"it is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, without at the same time conceiving a reality of which they are appearances; for appearances without reality is unthinkable" (p. 88). But then he maintains that this Reality beyond the appearances is and must for ever remain unknown to man. Nor is his general doctrine much improved by his allowing that "besides definite consciousness there is an indefinite consciousness which cannot be formulated," for this indefinite thing is only the faith and negative judgments of Hamilton in a still vaguer form. He reckons it the province of science to master the known appearances; and he allots to religion the sphere of unknown realities, "that unascertained something which phenomena and their relations imply" (p. 17). This is the "fundamental verity,' "common to all religions," "the ultimate religious truth of the highest possible certainty" that "the Power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." He quotes with approbation the language of Hamilton about its being the highest effort of thought to erect an altar "to the unknown and unknowable God ;" and as to this unknown he thinks it right "to refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations but degradations". (p. 109). Looking to the interests both of philosophy and religion, it is of great moment to lay an arrest on this style of thought-quite as important as it was to stay in last age the now exploded Philosophy of the Absolute. I meet it by maintaining as the proper postulate, sanctioned by consciousness, that the mind begins with a knowledge of things, partial, no doubt, but still correct so far as it goes. From this primitive knowledge and adhering beliefs it reaches further knowledge. In particular, the real effects in nature carry us up to a real cause. The evidences of design argue an adequate cause in an intelligent designer, and the nature of the moral power in man and of the moral government of the world is proof of the existence of a Moral Governor. "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood (vooúμɛva) by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." Should it come to be thought that religion has only the sphere of the "unknown and unknowable," I am sure it would disappear from our world as a living power. When the apostle beheld the altar with the inscription, "To the Unknown God," he hastened to proclaim a Known God: "Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you. God that made the world," etc.

Mr. Spencer, in his Psychology, insists that we seek an Ultimate Datum or Postulate. He finds such a Postulate in Belief. He does not very distinctly explain what is involved in belief. He says (p. 14), that belief is the recognition of existence.' If he had left out the re as implying something prior brought back, and said cognition, his statement would have been correct. Again, he says, "Every logical act of the intellect is a predication, is an assertion that something is, and this is what we call belief." I do not admit that all cognition is predication (see supra p. 212), but taking his explanation, I ask my readers to consider how much is implied in this predication that something is, in this cognition of existence; and the postulate, if it is not unmeaning, or if its meaning is not suicidal, must postulate all that is in it, must postulate existence and something existing. I maintain, further, that a something can be known as existing only so far as we know it to be something, that is, know something of it, that is, know some quality of it. Setting out with something, I hold that all the consequences logically drawn also imply existence, and something existing with some quality. By such a process we find ourselves reach

ing further knowledge and other realities. Mr. Spencer, quite in the spirit of the German speculatists, will admit only one ultimate postulate: what he calls belief. On the ground on which he calls in the one, I think, he is bound to admit others-what I call beliefs and judgments, intellectual and moral. By these, and by ordinary observation, we rise to a God who is not an unknown God. He says (p. 28): "Not only is the invariable existence of a belief our sole warrant for every truth of immediate consciousness, and for every primary generalization of the truths of immediate consciousness-every axiom; but it is our sole warrant for every demonstration." There is surely some confusion of statement here. I will not insist on the circumstance that generalization must imply a discursive process. I remark upon the principle that invariable existence is the warrant of the truths of immediate consciousness. I should rather say, that the belief invariably exists, since we have in sense-perception and self-consciousness the object before us, and we perceive it. According to Mr. Spencer (p. 27), "In the proposition 'I am,' no one who utters it can find any proof but the invariable existence of the belief in it." I should rather say, that the belief is so invariable since all men have invariably the object self under their view. Mr. Spencer lays down the further principle (p. 26), "The inconceivability of its negation is the test by which we ascertain whether a given belief invariably exists or not;" and then in the application he uses the word "conceiving" (with its derivatives) in all its various meanings, as imaging, apprehending in a notion, knowing, believing, judging (see supra, p. 304).1 Negation may no doubt be used as a test, but it is a secondary one, throwing us back on the primary one of self-evidence; and the negation used as a test must not be of conception, but the impossibility of not knowing when the primitive conviction is a cognition, of not believing when it is a belief, and of not judging in a particular way when it is a comparison. Such tests carry us on from primary knowledge, to further knowledge, embracing the existence of God.

It does not concern us in this treatise to examine Mr. Spencer's ambitious attempt to explain the formation of the present state of the cosmos, by means of an unknown Infinite necessitated by thought, and certain forces. It could easily be shown that there are tremendous chasms in the process which he has unfolded. The forces which he is obliged to postulate, may so far account for certain physical phenomena, such as the size, shape, and movements of the planets. But they give no explanation of sensation, or emotion, or consciousness, or belief, or intuition, or judgment, or the sense of beauty, or reasoning, or desire, or volition. Great as are the author's intellectual powers, he has attempted a task far beyond them, I believe beyond human capacity, certainly far beyond it at the present stage of science. The attempt by this giant mind to reach an unapproachable height, by heaping Ossa on Pelion, must turn out a lamentable failThis in regard to his theory as a whole; but his bold generalizations are always suggestive, and some of them may in the end be established as the profoundest laws of the knowable universe.

ure.

1 He says acutely, in criticising Hume (p. 49), "For what is contained in the concept, an impression? Translate the word into thought, and there are manifestly involved a thing impressing and a thing impressed. It is impossible to attach any idea to the word save by the help of these two other ideas." Now, I ask him to translate in the same manner his own language, and it will imply a thing cognizing, and an existing thing cognized.

BOOK II.

METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE VARIOUS SCIENCES.

CHAPTER I.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DEMONSTRATIVE OR FORMAL AND THE MATERIAL OR INDUCTIVE SCIENCES.

THE distinction between them is so obvious that it has been very generally acknowledged. Every one sees the difference between such sciences as mathematics and the Aristotelian logic, on the one hand, and zoology and chemistry on the other. Different accounts, however, have been given of the grounds of the distinction. Here, as in so many of the other topics which have fallen under our notice, there has been much confusion, issuing in partial truth and positive error. Thus, it is often said that the one class has to do exclusively with abstract truth, and the other with facts which it seeks to classify and arrange. But there are generalizations, and therefore abstractions, in all science; and if there be any truth in the account given in this treatise, even the sciences which proceed on intuition have to commence with singulars which they generalize. Again, the one class is said to be concerned with a priori and the other with a posteriori truth. But then truth can be available in such sciences only in a general form, and in order to reach the general truth there must be a process of induction. Still there is truth in both these statements. All that is necessary is to explicate it clearly, and make it stand out separate from associated errors.

One class of sciences have evidently to do throughout with facts which they seek to correlate by observing the relations among

them, say of form, of property, or of cause and effect. When these facts are external, the sciences are material, such as physiology and chemistry and geology. If the facts be internal, then we have the science of psychology, with its several subdivisions. In these sciences the inquirer always starts with individual facts, but he aims to discover resemblances or other relations, to abstract the points of correlation, and at last to arrive at general laws or causes ever rising in generality. The other class of sciences, if there be any accuracy in the fundamental principles of this work, must also begin with singulars, but they are singulars of a different order. The investigator seizes on the original convictions of the mind as to the given set of objects, discovers their rule, or the principle involved in them, by a process of abstraction and generalization, and then constructs his science by combining them, and carrying them out deductively. I am to show, in the chapters which follow, that this is what is done in the science of mathematics, and to some extent also in logic and ethics.

The distinction between the two is thus sufficiently marked. Both must start with particulars, but the one starts with the individual convictions, which are native, original, and necessaryor, to speak more accurately, with the facts and truths thus revealed,—and formalizing the principles involved in them, it adopts these as its fundamental maxims, and is now ready to begin its proper work of combining its truths and deducing consequences. The sciences which use only such principles are very properly called apodictic, or demonstrative. They may also be called, in an especial sense, abstract sciences, inasmuch as they deal with principles in an abstract form. Logic is frequently called formal, because it proceeds on such rules: and the appeilation might be applied to other sciences, such as ethics, and even mathematics. But it is not to be forgotten that, after all, these sciences do start from particulars, though from particulars of a special kind; and if there be any dispute as to their fundamental principles, the appeal must be to these facts, that is, to the original convictions of the mind. These singulars have all a conviction of necessity in them, and on the condition that they be properly generalized, the necessity goes up with each case into the general

axiom, and all the truths may be represented as NECESSARY TRUTHS. The maxims with which these sciences start are all generalizations of our primitive cognitions, beliefs, or judgments, and these, with the furthest deductions reached, have all a reference to objects, and these the particular kind of objects contemplated in the original conviction. The propositions of geometry have a reference to space. The maxims of ethics have a meaning as applied to voluntary actions. Logical formulæ have a respect to the notions of the mind, and the objects apprehended in these notions. We may at any time apply the abstract deductions of any of these sciences to cases which fulfil the conditions. They are all true, necessarily true, of their corresponding objects. Thus all the conclusions of mathematics in regard to the ellipse must hold good of the planets, so far as they move in an elliptic orbit. That sin is of evil desert and deserves punishment, applies to deceit and every other crime. The special rules of the syllogism must hold good of our reasoning about every sort of things. It is to be remembered, however, that most of the axioms of the sciences are generalizations, not so much of our primitive cognitions or beliefs, as of our primitive judgments, and these, while they have a reference to objects, may have a reference to such merely potentially. There may be no such thing as a perfectly elliptic curve in the planetary movements; still, even in such cases, the abstract truth has a respect to a possible ellipse. mathematically correct.1

And here the question is started, How can demonstration be carried so far in certain departments, while in others it can proceed only a very little way? To this it must be answered, first, in a general way, that demonstration, as proceeding on intuition, is possible only in those departments in which we have intuition, and in them only so far as the special intuition will carry us. In mathematics we have the necessary relations of space, time, number, and quantity to proceed on. The simplicity of the objects allows of great accuracy of expression, which again admits, and all but necessitates, great clearness of notion and comprehension, and thus error is rendered all but impossible, except from the grossest carelessness. An encouragement is given to the prosecution of 1 The general doctrine on this subject is explained, supra, pp. 305–307.