ARTICLE VII.

AN ESSAY ON THE POWER OF THE WILL OVER THE OTHER FACULTIES.

By the Author of "An Essay on Cause and Effect," etc. Vol. II., p. 381.

In an "Essay on Cause and Effect," in the Repository for October, 1839, the writer of the present article endeavored to establish the position, that the doctrine of free agency primarily consists in maintaining, that mind is constituted with power to choose otherwise than as it does choose. In other words, a free agent is a mind possessing susceptibilities of pain and pleasure, intellect, which enables it to judge what will secure the most enjoyment, and will, or the power of deciding which kind of enjoyment shall be secured ;it is not, like matter, bound, by its nature to one and only one fixed rule of change, but is endowed with inherent powers of activity, so that motives are not producing, but only occasional causes of volition.

* The "Essay" of this writer in the Repository for October, 1839, for peculiar reasons, as then stated, was allowed to appear anonymously. Much curiosity was manifested to know its authorship, and the editor, as well as the writer, has to regret that the name, through the neglect of some one, has become known to a few of our readers. As the reasons for withholding it are quite peculiar, and such as would be regarded altogether creditable to the writer, it is hoped that no unnecessary publication of it will be made by those to whom it may have been communicated.

Our constant readers are aware that the former "Essay" by this author has called forth two articles from the Rev. Dr. Woods, in the January and July Nos. of the Repository, and an article by an anonymous "Inquirer," in the April No., on the same general subject. The points in discussion, in these able hands, we think have already received some interesting and profitable elucidation. Dr. Woods, however, has something more to say in reply to the questions propounded to him by "Inquirer," and the writer of the present article will claim the right of replying to the strictures of Dr. Woods on the Essay of October, 1839. Indeed a reply to the first article of Dr. Woods was furnished by the author of the " Essay," in

The question of free agency relates simply to the powers conferred on mind by the Creator. The fatalist claims that it is so constituted that it can choose only one thing, viz. that which it does choose. The advocate of free agency claims that it has power to choose either of two or more modes of enjoyment, and that in all cases of volition it had power to have chosen otherwise.

In maintaining the doctrine of free agency, the writer stated the opposite doctrine of fate, and showed that its whole defence was based, either on the assumption that desire and volition are the same thing, or else on a species of sophistry which seems to unite the character of the petitio principii, and also of reasoning in a circle. The writer then attempted to establish the doctrine of free agency, by showing that it is one of those intuitive truths, or first principles of reason, which all men believe, and which they prove to be their belief by their feelings, words and actions.

It is now proposed to inquire concerning the other constitutional powers of mind, and how far they can be modified or controlled by the will. And in doing this, there will be no need of abstruse and metaphysical subtilties or technics. The language of common life furnishes all the distinctions and the terms which will be required.

The question then in popular language is this, How far are our thoughts and feelings under the control of our will? It appears that the mind is susceptible of pain and pleasure from a great variety of sources. There are the enjoyments of the senses, the pleasures of taste, the enjoyment connected with the simple exercise of our physical and mental powers, the enjoyment of the affections, and the pleasures incident to our moral nature. All these suscepti

season for our July No. But we shall be excused for deferring its publication, to afford the writer opportunity to say, in a single article hereafter, all that may be judged necessary in answer to the two articles by Dr. Woods. We are happy to add that the spirit of these discussions, thus far, has been such as we desire ever to see exhibited on the pages of the Repository. We trust, also, that the writers will, in the end, be able fully to understand each other, and that some points of truth, which have long been the subject of controversy, will have been so explained and defended as to command the settled belief of our intelligent readers.-EDITors.

bilities render us liable to suffer from the same sources. This, of course, is an incomplete enumeration of the mental susceptibilities. All acts of volition relate to the attainment of some one or other of these kinds of enjoyment, or the avoidance of suffering from some of these sources. No act of volition can be named, that does not imply a desire to escape some evil or gain some good, of which these susceptibilities make us capable.

Minds seem to be differently endowed in reference to the relative proportion of these susceptibilities, as to vividness and strength. Whether this is owing to the original constitution of mind, or to differing influences and circumstances in the early period of existence, is a question of little practical moment, and one not easily determined. But the fact of such a difference none can dispute That some are much more susceptible to emotions of shame, or fear, or anger, that some are susceptible to higher enjoyment from the possession of power, or distinction or affection than others, none will deny. A rational mind is one which has the power of comparing different modes of enjoyment, of ascertaining their relative tendencies through a long period of time, and of deciding which will secure the most enjoyment with the least suffering; and a mind is said to act rationally, just in proportion as its choices lead to the attainment of the highest amount of good, with the least consequent evil.

in regard to volitions, there is the foundation for a distinction which may be denominated generic and specific. Generic volitions are those on which subsequent volitions depend, and specific volitions are those which are consequent on some previous volition. For example, a man wills to sketch a landscape from nature. In consequence of this volition, a thousand specific volitions follow. Every step taken, every movement of the pencil in executing this determination, is caused by volitions which are consequent on a generic previous volition. Volitions may be generic in regard to certain volitions and specific in reference to others. Thus the determination to sketch a landscape, though generic in reference to consequent volitions, may be specific in reference to a more generic volition, which was made when the man chose the profession of a painter.

There are some volitions so extensive in their consequences as to exert a controlling influence over almost all

Thus when a man

the volitions of the whole future life. chooses to become a lawyer, rather than a merchant or a physician, by one act of choice he renders almost every volition of his future life different from what it would have been, had this generic volition been otherwise.

We are now prepared to inquire respecting the influence of our volitions on our thoughts and feelings, or in more scientific terms, on our intellectual powers and our susceptibilities.

The laws of association, as they are called, are those facts in regard to the succession of our thoughts, which have been ascertained by experience. One of the most important of these is the influence of strong desire, or other strong emotions in making vivid our perceptions and conceptions. For example, in regard to perceptions, let persons be sitting in a parlor in the evening without any anxiety respecting matters without, and the sound of passing wheels is not vivid or distinct. But let the mind be in a state of great fear or anxiety, awaiting the return of a messenger, and even the distant sound of wheels will be clear and vivid. So of our conceptions: let the mind be in a state of indifference when an event takes place, the after conception of this event will be vague and indistinct ;-as for example, when we meet a person in whom we feel no interest, the idea of his countenance afterwards will be vague and imperfect. But let us meet the admired and venerated deliverer of a nation, and the lineaments of his face, which were seen when the mind was excited with emotion, return almost with the vividness of perception.

Another important principle of association is this, that those ideas which have been united when the mind is under the influence of strong desire, or of other strong emotions, usually return in the same association. For example, let a messenger bring mournful or joyful tidings to us, and afterwards the sight of his face will recall the tidings. Or let our feelings of enthusiasm and affection be excited toward any object, and whatever has been in any way associated with it, will recall this beloved object to the mind.

These illustrations enable us to detect and describe the mental process involved in the succession of our thoughts, and show that, in a very great degree, it must depend upon our present interests and plans. These decide what ideas shall become most vivid and distinct, while our past interests and emotions decide what ideas shall return by association.

The mind ordinarily has some object of interest which it is pursuing some wish is to be gratified some cause to be searched out-some good to be gained. A mental picture arises before the mind composed of various objects. Among these associated objects, those which are most consonant with the leading desires of the mind become vivid and distinct, and the others fade away. Then by the law of association these prominent objects soon gather around them the various associates with which they have been connected at times when the mind was excited by desire or emotion, and thus a new picture is formed. In this new combination the mind again fastens on those objects which are in agreement with the chief interest of the mind, and these stand out from the rest with fresh vividness, and gather around them past associates to form another picture. And thus the mental process is carried on, until outward objects affect the senses and change this process of mental action. But objects that affect the senses have all been associated with other objects, at periods when the mind was excited by desire and emotion, and so these associated ideas are recalled even by outward objects. Thus it is clear that the nature and succession of our thoughts are very greatly determined by the nature of our plans, purposes and desires.

There is one other very important fact in our mental history. When the mind, in a state of indecision, contemplates two incompatible modes of enjoyment, it feels a desire for both, but after duly considering which will be best on the whole, it makes its election; and after this decision, the desire for the thing which is relinquished usually diminishes. For example, if a man decides that a certain kind of food is injurious, the firm determination not to touch it usually lessens the desire for it. The mind is seldom excited by any strong desire for a thing which it is certain can never be attained. If it were discovered that we could all visit the moon by an easy and safe method, it is probable that multitudes would be agitated by a strong desire to go, but how seldom and how faint are the desires now felt for such a journey! So men will be agitated by the strongest desire for wealth and honor within their reach, but how few are stimulated by such fervent desires to be a king or queen! Desire then is dependent in some degree on the hope of attainment. Whenever therefore the mind has decided not