truth, little more than nominal; that in the anatomy of the body, as in the anatomy of the mind, facts are obtained solely by accurate observations, yet no one ever doubted the usefulness of that study; and that, as the whole science of astronomy evidently falls within the scope of the Reviewer's remarks, his arguments, if they possess any force, tend to depreciate a large department of physics equally with the science of mind. In reply to some instances, adduced to shew that men who never studied the philosophy of mind have sufficient practical acquaintance with the relation subsisting between its faculties, Mr. Stewart observes, that a considerable proportion of the most important theorems upon motion, the centre of gravity, the composition of forces, and other mathematical truths, are solved by every savage who feathers his arrow or loads it, or trains his horse to particular exercises; and on the whole, he insists, in a series of arguments and illustrations, through which we have not space sufficient to follow him, that he is sanctioned by the justest views of the probable progress of philosophy, in re-affirming the beneficial tendency of the studies to which the best years of his life have been devoted. To this chapter the Edinburgh Reviewers have rejoined, and defended their original positions with some eagerness; but we think, they have left the question about where they found it.. Upon the principal subject in debate, which respects the utility or unprofitableness of metaphysical studies, we concur, in the main, with Mr. Stewart; yet we are far from thinking that there is absolutely nothing in what is urged on the other side. When the Reviewer says broadly, that in metaphysics certain ly knowledge is not power, we have no hesitation in saying, that certainly he is wrong. There can be no doubt that a knowledge of the connection between the different faculties of the mind, may, in many cases, enable us to devise methods for managing them skilfully:-an intimate acquaintance with the nature and extent of associations, is of great value in education: and it seems even probable, that, in the progress of the science, some lights may be obtained for the assistance of those who may suffer an accidental injury in any of their senses, or who labour under the very common and very afflicting disorders of the judgment or imagination. Still, it is impossible to contend that knowJedge is power, to the same extent in metaphysics, as in natural science; and though, when facts are once procured, it matters little whether they were obtained by means of observation or experiment, it cannot be denied that the more experiments we can make, the more chances we have of discovering phenomena, and that, in the nature of things, experiments are far more conveniently made upon matter, than upon mind. But we think that Mr. Stewart has permitted his opponents to narrow too much the grounds on which the defence of metaphysical studies may be rested. Some knowledge, to be sure, is power; perhaps, in a sense, all knowledge is so: but knowledge is not merely power, nor can its value be fairly measured only by this rule. Many branches of inquiry well deserve the attention of every inquisitive understanding; many have a tendency to fortify the mind, or to enlarge or to adorn it; many contribute to the sources of elegant and harmless amusement, which have only a very remote effect in increasing the powers of man, even upon the largest meaning that can be given to that expression. Nor is it in any manner an objection to the philo sophy of mind, that it is less useful than physical inquiries. Different branches of knowledge are doubtless of different values, sometimes in the nature of things, sometimes in relation to certain individuals or to particular objects; but any science is worthy of cultivation which is likely to be of some use to many persons, or of much use even to a few. What is ordinarily unprofitable, should not be generally pursued; what is essentially frivolous, should be universally neglected; but in the different branches of real knowledge we must permit men to choose pretty freely, as their interests, or opportunities, or tastes, may direct them; and among these, we are inclined to think the metaphysical studies entitled to occupy a very respectable station. Many worthy men entertain, indeed, strong prejudices against these pursuits; but let it be recollected, that reflective understandings are naturally metaphysical. It happens, we believe, to almost every man of a vigorous intellect, at some period of his life, and generally very early, to feel considerable curiosity respecting the nature of his faculties, and the modes of exercising them; to arrest the progress of his thoughts, for the purpose of contemplating them more accurately; to consider with some anxiety the manner of his existence; what it is he means when be speaks of his ideas, thoughts, sentiments; what life is; what is death; what time, what eternity; what space, and matter, and motion. Good men, who discern, or who fancy they discern, the dangers attend. ing such speculations, may warn the young and inquisitive; but it is impossible, for those who have a glimpse of light, to rest contentedly in darkness; and surely it is more rational fairly to ascertain, by a welldirected course of inquiry, what can be known respecting these things, and what must remain hidden, than to suffer the mind to run out into every sort of vagrant theory, or sink, after a few excursions, into that senseless scepticism which is really the refuge of indolence, not the resting place of manly thought and candid investigation. It is not enough considered, how useful it is for us to be acquainted with the real limits of our know ledge. A celebrated French wri ter thought he paid a high compliment to Mr. Locke, in saying that " he was the Hercules who had fixed the boundaries of the human understanding." Surely it is something, indeed it is by no means a little matter, that we are no longer in danger of straining our faculties, and wasting our time, in researches respecting general essences, substantial forms, and the like unintelligible jargon. In common life, and conversation also, not to say in books, how many foolish sentences, which are thought wise by those who utter them, would be saved, if men were more generally persuaded that, when they talk of abstract ideas, they use words without a meaning; that, when they speak of images im Mons. Voltaire.-It has been the fashion of late, with the Edinburgh Reviewers, when this name is mentioned, to couple it with "the great," " the illustrious," or some We really such high-sounding epithet. think this not in very good taste. There is in such a superabundance of encomium. an appearance of a little sectarian eagerness, Voltaire was justly eminent as a poet and a wit; he was an entertaining historian; and, as far as his philosophy extended (for he was not profound in any science, though he had an insight into all), he was sound and clearheaded. The vivacity of his parts, and variety of his attainments, entitle him to be considered as an extraordinary man; but it is very questionable whether he deserves the character of a great man. The unjust treatment he experienced in early life, is some excuse for his prejudices against religion during that period; but what apology can be offered for the miserable and devoted fury with which he persecuted Christianity during all his later years? Or what shall we say of the temper, wisdom, and enlargement of a philosopher, who could see no distinction between the blind bigotry of a popish establishment, and that pure, practical, and benign spirit which breathes through every page of the New Testament? If Voltaire had shewn half the ignorance and timerity in any branch of philosophical discussion, with which his strictures on the Holy Scriptures are justly chargeable, we suspect the votes of our northern brethren would have been more divided than they appear to be respecting his merits. pressed on the sensorium, they nei ther understand themselves, nor en able any body else to understand them; and that, though they should dispute about mind and matter from the cock-crow till the curfew, they have not in reality the least acquaintance with the one or the other. These things, and many like them, have been taught us by the men who have inquired into the origin of our knowledge, the least useful part unquestionably of me taphysical science; yet, unprofitable as it now appears to us, so curious and inviting as to have attracted the full attention of some of the most powerful understandings that have appeared in modern Europe. But the advantages which belong to the study of the philosophy of the mind, are not merely negative. Not to mention the hints that have been obtained from the researches of metaphysicians for the judicious management of the understanding, and the more perfeet lights which may be anticipated from their future labours, this science borders so closely upon others of the most unquestionable importance, that some insight into it seems necessary for the perfect understanding of subjects which nobody thinks himself at liberty to despise. Its connection with physics is so close, that the ancient writers classed them together, or, rather, considered the philosophy of mind as a part of the philosophy of nature. Of philology, at least one half, and that the most important half, is strictly metaphysical. In morals the case is so nearly similar, that a man might as reasonably entitle himself a learned physician though he had never studied anatomy, as esteem himself an adept in moral science without having obtained an intimate acquaintance with the affections, passions, and sentiments of the human heart. Indeed, all moral writers must be in a greater or less degree metaphysical; though, to be sure, it must be owned that all metaphysical writers have not been very moral. Politics, which profess to regard only the external condition of mankind, have perhaps less connection with inquiries concerning the mind, than the sciences already mentioned; yet every body has doubtless heard of political metaphysics: and though we should have no objection to admit that the questions in that department which have occasioned the most eager controversies are for the most part frivolous, yet so long as there are foolish men who will insist upon discussing them, it is exceedingly proper that there should be wise men sufficiently prepared to discuss them also. Lastly, in theology, the most important and interesting of all studies to an immortal and accountable being, who is there that is not sensible of the value of metaphysical knowledge in conducting us through the great questions of predestination, election, and free-agency? What violence have some Calvinistic divines done to the common sense and feelings of mankind, what perilous approaches to practical Antinomianism have they sometimes made, in the stiff, unqualified, and really unphilosophical statement of their favourite doctrines! What mere verbal frivolities, what contradictory propositions, and sometimes what dangerous errors and heresies, have some Arminian writers fallen into, from their ignorance of the diffi culties which unquestionably embarrass their tenets respecting the will! There is another view in which the value of the metaphysics deserves to be considered; we mean, in respect of the discipline they afford to the understanding. In the English universities, the certain sciences are those which alone have been employed in the institution of youth. In a neighbouring realm, young minds are exercised chiefly in morals, politics, public law, and metaphysics. Far be from us the presumption of deciding which of the two schemes is the most successful; but we have no doubt at all which is, in its principle, the most reasonable. The great objects in the instruction of young persons, so far at least as intellectual cultivation is regarded, and we suspect even a little further, are, to form their minds to habits of thought at once bold and cautious, patient and discursive; to teach them that the memory is to be the handmaid of the understand ing, not the mistress; to instil an ardent curiosity and thirst of knowledge, yet to accustom them at the same time to estimate their progress rather by the value and accuracy than by the apparent extent of their acquirements. For these purposes, perhaps for every purpose of intellectual institution, those sciences in which the evidence is only probable possess manifest advantages over those in which it is demonstrative; and, among the former, none are better fitted to discipline the understanding than the metaphysics. The subjects which they present for examination are exactly those about which the mind is apt to be curious, at a time when its curiosity is unprejudiced, before it has received a particular direction from worldly in terests and habits. They are neither, like geometrical studies, so perfectly abstruse as to connect themselves very rarely with the practical pursuits of life; nos, like political inquiries, apt to become vulgar and unscientific from a multitude of local details and temporary interests. They form, beyond all other sciences, reflective habits of mind. In other pursuits, these are for the most part exercised only in forming general conclusions; but in the metaphysics the whole process is reflective. Reflection is requisite for observing the phenomena on which we are to reason; it is requisite for separating, comparing, and combining them; it is requisite ultimately for ascertain ing the laws to which they are subjected. To all this must be added, that, while other sciences require a considerable apparatus of books and opportunities of general information, the metaphysician carries the materials of his art constantly about with him. They are perpetually present and ready for his use; "pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur:" and the most vulgar incidents of life, which only distract the thoughts of other speculators, furnish to him not unfrequently occasions for examining anew the principles he has established, and supply hints for their enlargement, illustration, or correction. The considerations last mentioned are nearly allied to others of still higher importance. A branch of the metaphysics (as we have already observed) borders upon ethics, and embraces the study of those internal principles which evidently are of a moral nature. Such are love, compassion, sympathy, generosity, gratitude, courage, and the like. Surely if self-discipline be important, and if man possesses in any degree the power of directing or regulating his own emotions, that science cannot be useless which introduces us to a more perfect acquaintance with ourselves; which lays open to us the very springs of action; which discloses not merely the full-grown thought or inclina tion, but the secret cell where its seed was deposited, the soil where it began to germinate, the neighbouring affections to which its young fibres first attached themselves, and from whence, perhaps, they drew their chief nutriment. It is principally on this account that almost all the best practical writers on religion have been metaphysical. They are not satisfied to shew what is the meaning or what the extent of any precept; but they endeavour to trace the avenues by which it may be conducted to the recesses of the heart, and to detect the prin. ciples of our nature to which it has the nearest alliance, or from which the most obstinate hostility may be expected. Any one may satisfy himself of the truth of this, by opening at hazard the practical works of Baxter, Owen, Leighton, Watts, Witherspoon, Edwards, and reading on for a few pages. Many a pious man, who has been accustom- slight investigation: if this, or any thing like this meaning, belongs to the word scepticism, we cannot hesitate to say, that those who object to the metaphysical studies on such grounds, pass upon them, in the form of a censure, a very high eulogium. There is hardly any habit more pernicious, not merely in scientific researches, but daily and hourly in every department of life, than that loose indolent way which men have of jumping upon their conclusions in all sorts of subjects, and accepting, almost without examination, sentiments and maxims of the most.extensive practical import. If, on the other hand, by scepticism is intended a disposition of mind unfavourable to the cordial reception of the truths of religion, upon what evidence is it asserted, that metaphysical studies have the tendency imputed to them? Was Locke a scep ed to run on against metaphysics with more zeal than knowledge, might undoubtedly be convicted (to his great surprise) of being himself pretty deep in that science; which he would be found to have studied through a large part of his life, not indeed very systematically, but to a much better purpose than a considerable majority of those who have written upon it the most abstrusely. Many pious persons might also be found, who, in part at least, for want of that knowledge which metaphysics would have given, deceive themselves in many things of great practical importance; are insensible to the growth of the most dangerous associations; mistake the real sources of their errors in conduct; confound the more amiable natural dispositions with the evidences and fruits of sanctification; or remain insensible to dormant principles of sin, which they might have discovered and mortified, till a powerful temptation draws them forth to a terrible and fatal activity. These are some of the advantages which may fairly be considered as belonging to the cultivation of those studies which are commonly called metaphysical. To all this, and to whatever else has by different writers been urged in favour of such pursuits, the common reply is, that they are exceedingly dangerous; they make men sceptical." Now it is natural to ask the many worthy and respectable persons by whom this objection is made (what perhaps they have not always recollected to ask themselves), "What is it you mean by scepticism?" If that word is used to denote a habit of mind slow and cautious in forming its conclusions, sufficiently distrustful of itself to be desirous of knowing what can be argued against the inferences which it inclines to adopt, and even so far diffident of its performances as to be perfectly willing, upon the appearance of new lights, to re-examine those positions which had been adopted upon no Was Clark a sceptic? Was Berkley a sceptic? All these great men not only openly professed their belief in Christianity, but thought they could not better employ their best years and maturest faculties than by consecrating them to the defence of those truths, which thoughtless, licentious men are apt to deride, but which it is the peculiar character of a truly elevated understanding to feel and venerate. Bishop Berkley, in particolar, was led to the adoption of his peculiar theory in metaphysics principally from an anxiety to refute the sceptics of his day, whose reasonings were all founded on the received opinions respecting a material world; and, in the work which he entitled "The Minute Philosopher," he has discussed at large all the prevailing ojections to natural and revealed religion, and employed much of his metaphysical learning, particularly his important discoveries respecting vision, and his very fine and original speculations on the nature of language, as materials for replying to those objections. Mr. Hume, indeed, whom every body knows to have been sceptical enough, bas ap |