distinguishable objects are confounded, we are conscious of them as one; where no object is discriminated, we are not conscious of any. Before leaving this condition, I may parenthetically state, that, while all philosophers admit that consciousness involves a discrimination, many do not allow it any cognizance of aught beyond the sphere of self. The great majority of philosophers do this because they absolutely deny the possibility of an immediate knowledge of external things, and, consequently, hold that consciousness in distinguishing the non-ego from the ego, only distinguishes self from self; for they maintain, that what we are conscious of as something different from the perceiving mind, is only, in reality, a modification of that mind, which we are condemned to mistake for the material reality. Some philosophers, however, (as Reid and Stewart,) who hold, with mankind at large, that we do possess an immediate knowledge of something different from the knowing self, still limit consciousness to a cognizance of self; and, consequently, not only deprive it of the power of distinguishing external objects from each other, but even of the power of discriminating the ego and non-ego. These opinions we are afterwards to consider. With this qualification, all philosophers may be viewed as admitting that discrimination is an essential condition of consciousness. The fourth condition of consciousness, which may be assumed as very generally acknowledged, is, that it in4. Judgment. volves judgment. A judgment is the mental act by which one thing is affirmed or denied of another. This fourth condition is in truth only a necessary consequence of the third, for it is impossible to discriminate without judging, - discrimination, or contradistinction, being in fact only the denying one thing of another. It may to some seem strange that consciousness, the simple and primary act of intelligence, should be a judgment,— which philosophers, in general, have viewed as a compound and derivative operation. This is, however, altogether a mistake. A judgment is, as I shall hereafter show you, a simple act of mind, for every act of mind implies a judgment. Do we perceive or imagine without affirming, in the act, the external or internal existence of the object? Now these fundamental affirmations are the affirmations, in other words, the judgments, of consciousness.

The fifth undeniable condition of consciousness is memory. This condition also is a corollary of the third. For without memory our mental states could not be

5. Memory.

held fast, compared, distinguished from each other, and referred to

1 See Reid's Works, pp. 243, 414, with the Editor's Notes. -ED.

self. Without memory, each indivisible, each infinitesimal, moment in the mental succession, would stand isolated from every other,— would constitute, in fact, a separate existence. The notion of the ego or self, arises from the recognized permanence and identity of the thinking subject in contrast to the recognized succession and variety of its modifications. But this recognition is possible only through memory. The notion of self is, therefore, the result of memory. But the notion of self is involved in consciousness, so consequently is memory.

LECTURE XII.

CONSCIOUSNESS,-ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS: RELATION TO COGNITIVE FACULTIES IN GENERAL.

So far as we have proceeded, our determination of the contents of consciousness may be viewed as that universally admitted; for though I could quote to you certain counterRecapitulation. doctrines, these are not of such importance as to warrant me in perplexing the discussion by their refutation, which would indeed be nothing more than the exposition of very palpable mistakes. Let us, therefore, sum up the points we have established. We have shown, in general, that consciousness is the self-recognition that we know, or feel, or desire, etc. We have shown, in particular, 1°, That consciousness is an actual or living, and not a potential or dormant, knowledge;-2°, That it is an immediate and not a mediate knowledge; -3°, That it supposes a discrimination; -4°, That it involves a judgment;-and, 5°, That it is possible only through memory.

We are now about to enter on a more disputed territory; and the first thesis I shall attempt to establish, involves several subordinate questions.

II. Special conditions of consciousness not generally admitted.

I state, then, as the first contested position which I am to maintain, that our consciousness is coëxtensive with our knowledge. But this assertion, that we have no knowledge of which we are not conscious, is tantamount to the other that consciousness is coëxtensive with our cognitive faculties, and this again is convertible with the assertion, that consciousness is not a special faculty, but that our special faculties of knowledge are only modifications of consciousness. The question, therefore, may be thus stated, Is consciousness the genus under which our several faculties of knowledge are contained as species, or, is consciousness itself a special faculty coördinate with, and not comprehending, these?

1. Our consciousness coëxtensive with our knowledge.

Error of Dr. Brown.

Before proceeding to canvass the reasonings of those who have reduced consciousness from the general condition, to a particular variety, of knowledge, I may notice the error of Dr. Brown, in asserting that, "in the systems of philosophy which have been most generally prevalent, especially in this part of the island, consciousness has always been classed as one of the intellectual powers of the mind, differing from its other powers, as these mutually differ from each other." This statement, in so far as it regards the opinion of philosophers in general, is not only not true, but the very reverse of truth. For, in place of consciousness being, "in the systems most generally prevalent," classed as a special faculty, it has, in all the greater schools of philosophy, been viewed as the universal attribute of the intellectual acts. Was consciousness degraded to a special faculty in the Platonic, in the Aristotelian, in the Cartesian, in the Lockian, in the Leibnitzian, in the Kantian philosophies? These are the systems which have obtained a more general authority than any others, and yet in none of these is the supremacy of consciousness denied; in all of them it is either expressly or implicitly recognized. Dr. Brown's assertion is so far true in relation to this country, that by Hutcheson, Reid, and Stewart, to say nothing of inferior names, consciousness has been considered as nothing higher than a special faculty. As I regard this opinion to be erroneous, and as the error is one affecting the very cardinal point of philosophy, as it stands opposed to the peculiar and most important principles of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart themselves, and has even contributed to throw around their doctrine of perception an obscurity that has caused Dr. Brown absolutely to mistake it for its converse, and as I have never met with any competent refutation of the grounds on which it rests, I shall endeavor to show you that, notwithstanding the high authority of its supporters, this opinion is altogether untenable.

Reid and Stewart on consciousness.

As I previously stated to you, neither Dr. Reid nor Mr. Stewart has given us any regular account of consciousness; their doctrine on this subject is to be found scattered in different parts of their works. The two following brief passages of Reid contain the principal positions of that doctrine. The first is from the first chapter of the first Essay On the Intellectual Powers :2 "Consciousness is a word used by philosophers to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all

1 Philosophy of the Human Mind, lecture xi. vol. i. p. 225, 2d edit. - ED. 2 Works, p. 222.

the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe that consciousness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in popular discourse, is to confound consciousness with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in philosophical discourse. It is likewise to be observed, that consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, I am conscious of the table which is before me. I perceive it, I see it; but do not say I am conscious of it. As that consciousness by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds, is a different power from that by which we perceive external objects, and as these different powers have different names in our language, and, I believe, in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this distinction, and never to confound things so different in their nature.” The second is from the fifth chapter of the sixth Essay On the Intellectual Powers. "Consciousness is an operation of the understanding of its own kind, and cannot be logically defined. The objects of it are our present pains, our pleasures, our hopes, our fears, our desires, our doubts, our thoughts of every kind; in a word, all the passions and all the actions and operations of our own minds, while they are present. We may remember them when they are past; but we are conscious of them only while they are present.”. Besides what is thus said in general of consciousness, in his treatment of the different special faculties, Reid contrasts consciousness with each. Thus in his essays on Perception, on Conception or Imagination, and on Memory, he specially contradistinguishes consciousness from each of these operations; and it is also incidentally by Reid, but more articulately by Stewart, discriminated from Attention and Reflection.

3

Consciousness a spe

cial faculty, according to Reid and Stewart.

According to the doctrine of these philosophers, consciousness is thus a special faculty, coördinate with the other intellectual powers, having like them a particular operation and a peculiar object. And what is the peculiar object which is proposed to consciousness? The peculiar objects of consciousness, says Dr. Reid, are all the present passions and operations of our minds. Consciousness thus has for its objects, among the other modifica

1 Works, p. 442.

5

2 See Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. Works, p. 297, and Essay i. Works, p. 222; Essay iii. Works, pp. 340, 351; Essay iv. Works, p. 368. -ED.

3 See Works, p 239. Compare pp. 240, 258, 347, 419-20, 443. — .ED.

4 Coll. Works, vol. ii. p. 134, and pp. 122, 123. -ED.

5 See the same argument in the Author's Discussions, p. 47. - ED.