prædicabiles. Sic totum integrum nobis notius, quam partes e quibus constat. Omne igitur quodcunque sub totius notione sese offert, prius cognoscitur, quam ejus partes. Sic species constituta, prius quam constituentia: ut equus, prius quam animal domabile ad trahendum, et vehendum. Hoc enim postea scimus per resolutionem. Sic genus prædicabile, prius quam suæ species. Sic totum integrum, prius quam partes. Contrarius huic ordo Naturæ est." 1 1 De Subtilitate, Ex. cccvii. § 21. [Cf. Zabarella, De Ordine Intelligendi, c. i. (De Rebus Naturalibus, p. 1042), and In Phys. Arist. i. 1, text. 5. Andreæ Cæsalpini, Peripatetica Quas tiones, lib. i. q. 1, p. 1 (edit. 1571). Herbart Lehrbuch zur Psychologie, § 194. Crousaz, Logique, t. iii. p. 1, § iii. c. iv. p. 141.] LECTURE XXXVII. THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY. — JUDGMENT AND REASONING. In our last Lecture, I terminated the consideration of the faculty of Comparison in its process of Generalization. I am to-day to consider it in those of its operations, which have obtained the Judgment and Reasoning. special names of Judgment and Reasoning. In these processes the act of Comparison is a judgment of something more than a mere affirmation of the exActs of Comparison. istence of a phænomenon, something more than a mere discrimination of one phænomenon from another; and, accordingly, while it has happened, that the intervention of judgment in every, even the simplest, act of primary cognition, as monotonous and rapid, has been overlooked, the name has been exclusively limited to the more varied and elaborate comparison of one notion with another, and the enouncement of their agreement or disagreement. It is in the discharge of this, its more obtrusive, function, that we are now about to consider the Elaborative Faculty. Judgment and Reasoning, necessary from the limitation of the human mind. Considering the Elaborative Faculty as a mean of discovering truth, by a comparison of the notions we have obtained from the Acquisitive Powers, it is evident that, though this faculty be the attribute by which a man is distinguished as a creation higher than the animals, it is equally the quality which marks his inferiority to superior intelligences. Judgment and Reasoning are rendered necessary by the imperfection of our nature. Were we capable of a knowledge of things and their relations at a single view, by an intuitive glance, discursive thought would be a superfluous act. It is by such an intuition that we must suppose that the Supreme Intelligence knows all things at once. I have already noticed that our knowledge does not commence with the individual and the most particular, objects of knowledge, Our knowledge commences with the vague and confused. - that we do not rise in any regular progress from the less to the more general, first considering the qualities which characterize individuals, then those which belong to species and genera, in regular ascent. On the contrary, our knowledge commences with the vague and confused, in the way which Aristotle has so well illustrated in the passage alleged to you. This I may further explain by another analogy. We perceive an object approaching from a distance. Illustrated. At first we do not know whether it be a living or an inanimate thing. By degrees we become aware that it is an animal, but of what kind, - whether man or beast, we are not as yet able to determine. It continues to advance, we discover it to be a quadruped, but of what species we cannot yet say. At length, we perceive that it is a horse, and again, after a season, we find that it is Bucephalus. Thus, as I formerly observed, children, first of all, take note of the generic differences, and they can distinguish species long before they are able to discriminate individuals. In all this, however, I must again remark, that our knowledge does not properly commence with the general, but with the vague and confused. Out of this the general and the individual are both equally evolved. "In consequence of this genealogy of our knowledge we usually commence by bestowing a name upon a whole object, or congeries of objects, of which, however, we possess only a partial and indefinite conception. In the sequel, this vague notion becomes somewhat more determinate; the partial idea which we had becomes enlarged by new accessions; by degrees, our conception waxes fuller, and represents a greater number of attributes. With this conception, thus amplified and improved, we compare the last notion which has been acquired, that is to say, we compare a part with its whole, or with the other parts of this whole, and finding that it is harmonious, that it dovetails and naturally assorts with other parts, we acquiesce in this union; and this we denominate an act of Judg Act of judgment, what. ment. Illustrated. "In learning Arithmetic, I form the notion of the number six, as surpassing five by a single unit, and as surpassed in the same proportion by seven. Then I find that it can be divided into two equal halves, of which each contains three units. By this procedure, the notion of the number six becomes more complex; the notion of an even number is one 1 See above, p. 500.- ED. of its parts. Comparing this new notion with that of the number, six becomes fuller by its addition. I recognize that the two notions suit, — in other words, I judge that six is an even number. "I have the conception of a triangle, and this conception is composed in my mind of several others. Among these partial notions, I select that of two sides greater than the third, and this notion, which I had at first, as it were, taken apart, I reünite with the others from which it had been separated, saying the triangle contains always two sides, which together are greater than the third. Subject. Predicate. "When I say, body is divisible; among the notions which concur in forming my conception of body, I particularly attend to that of divisible, and finding that it really agrees with the others, I judge accordingly that body is divisible. "Every time we judge, we compare a total conception with a partial, and we recognize that the latter really constitutes a part of the former. One of these conceptions has received the name of subject, the other that of attribute or predicate." The verb which connects these two parts is called the copula. The quadrangle is a double triangle; nine is an odd number; body is divisible. Here quadrangle, nine, body, are subjects; a double triangle, an odd number, divisible, are predicates. The whole mental judgment, formed by the subject, predicate, and copula, is Proposition. called, when enounced in words, proposition. How the parts of a proposition are to be discriminated. "In discourse, the parts of a proposition are not always found placed in logical order; but to discover and discriminate them, it is only requisite to ask What is the thing of which something else is affirmed or denied? The answer to this question will point out the subject; and we shall find the predicate if we inquire, What is affirmed or denied of the matter of which we speak? "A proposition is sometimes so enounced that each of its terms may be considered as subject and as predicate. Thus, when we say,Death is the wages of sin; we may regard sin as the subject of which we predicate death, as one of its consequences, and we may likewise view death as the subject of which we predicate sin, as the origin. In these cases, we must consider the general tenor of the discourse, and determine from the context what is the matter of which it principally treats." "In fine, when we judge we must have, in the first place, at least 1 Crousaz, [Logique, tom. iii. part ii. c. i. pp. 178, 181. — ED.] two notions; in the second place, we compare these; in the third, we recognize that the one contains or excludes the other; and, in the fourth, we acquiesce in this recognition."1 What Judgment involves. Simple Comparison or Judgment is conversant with two notions, the one of which is contained in the other. But Illustrated. Reasoning, what. it often happens that one notion is contained in another not immediately, but mediately, and we may be able to recognize the relation of these to each other only through a third, which, as it immediately contains the one, is immediately contained in the other. Take the notions, A, B, C.- A' contains B; B contains C;-A, therefore, also contains C. But as, ex hypothesi, we do not at once and directly know C as contained in A, we cannot immediately compare them together, and judge of their relation. We, therefore, perform a double or complex process of comparison; we compare B with A, and C with B, and then C with A, through B. We say B is a part of A; C is a part of B; therefore, C is a part of A. This double act of comparison has obtained the name of Reasoning; the term Judgment being left to express the simple act of comparison, or rather its result. If this distinction between Judgment and Reasoning were merely a verbal difference to discriminate the simpler and more complex act of comparison, no objection could be raised to it on the score of propriety, and its convenience would fully warrant its establishment. But this distinction has not always been meant to express nothing more. It has, in fact, been generally supposed to mark out two distinct faculties. Reasoning,- Deductive and Inductive. Reasoning is either from the whole to its parts; or from all the parts, discretively, to the whole they constitute, collectively. The former of these is Deductive; the latter is Inductive Reasoning. The statement you will find, in all logical books, of reasonings from certain parts to the whole, or from certain parts to certain parts, is erroneous. I shall first speak of the reasoning from the whole to its parts, or of the Deductive Inference. Deductive Reasoning, its axiom. Two phases of Deductive Reasoning, determined by two kinds of whole and parts. 1°, It is self-evident, that whatever is the part of a part, is a part of the whole. This one axiom is the foundation of all reasoning from the whole to the parts. There are, however, two kinds of whole and 1 Crousaz, [Logique. t. iii. p. ii. c. i. pp. 181, 186.- - ED.] |