stimulated to put forth a larger amount than that to which it is spontaneously disposed. The amount or quantum of energy in the case of a single power is of two kinds, 1°, An intensive, and 2°, A protensive; the former expressing the higher degree, the latter the longer duration, of the exertion. A perfect energy is, therefore, that which is evolved by a power, both in the degree and for the continuance to which it is competent without straining; an imperfect energy, that which is evolved by a power in a lower or in a higher degree, for a shorter or for a longer continuance, than, if left to itself, it would freely exert. There are, thus, two elements of the perfection, and, consequently, two elements of the pleasure, of a simple energy its adequate degree and its adequate duration; and four ways in which such an energy may be imperfect, and, consequently, painful; inasmuch as its degree may be either too high, or too low; its duration either too long, or too short. When we do not limit our consideration to the simple energies of individual powers, but look to complex states, in which a plurality of powers may be called simultaneously into action, we have, besides the intensive and protensive quantities of energy, a third kind, to wit, the extensive quantity. A state is said to contain a greater amount of extensive energy, in proportion as it forms the complement of a greater number of simultaneously coöperating powers. This complement, it is evident, may be conceived as made up either of energies all intensively and protensively perfect and pleasurable, or of energies all intensively and protensively imperfect and painful, or of energies partly perfect, partly imperfect, and this in every combination afforded by the various perfections and imperfections of the intensive and protensive quantities. It may be here noticed, that the intensive and the two other quantities stand always in an inverse ratio to each other; that is, the higher the degree of any energy, the shorter is its continuance, and, during its continuance, the more completely does it constitute the whole mental state, does it engross the whole disposable consciousness of the mind. The maximum of intensity is thus the minimum of continuance and of extension. So much for the perfection, and proportional pleasure, of an energy or state of energies, by relation to the power out of which it is elicited. This paragraph requires, I think, no commentary. Eighth. VIII. By relation to the object (and by the term object, be it observed, is here denoted every objective cause by which a power is determined to activity), about which it is conversant, an energy is perfect, when this object is of such a character as to afford to its power the condition requi site to let it spring to full spontaneous activity; imperfect, when the object is of such a character as either, on the one hand, to stimulate the power to a degree, or to a continuance, of activity beyond its maximum of free exertion; or, on the other hand, to thwart it in its tendency towards this its natural limit. An object is, consequently, pleasurable or painful, inasmuch as it thus determines a power to perfect or to imperfect energy. But an object, or complement of objects simultaneously presented, may not only determine one but a plurality of powers into coäctivity. The complex state, which thus arises, is pleasurable, in proportion as its constitutive energies are severally more perfect; painful, in proportion as these are more imperfect; and in proportion as an object, or a complement of objects, occasions the average perfection or the average imperfection of the complex state, is it, in like manner, pleasurable or painful. Ninth. Definitions of Pleasure and Pain. IX. Pleasure is, thus, the result of certain harmonious relations, of certain agreements; pain, on the contrary, the effect of certain unharmonious relations of certain disagreements. The pleasurable is, therefore, not inappropriately called the agreeable, the painful the disagreeable; and, in conformity to this doctrine, pleasure and pain may be thus defined: Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power, of whose energy we are conscious.1 Pain, a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power. The definition of Pleasure illustrated. 1. Pleasure the reflex of energy. I shall say a word in illustration of these definitions. Taking pleasure, pleasure is defined to be the reflex of energy, and of perfect energy, and not to be either energy or the perfection of energy itself, --and why? It is not simply defined an energy, exertion, or act, because some energies are not pleasurable, being either painful or indifferent, It is not simply defined the perfection of an energy, because we can easily separate in thought the perfection of an act, a conscious act, from any feeling of pleasure in its performance. The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, of the definition of pain, as a reflex of imperfect energy. Again, pleasure is defined the reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded, of free and unimpeded, exertion of a power, of whose 1 This is substantially the definition of Aristotle, whose doctrine, as expounded in the 10th book of the Nicomachean Ethics, is more fully stated below, p. 584. In the less accurate dissertation, which occurs in the 7th book of the same treatise, and which perhaps properly belongs to the Endemian Ethics, the pleasure is identified with the energy itself.→ ED. 2. Spontaneous and unimpeded. energy we are conscious. Here the term spontaneous refers to the subjective, the term unimpeded to the objective, perfection. Touching the term spontaneous, every power, all conditions being supplied, and all impediments being removed, tends, of its proper nature and without effort, to put forth a certain determinate maximum, intensive and protensive, of free energy. This determinate maximum of free energy, it, therefore, exerts spontaneously: if a less amount than this be actually put forth, a certain quantity of tendency has been forcibly repressed; whereas, if a greater than this has been actually exerted, a certain amount of nisus has been forcibly stimulated in the power. The term spontaneously, therefore, provides that the exertion of the power has not been constrained beyond the proper limit, the natural maximum, to which, if left to itself, it freely springs. Again, in regard to the term unimpeded, this stipulates that the power should not be checked in the spring it would thus spontaneously make to its maximum of energy, that is, it is supposed that the conditions requisite to allow this spring have been supplied, and that all impediments to it have been removed. This postulates of course the presence of an object. The definition further states, that the exertion must be that of a power of whose energy we are conscious. This requires no illustration. There are powers in man, the activities of which lie beyond the sphere of consciousness. But it is of the very essence of pleasure and pain to be felt, and there is no feeling out of consciousness. What has now been said of the terms used in the definition of pleasure, renders all comment superfluous on the parallel expressions employed in that of pain. 3. Of which we are conscious. Pleasure,-Positive and Negative. On this doctrine it is to be observed, that there are given different kinds of pleasure, and different kinds of .pain. In the first place, these are twofold, inasmuch as each is either Positive and Absolute, or Negative and Relative. In regard to the former, the mere negation of pain does, by relation to pain, constitute a state of pleasure. Thus, the removal of the toothache replaces us in a state which, though one really of indifference, is, by contrast to our previous agony, felt as pleasurable. This is negative or relative pleasure. Positive or absolute pleasure, on the contrary, is all that pleasure which we feel above a state of indifference, and which is, therefore, prized as a good in itself, and not simply as the removal of an evil. On the same principle, pain is also divided into Positive or Abso Pain,-Positive and lute, and into Negative or Relative. But, in the second place, there is, moreover, a subdivision of positive pain into that which accompanies a repression of the spontaneous energy of a power, and that which is conjoined with its effort, when stimulated to over-activity.1 Negative. Positive pain, subdivided. I proceed now to state certain corollaries, which flow immediately from the preceding doctrine. Corollaries from preceding doctrine. 1. The individual will be disposed to exercise his more vigorous powers. In the first place, as the powers which, in an individual, are either preponderantly strong by nature, or have become preponderantly strong by habit, have comparatively more perfect energies; so the pleasures which accompany these will be proportionally intense and enduring. But this being the case, the individual will be disposed principally, if not exclusively, to exercise these more vigorous powers, for their energies afford him the largest complement of purest pleasure. "Trahit sua quemque voluptas," each has his ruling passion. 2. Those faculties which most need cultivation, the least secure it. But, in the second place, as the exercise of a power is the only means by which it is invigorated, but as, at the same time, this exercise, until the development be accomplished, elicits imperfect, and, therefore, painful, or at least less pleasurable, energy, it follows that those faculties which stand the most in need of cultivation, are precisely those which the least secure it; while, on the contrary, those which are already more fully developed, are precisely those which present the strongest inducements for their still higher invigoration. 1 [With the foregoing theory compare Hutcheson, System of Moral Philosophy, i. p. 21 et seq Lüders, Kritik d. Statistik, p. 457-9. Tiedemann, Psychologie, p. 151. edit. 1804.] [Bonnet, Essai Analytique sur l'Ame, caps. xvii. LECTURE XLIII. THE FEELINGS. HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THEORIES OF Recapitulation. General historical notices of Theories of the Pleasurable. In my last Lecture, I gave an abstract statement of that Theory of Pleasure and Pain, which, I think, is competent, and exclusively competent, to explain the whole multiform phænomena of our Feelings, -a theory, consequently, which those whole phænomena concur in establishing. It is, in truth, nothing but a generalization of what is essential in the concrete facts themselves. Before, however, proceeding to show, by its application to particular cases, that this theory affords us a simple principle, on which to account for the most complicated and perplexing phænomena of Feeling, I shall attempt to give you a slight survey of the most remarkable opinions on this point. To do this, however imperfectly, is of the more importance, as there is no work in which any such historical deduction is attempted; but principally, because the various theories of philosophers on the doctrine of the pleasurable, are found, when viewed in connection, all to concur in manifesting the truth of that one which I have proposed to you,- a theory, in fact, which is the resumption and complement of them all. In attempting this survey, I by no means propose to furnish even an indication of all the opinions that have been held in regard to the pleasurable in general, nor even of all the doctrines on this subject that have been advanced by the authors to whom I specially refer. I can only afford to speak of the more remarkable theories, and, in these, only of the more essential particulars. But, in point of fact, though there is no end of what has been written upon pleasure and pain, considered in their moral relations and effects, the speculations in regard to their psycholog ical causes and conditions are comparatively few. In general, I may also premise that there is apparent a remarkable gravitation in the various doctrines promulgated on this point, towards a common centre; and, however one-sided and insufficient the several opinions |