LECTURE IV.

THE CAUSES OF PHILOSOPHY.

HAVING thus endeavored to make you vaguely apprehend what

The causes of philosophy in the elements of our constitution.

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cannot be precisely understood, the Nature and Comprehension of Philosophy, — I now proceed to another question, - What are the Causes of Philosophy? The causes of philosophy lie in the original elements of our constitution. We are created with the faculty of knowledge, and, consequently, created with the tendency to exert it. Man philosophizes as he lives. He may philosophize well or ill, but philosophize he must. Philosophy can, indeed, only be assailed through philosophy itself. "If," says Aristotle, in a passage preserved to us by Olympiodorus,' "we must philosophize, we must philosophize; if we must not philosophize, we must philosophize;-in any case, therefore, we must philosophize." "Were philosophy," says Clement of Alexandria, "an evil, still philosophy is to be studied, in order that it may be scientifically contemned." And Averroes,3-"Philosophi solum est spernere philosophiam." Of the causes of philosophy some are, therefore, contained in man's very capacity for knowledge; these are essential and necessary. But there are others, again, which lie in certain feelings with which he is endowed; these are comple

These causes either essential or complementary.

mentary and assistant. Of the former class, that is, of the essential causes, there are in all two: the one is, the necessity we feel to connect Causes with Effects; the other, to carry up our knowledge into Unity. These tendencies, however, if not identical in their origin, coincide in

The first class apparently two-fold.

1 Olympiodori in Platonis Alcibiadem Priorem Commentarii, ed. Creuzer, p. 144. Kal Apioτοτέλης ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ ἔλεγεν ὅτι εἴτε φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον· εἴτε μὴ φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον· πάντως δὲ φιλοσοφητέον. Quoted also by the anonymous commentator in Cramer's Anecdota, iv. p. 391. -ED.

2 Εἰ καὶ ἄχρηστος εἴη φιλοσοφία, ει εὔχε ρηστος ἡ τῆς ἀχρηστίας βεβαίωσις, εὔχρησε TOS. Stromata, i. 2.- ED.

3 See Discussions, p. 786.-ED. ["Se moquer de la philosophie, c'est vraiment philosopher." Pascal, Pensées, part i. art. xi. § 36. Compare Montaigne, Essais, lib. ii. c. xii. -tom. ii. p. 216, ed. 1725.]

1. The principle of Cause and Effect.

their result; for, as I have previously explained to you, in ascending from cause to cause, we necessarily, (could we carry our analysis to its issue,) arrive at absolute unity. Indeed, were it not a discussion for which you are not as yet prepared, it might be shown, that both principles originate in the same condition;- that both emanate, not from any original power, but from the same original powerlessness of mind. Of the former, namely, the tendency, or rather the necessity, which we feel to connect the objects of our experience with others which afford the reasons of their existence,—it is needful to say but little. The nature of this tendency is not a matter on which we can at present enter; and the fact of its existence is too notorious to require either proof or illustration. It is sufficient to say, or rather to repeat what we have already stated, that the mind is unable to realize in thought the possibility of any absolute commencement; it cannot conceive that anything which begins to be is anything more than a new modification of preexistent elements; it is unable to view any individual thing as other than a link in the mighty chain of being; and every isolated object is viewed by it only as a fragment which, to be known, must be known in connection with the whole of which it constitutes a part. It is thus that we are unable to rest satisfied with a mere historical knowledge of existence; and that even our happiness is interested in discovering causes, hypothetical at least, if not real, for the various phænomena of the existence of which our experience informs us.

2. The love of Unity.

"Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas." 2

The second tendency of our nature, of which 'philosophy is the result, is the desire. of Unity. On this, which indeed involves the other, it is necessary to be somewhat more explicit. This tendency is one of the most prominent characteristics of the human mind. It, in part, originates in the imbecility of our faculties. We are lost in the multitude of the objects presented to our observation, and it is only by assorting them in classes that we can reduce the infinity of nature to the finitude of mind. The conscious Ego, the conscious Self, by its nature one, seems also constrained to require that unity by which it is distinguished, in everything which it receives, and in everything which it produces. I regret that I can illustrate this only by examples which cannot, I am aware, as yet be fully intelligible

1 This is partially argued in the Discussions, p. 609.—ED. 2 Virgil, Georgics, ii. 490.

to all.

We are conscious of a scene presented to our senses only by uniting its parts into a perceived whole. Perception is thus a unifying act. The Imagination cannot represent an object without uniting, in a single combination, the various elements of which it is composed. Generalization is only the apprehension of the one in the many, and language little else than a registry of the factitious unities of thought. The Judgment cannot affirm or deny one notion of another, except by uniting the two in one indivisible act of comparison. Syllogism is simply the union of two judgments in a third. Reason, Intellect, vous, in fine, concatenating thoughts and objects into system, and tending always upwards from particular facts to general laws, from general laws to universal principles, is never satisfied in its ascent till it comprehend, (what, however, it can never do), all laws in a single formula, and consummate all conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditional existence. Nor is it only in science that the mind desiderates the one. We seek it equally in works of art. A work of art is only deserving of the name, inasmuch as an idea of the work has preceded its execution, and inasmuch as it is itself a realization of the ideal model in sensible forms. All languages express the mental operations by words which denote a reduction of the many to the one. Σύνεσις, περίληψις, συναίσθησις, συνεπιγνῶσις, etc. in Greek ; - in Latin, cogere, (co-agere), cogitare, (co-agitare), concipere, cognoscere, comprehendere, conscire, with their derivatives, may serve for examples.

Testimonies to the love of unity.

The history of philosophy is only the history of this tendency; and philosophers have amply testified to its reality. "The mind," says Anaxagoras,1 "only knows when it subdues its objects, when it reduces the many to the one?" "All knowledge," say the Platonists,2 "is the gathering up into one, and the indivisible apprehension of this unity by the knowing mind." Leibnitz and Kant1 have, in like manner, defined knowledge by the representation of multitude in unity. The end of philosophy," says Plato, "is the intuïtion

1 Arist. De Anima, iii 4: Ανάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν Αναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῇ. The passage of Anaxagoras is given at length in the Commentary of Simplicius, and quoted in part by Trendelenburg on the De Anima, p. 466. — ED.

2 Priscianus Lydus: Κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἐν συνάιρεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀμερίστον τοῦ γνωστοῦ παντὸς περίληψιν, ἁπάσης ἱσταμένης γνώσεως. (Μετάφρασις τῶν Θεοφράστου Περὶ Alohσews Opera Theoph. ed. Basil p. 273)

Thus rendered in the Latin version of Ficinus: "Cognitio omnis constat secundum quandam in unum congregationem, atque secundem impartibilem cognoscibilis totius comprehensionem. - ED.

3 Monadologie, § 14.-ED.

4 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 359, ed. 1799. -ED.

Cf. Philebus, sub init., especially p. 16: Δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστ τοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν; and Republic, v. p. 475, et. seq. Ed.

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of unity;" and Plotinus, among many others, observes that our knowledge is perfect as it is one. The love of unity is by Aristotle applied to solve a multitude of psychological phænomena. St. Augustin even analyzes pain into a feeling of the frustration of unity. "Quid est enim aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens? Unde luce clarius apparet, quam sit illa anima in sui corporis universitate avida unitatis et tenax."3 This love of unity, this tendency of mind to generalize its

Love of unity a guiding principle in philosophy.

knowledge, leads us to anticipate in nature a corresponding uniformity; and as this anticipation is found in harmony with experience, it not only affords the efficient cause of philosophy, but the guiding principle to its discoveries. "Thus, for instance, when it is observed that solid bodies are compressible, we are induced to expect that liquids will be found to be so likewise; we subject them, consequently, to a series of experiments; nor do we rest satisfied until it be proved that this quality is common to both classes of substances. Compressibility is then proclaimed a physical law,—a law of nature in general; and we experience a vivid gratification in this recognition of unconditioned universality." Another example; Kant, reflecting on the differences among the planets, or rather among the stars revolving round the sun, and having discovered that these differences betrayed a uniform progress and proportion, a proportion which was no longer to be found between Saturn and the first of the comets, -the law of unity and the analogy of nature, led him to conjecture that, in the intervening space, there existed a star, the discovery of which would vindicate the universality of the law. This anticipation was verified. Uranus was discovered by Herschel, and our dissatisfac

1 Enn. iii. lib. viii. c. 2, on which Ficinus says: "Cognoscendi potentia in ipso actu cognitionis unum quodammodo sit cum objecto, et quo magis sit unum, eo perfectior est cognitio, atque vicissim - ED.

...

Enn. vi. lib. ix. c. 1: ̓Αρετὴ δὲ ψυχῆς ὅταν εἰς ἕν, καὶ εἰς μίαν ὁμολογίαν ἑνωθῇ. . Ἐπειδὴ τὰ πάντα εἰς ἐν ἄγει, δημιουργοῦσα καὶ πλάττουσα καὶ μορφοῦσα καὶ συντάττουσα. Proclus, - Γνῶσις οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ὄντων, εἴπως μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν . . . Οὐδὲ λόγος ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἐκ πολλῶν εἶς, εἴπερ τέλειος· καὶ ἡ γνῶσις, ὅταν τὸ γινώσκον ἐν γίνηται πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν. In Platonis Theologiam, p. 76 (ed. 1618). — ED.

2 See De Memoria, § 5, for application of this principle to the problem of Reminiscence. Cf. Reid's Works, p. 900. See also Problems,

xviii. 9, where it is used to explain the higher pleasure we derive from those narratives that relate to a single subject. - ED.

3 De Libero Arbitrio, lib. iii. 23. [St. Augustin applied the principle of Unity to solve the theory of the Beautiful: "Omnis pulchritudinis forma unitas est." Epist. xviii.] Oral Interp.

4 Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, 1755; Werke, vol. vi. p. 88. Kant's conjecture was founded on a supposed progressive increase in the eccentricities of the planetary orbits. This progression, however, is only true of Venus, the Earth, Jupiter, and Saturn. The eccentricity diminishes again in Uranus, and still more in Neptune. Subsequent discoveries have thus rather weakened than confirmed the theory. — ED.

tion at the anomaly appeased. Franklin, in like manner, surmised that lightning and the electric spark were identical; and when he succeeded in verifying this conjecture, our love of unity was gratified. From the moment an isolated fact is discovered, we endeavor to refer it to other facts which it resembles. Until this be accomplished, we do not view it as understood. This is the case, for example, with sulphur, which, in a certain degree of temperature melts like other bodies, but at a higher degree of heat, instead of evaporating, again consolidates. When a fact is generalized, our discontent is quieted, and we consider the generality itself as tantamount to an explanation. Why does this apple fall to the ground? Because all bodies gravitate towards each other. Arrived at this general fact, we inquire no more, although ignorant. now as previously of the cause of gravitation; for gravitation is nothing more than a name for a general fact, the why of which we know not. A mystery, if recognized as universal, would no longer appear mysterious.

Love of unity a source of error.

"But this thirst of unity,- this tendency of mind to generalize its knowledge, and our concomitant belief in the uniformity of natural phænomena, is not only an effective mean of discovery, but likewise an abundant source of error. Hardly is there a similarity detected between two or three facts, than men hasten to extend it to all others; and if, perchance, the similarity has been detected by ourselves, self-love closes our eyes to the contradictions which our theory may encounter from experience."1 "I have heard,” says Condillac, "of a philosopher who had the happiness of thinking that he had discovered a principle which was to explain all the wonderful phænomena of chemistry, and who, in the ardor of his self-gratulation, hastened to communicate his discovery to a skilful chemist. The chemist had the kindness to listen to him, and then calmly told him that there was but one unfortunate circumstance for his discovery, that the chemical facts were precisely the converse of what he had supposed them to be. Well, then, said the philosopher, 'have the goodness to tell me what they are, that I may explain them on my system.'"2 We are naturally disposed to refer everything we do not know to principles with which we are familiar. As Aristotle observes, the early Pythagoreans, who first studied arithmetic, were induced, by their scientific predilections, to explain the problem of the universe by the properties of

1 Garnier, Cours de Psychologie, p. 192-94. [Cf. Ancillon, Nouv. Mélanges, i. p. 1, et seq.]

2 Traité des Systèmes, chap. xii. Œuvres Philos. tom. iv. p. 146 (ed. 1795).

3 Metaph. i. 5. - ED.