was long generally believed, that what is known must be of an analogous essence (the same or similar) to what knows. In consequence of this persuasion, it was deemed impossible that the immaterial, unextended mind could apprehend in itself, as extended, a material reality. To explain the fact of sensitive perception, it was therefore supposed requisite to attenuate to immaterialize the immediate object of perception, by dividing the object known from the reality existing. Perception thus became a vicarious or mediate cognition, in which the corporeal was said to be represented by the incorporeal.

PERCEPTION-POSITIVE RESULT.

1. We perceive only through the senses.

2. The senses are corporeal instruments, parts of our bodily organism. 3. We are, therefore, percipient only through, or by means of, the body. In other words, material and external things are to us only not as zero, inasmuch as they are apprehended by the mind in their relation with the material organ which it animates, and with which it is united.

4. An external existence, and an organ of sense, as both material, can stand in relation only according to the laws of matter. According to these laws, things related, connected, must act and be acted on; but a thing can act only where it is. Therefore the thing perceived, and the percipient organ, must meet in place, must be contiguous. The consequence of this doctrine is a complete simplification of the theory of perception, and a return to the most ancient speculation on the point. All sensible cognition is, in a certain acceptation, reduced to Touch, and this is the very conclusion maintained by the venerable authority of Democritus.

According to this doctrine, it is erroneous, in the first place, to affirm that we are percipient of distant, etc., objects.

It is erroneous, in the second place, to say that we perceive external things in themselves, in the signification that we perceive them as existing in their own nature, and not in relation to the living organ. The real, the total, the only object perceived has, as a relative, two phases. It may be described either as the idiopathic affection of the sense (i. e. the sense in relation to an external reality), or as the quality of a thing actually determining such or such an affection of the sentient organ (i. e. an external reality in correlation to the sense).

A corollary of the same doctrine is, that what have been denominated the Primary Qualities of body, are only perceived through the Secondary; in fact, Perception Proper cannot be realized except through Sensation Proper. But synchronous.

The object of perception is an affection, not of the mind as apart from body,

not of the body as apart from mind, but of the composite formed by union of the two; that is, of the animated or living organism (Aristotle).

In the process of perception there is required both an act of the conscious mind and a passion of the affected body; the one without the other is null. Galen has, therefore, well said, "Sensitive perception is not a mere passive or affective change, but the discrimination of an affective change." (Aristotle,— judgment.)

Perception supposes Consciousness, and Consciousness supposes Memory and Judgment; for, abstract Consciousness, and there is no Perception; abstract Memory, or Judgment, and Consciousness is abolished. (Hobbes, Memory; Aristotle, Judgment of Sense.) Memory, Recollection; for change is necessary to Consciousness, and change is only to be apprehended through the faculty of Remembrance. Hobbes has, therefore, truly said of Perception, "Sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recident." But there could be no discriminative apprehension, supposing always memory without an act whereby difference was affirmed, or sameness denied; that is, without an act of Judgment. Aristotle is, therefore, right in making Perception a Judgment.

3

IV. LAWS OF THOUGHT.-(See p. 527.)

(Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR. STEWART. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn, 1855.- ED.)

The doctrine of Contradiction, or of Contradictories (ažíwμa Tîs àvtipáσews), that Affirmation or Negation is a necessity of thought, whilst Affirmation and Negation are incompatible, is developed into three sides or phases, each of which implies both the others, -phases which may obtain, and actually have received, severally, the name of Law, Principle, or Axiom. Neglecting the historical order in which these were scientifically named and articulately developed, they are:

1o, The Law, Principle, or Axiom, of Identity, which, in regard to the same thing, immediately or directly enjoins the affirmation of it with itself, and mediately or indirectly prohibits its negation:`(A is A.)

2°, The Law, etc., of Contradiction (properly Non-contradiction), which, in regard to contradictories, explicitly enjoining their reciprocal negation, implicitly prohibits their reciprocal affirmation: (A is not Not-A.) In other words, contradictories are thought as existences incompatible at the same time, once mutually exclusive.

as at

3°, The Law, etc., of Excluded Middle or Third, which declares that, whilst contradictories are only two, everything, if explicitly thought, must be thought as of these either the one or the other: (A is either B or Not-B.) In different terms:- Affirmation and negation of the same thing, in the same respect, have no conceivable medium; whilst anything actually may, and virtually must, be

1 See Reid's Works, p. 878.- ED. 2 See Ibid.-Ed.

3 See Ibid.-Ed.

either affirmed or denied of anything. In other words: - Every predicate is true or false of every subject; or, contradictories are thought as incompossible, but, at the same time, the one or the other as necessary. The argument from Contradiction is omnipotent within its sphere, but that sphere is narrow. has the following limitations:

It

1o, It is negative, not positive; it may refute, but it is incompetent to establish. It may show what is not, but never of itself, what is. It is exclusively Logical or Formal, not Metaphysical or real; it proceeds on a necessity of thought, but never issues in an Ontology or knowledge of existence.

2o, It is dependent; to act it presupposes a counter-proposition to act from. 3o, It is explicative, not ampliative; it analyzes what is given, but does not originate information, or add anything, through itself, to our stock of knowledge.

4°, But, what is its principal defect, it is partial, not thorough-going. It leaves many of the most important problems of our knowledge out of its determination; and is, therefore, all too narrow in its application as a universal criterion or instrument of judgment. For were we left, in our reasonings, to a dependence on the principle of Contradiction, we should be unable competently to attempt any argument with regard to some of the most interesting and important questions. For there are many problems in the philosophy of mind where the solution necessarily lies between what are, to us, the one or the other of two counter, and, therefore, incompatible alternatives, neither of which are we able to conceive as possible, but of which, by the very conditions of thought, we are compelled to acknowledge that the one or the other cannot but be; and it is as supplying this deficiency, that what has been called the argument from Common Sense becomes principally useful.

The principle of Contradiction, or rather of Non-contradiction, appears in two forms, and each of these has a different application.

In the first place (what may be called the Logical application), it declares that, of Contradictories, two only are possible in thought; and that of these alternatives the one or the other, exclusively, is thought as necessarily true. This phasis of the law is unilateral; for it is with a consciousness or cognition that the one contradictory is necessarily true, and the other contradictory necessarily false. This one logical phasis of the law is well known, and has been fully developed.

In the second place (what may be called the Psychological application), while it necessarily declares that, of Contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be, still bilaterally admits that we may be unable positively to think the possibility of either alternative. This, the psychological phasis of the law, is comparatively unknown, and has been generally neglected. Thus, Existence we cannot but think, cannot but attribute in thought; nevertheless we can actually conceive neither of these contradictory alternatives, — the absolute commencement, the infinite non-commencement, of being. As it is with Existence, so is it with Time. We cannot think time beginning; we cannot think time not beginning. So also with Space. We are unable to conceive an existence out of space; yet we are equally unable to compass the notion of illimitable or infinite space. Our capacity of thought is thus peremptorily proved