LECTURE XI. OUTLINE OF DISTRIBUTION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA : Distribution of the mental phænomena. I Now proceed to the consideration of the important subject,the Distribution of the Mental Phænomena into their primary or most general classes. In regard to the distribution of the mental phænomena, I shall not at present attempt to give any history or criticism of the various classifications which have been proposed by different philo-. sophers. These classifications are so numerous, and so contradictory, that, in the present stage of your knowledge, such a history would only fatigue the memory, without informing the understanding; for you cannot be expected to be as yet able to comprehend, at least many of the reasons which may be alleged for, or against, the different distributions of the human faculties. I shall, therefore, at once proceed to state the classification of these, which I have adopted as the best. Consciousness,- the one essential element of the mental phæno mena. In taking a comprehensive survey of the mental phænomena, these are all seen to comprise one essential element, or to be possible only under one necessary condition. This element or condition is Consciousness, or the knowledge that I, that the Ego exists, in some determinate state. In this knowledge they appear, or are realized as phænomena, and with this knowledge they likewise disappear, or have no longer a phænomenal existence; so that consciousness may be compared to an internal light, by means of which, and which alone, what passes in the mind is rendered visible. Consciousness is simple, is not composed of parts, either similar or dissimilar. It always resembles itself, differing only in the degrees of its intensity; thus, there are not various kinds of consciousness, although there are various kinds of mental modes, or states, of which we are conscious. Whatever division, therefore, of the mental phænomena may be adopted, all its members must be within consciousness itself, which must be viewed as comprehensive of the whole phænomena to be divided; far less should we reduce it, as a special phænomenon, to a particular class. Let consciousness, therefore, remain one and indivisible, comprehending all the modifications, — all the phænomena, of the thinking subject. But taking, again, a survey of the mental modifications, or phanomena, of which we are conscious, - these are seen to divide themselves into THREE great classes. In the first place, there are the phanomena of Knowledge; in the second place, Three grand classes of mental phænom ena. there are the phænomena of Feeling, or the phænomena of Pleasure and Pain; and, in the third place, there are the phænomena of Will and Desire.1 Let me illustrate this by an example. I see a picture. Now, first of all, I am conscious of perceiving a certain complement of colors and figures, I recognize what the object is. This is the phænomenon of Cognition or Knowledge. But this is not the only phænomenon of which I may be here conscious. I may experience certain affections in the contemplation of this object. If the picture be a masterpiece, the gratification will be unalloyed; but if it be an unequal production, I shall be conscious, perhaps, of enjoyment, but of enjoyment alloyed with dissatisfaction. This is the phænomenon of Feeling,-or of Pleasure and Pain. But these two phænomena do not yet exhaust all of which I may be conscious on the occasion. I may desire to see the picture long, to see it often, - to make it my own, and, perhaps, I may will, resolve, or determine so to do. This is the complex phænomenon of Will and Desire. Their nomenclature. The English language, unfortunately, does not afford us terms competent to express and discriminate, with even tolerable clearness and precision, these classes of phænomena. In regard to the first, indeed, we have comparatively little reason to complain,-the synonymous terms, knowledge and cognition, suffice to distinguish the phænomena of this class from those of the other two. In the second class, the defect of the language becomes more apparent. The word feeling is the only term under which we can possibly collect the phænomena of pleasure and pain, and yet this word is ambiguous. For it is not only employed to denote what we are conscious of as agreeable or disagreeable in our mental states, but it is likewise used as a 1 Compare Stewart's Works, voi. i., Advertisement by Editor. - ED. -- synonym for the sense of touch. It is, however, principally in relation to the third class that the deficiency is manifested. In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of adequately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the nisus or conatus, the tendency towards the realization of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire a blind and fatal, tendency to act. Now, to express, I say, the tendency to overt action, the quality in which desire and will are equally contained, we possess no English term to which an exception of more or less cogency may not be taken. Were we to say the phanomena of tendency, the phrase would be vague; and the same is true of the phænomena of doing. Again, the term phænomena of appetency is objectionable, because, (to say nothing of the unfamiliarity of the expression,) appetency, though perhaps etymologically unexceptionable, has both in Latin and English a meaning almost synonymous with desire. Like the Latin appetentia, the Greck õpeĝis is equally ill-balanced, for, though used by philosophers to comprehend both will and desire, it more familiarly suggests the latter, and we need not, therefore, be solicitous, with Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo, to naturalize in English the term orectic3 Again, the phrase phænomena of activity would be even worse; every possible objection can be made to the term active powers, by which the philosophers of this country have designated the orectic faculties of the Aristotelians. For you will observe, that all faculties are equally active; and it is not the overt performance, but the tendency towards it, for which we are in quest of an expression. The German is the only language I am acquainted with which is able to supply the term of which philosophy is in want. The expression Bestrebungs Vermögen, which is most nearly, though awkwardly and inadequately, translated by striving faculties, faculties of effort or endeavor, is now generally employed, in the philosophy of Germany, as the genus comprehending desire and will. Perhaps the phrase, phænomena of exertion, is, upon the whole, the best expression to denote the manifestations, and exertive faculties, the best expression to denote the faculties of will and desire. Exero, in Latin, means literally to put forth, — and, with us, exertion and exertive are the only endurable words that I can find which approximate, though distantly, to the strength and precision of the German - 1 [Brown uses feeling for consciousness. Oral Interp.]; e. g. Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lecture xi. "The mind is susceptible of a variety of feelings, every new feeling being a change of its state." Second edition, vol. i. p. 222.- Ed. 2 Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. i. 10: Bouλnois, μetà λόγου ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, ἄλογοι δ' ὀρέξεις, ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία. - ED. 3 See Lord Monboddo's Ancient Metaphysics, book ii. chaps. vii. ix. - ED. expression. I shall, however, occasionally employ likewise the term appetency, in the rigorous signification I have mentioned, as a genus comprehending under it both desires and volitions.1 By whom this threefold distribution first made. 2 This division of the phænomena of mind into the three great classes of the Cognitive faculties, the Feelings, or capacities of Pleasure and Pain, and the Exertive or Conative Powers, -I do not propose as original. It was first promulgated by Kant; and the felicity of the distribution was so apparent, that it has now been long all but universally adopted in Germany by the philosophers of every school; and, what is curious, the only philosopher of any eminence by whom it has been assailed, indeed, the only philosopher of any reputation by whom it has been, in that country, rejected, is not an opponent of the Kantian philosophy, but one of its most zealous champions. To the psychologists of this country, it is apparently wholly unknown. They still adhere to the old scholastic division into powers of the Understanding and powers of the Will; or, as it is otherwise expressed, into Intellectual and Active powers.* By its author, the Kantian classification has received no illustration; and by other German philosophers, it has apparently been viewed as too manifest to require any. Nor do I think it needs much; Objection to the classification obviated. though a few words in explanation may not be inexpedient. An objection to the arrangement may, perhaps, be taken on the ground that the three classes are not coördinate. It is evident that every mental phænomenon is either an act of knowledge, or only possible through an act of knowledge, for consciousness is a knowledge, a phænomenon of cognition; and, on this principle, many philosophers, as Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Wolf, Platner, and others, -have been led to regard the knowing, or representative faculty, as they called it, the faculty of cognition, as the fundamental power of mind, from which all others are derivative. To this the 11848. The term Conative (from Conari) is employed by Cudworth in his Treatise on Free Will, published some years ago from his MSS. in the British Museum. [A Treatise on Free Will, by Ralph Cudworth, D. D., edited by John Allen, M. A. London, 1838, p. 31. "Notwithstanding which, the hegemonic of the soul may, by conatives and endeavors, acquire more and more power over them." The terms Conation and Conative are those finally adopted by the Author, as the most appropriate expressions for the class of phænomena in question. - ED. answer is easy. These philosophers did not observe that, although pleasure and pain - although desire and volition, are only as they are known to be; yet, in these modifications, a quality, a phænomenon of mind, absolutely new, has been superadded, which was never involved in, and could, therefore, never have been evolved out of, the mere faculty of knowledge. The faculty of knowledge is certainly the first in order, inasmuch as it is the conditio sine qua non of the others; and we are able to conceive a being possessed of the power of recognizing existence, and yet wholly void of all feeling of pain and pleasure, and of all powers of desire and volition. On the other hand, we are wholly unable to conceive a being possessed of feeling and desire, and, at the same time, without a knowledge of any object upon which his affections may be employed, and without a consciousness of these affections themselves. We can farther conceive a being possessed of knowledge and feeling alone a being endowed with a power of recognizing objects, of enjoying the exercise, and of grieving at the restraint, of his activity, and yet devoid of that faculty of voluntary agencyof that conation, which is possessed by man. To such a being would belong feelings of pain and pleasure, but neither desire nor will, properly so called. On the other hand, however, we cannot possibly conceive the existence of a voluntary activity independently of all feeling; for voluntary conation is a faculty which can only be determined to energy through a pain or pleasure, — through an estimate of the relative worth of objects. In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and conations, it is not, therefore, to be supposed that these phænomena are possible independently of each other. In our philosophical systems, they may stand separated from each other in books and chapters;—in nature, they are ever interwoven. In every, the simplest, modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will, go to constitute the mental state; and it is only by a scientific abstraction that we are able to analyze the state into elements, which are never really existent but in mutual combination. These elements are found, indeed, in very various proportions in different states, sometimes one preponderates, sometimes another; but there is no state in which they are not all coëxistent. Let the mental phænomena, therefore, be distributed under the three heads of phænomena of Cognition, or the faculties of Knowledge; phænomena of Feeling, or the capacities of Pleasure and Pain; and phænomena of Desiring or Willing, or the powers of Conation. The order of these is determined by their relative consecution. |