would be most felt in the financial and judicial departments, where strict morality and mental ability are most required.

We now come to the most important and, consequently, most debated question; that of the double government and the conflicting powers of the Directors and the Board of Control. We find here nothing but discrepancies. Some declare that the influence of the Board of Control has nearly always been evil-that it has encouraged extravagance and prevented internal improvements by its rash policy others, again, that the real power has been exercised by the Directors, and that they have used that power to serve their own ends, and with entire disregard to the interests of the native population. It is certain that the responsibility has been bandied from one to the other, and that the public have remained ignorant where it justly rested.

A comparison has been drawn between the double government of India and the constitutional government of England: but the one great difference between them is sufficient to destroy the resemblance. That is, in the case of England, no one of the legislative powers can act without the consent of the other two; but, in the case of India, as we have seen, the President of the Board of Control can dictate a policy and have it carried out in direct opposition to the wish of the Directors-the proceedings at the same time being so secret that few can tell which is the acting party. Another curious feature is, that the apparently despotic President is the part of the government really responsible to the English nation, if his powers were properly defined and explanations more easy to be obtained; while the Directors, the seemingly popular body, are related only to the shareholders, whose opinions and interests might induce them to differ entirely from the national decision.

If, therefore, in the attempt to regulate and systematize the government, either of these powers must be brought below the other, or even entirely abolished, we think there is little question which it should be. England, responsible, morally and practically, for the well government of her Indian subjects, must decide through her national legislature the policy which will determine that result. And we must recollect, that there can be now no question before us but this: "How can India be best governed?" The proprietors of stock having guaranteed to them the value of it, and the question of the national interference having been long settled, nothing is left but to consider in what degree and in what manner the legislature of this country shall act directly in this important matter. After all, the great end to be obtained is to prepare the people to govern themselves, and to extend to them gradually such power for that purpose as they may be able wisely to exercise. We must look, therefore, in what manner, and by whom, government is conducted in India itself.

The head of the government in India is the Governor General in Council. This Supreme Council consists of three ordinary members, (appointed by the Company), one legislative member, (who attends wholly to the duty of making laws), and the Commander

in-Chief, (who is an extraordinary member). The seat of government is Calcutta.

The presidencies of Bombay and Madras have each a Council, consisting of the Commander-in-Chief of the presidency and two members of the civil service. These Councils have the power of making laws, subject, in certain cases, to the Supreme Council, and in all cases to the home government. Separate armies are maintained in these presidencies, which occupy the respective commanders; so that the council business devolves mostly upon the two other members. The special business of the presidency of Bengal, is carried on by the Governor General, who is, also, Governor of Bengal. When the Governor General leaves for the provincies, another member of the Supreme Council becomes Deputy Governor of Bengal; and when he visits any other of the presidencies, he assumes, for the time being, the chief power therein. The northwestern provinces have a Lieutenant Governor, who carries on the administration. All these various powers are, as we have said, subject to the Supreme Council, which is, indeed, the ultimate legislative power. Thus the internal management of India is carried on in different parts upon different principles, and the evidence is conflicting as to the comparative results and the superiority of the several systems. Under all of them, so much depends upon the few Europeans who are appointed to the various offices, and in whose hands this great power is placed, that, even should but little alteration at present be made, the strictest national supervision should be kept up on the part of England, that her millions of subjects should not suffer from the foreign rule imposed upon them.

Intimately connected with this subject of the legislative powers, is that apparently interminable affair, the codification of the laws. This was determined in consequence of the discussion in 1833, and Mr. Macauley was then appointed to the task. He has been succeeded by several commisioners, and still the work remains to be completed. In the mean time, in the different districts the judges have to administer the laws, sometimes according to the native customs, often without definite authority; and as the judges themselves are not necessarily peculiarly qualified for the office, being promoted from that of Collector to that of Judge, we may imagine what confusion and failures frequently ensue.

There are two kinds of courts. One kind are the Queen's courts which have jurisdiction over Europeans and natives, within certain districts. In these courts trial by jury is established. The others are the Company's courts, to which the great bulk of the natives are subject; and we may gather some idea of the manner in which they are conducted when we learn that attempts to bring Europeans under their jurisdiction, were met with a resistance so determined that they had to be abandoned. It is true that great. difficulties exist in the administering the laws among the natives, arising in some degree from the prevalence of perjury and forgery; but this only calls for increased carefulness on our part, and an increased necessity for appointing able judges, and we are firmly of

opinion that no further legislation will or can take place in England on the question of India without some large and important alteration being made in this respect.

We now come to the question of revenue, of which the principal item is the land-tax. This, however, includes the rent of the land, of which the Government is the proprietor. It is let out to ryots, who have what may be called a prescriptive perpetual lease, so long as they cultivate and pay the tax. Sometimes the village system is carried out by which a certain number of ryots pay through a chief, or head; sometimes it passes through more stages; a higher class, as in the case of the Zemindars, having a recognised right to a certain interest in the rents. The tax is levied in proportion to the amount of produce; but, as the valuation is made by the "Collectors," who are government officials appointed by the Company, and as a system of drawbacks is inevitable, the whole apportionment of the tax is in their hands. A perpetual and most noxious uncertainty is thus induced; often a bare subsistence is left to the cultivator, and the whole population is virtually dependent for their means of living upon the will of the Collector. He, as we have seen, is appointed solely by some individual Director, who has himself, perhaps, no knowledge of India, and whose sole object in the appointment may be the gratification of some relative, or the reward of some electioneering agent. Yet, complicated as this system is, and liable as it is to such serious abuses, it is so interwoven with the habits and national traditions of the people as to make it difficult, if not fatal, to alter it. Indeed, it is in operation in most of the countries of Asia, and has been established from time immemorial. It is also mixed up with the question of castes, and is so arranged as to fall in with that social system. Besides which we cannot but feel that this tenure of the land may be yet made the means of great social and physical benefits to the people, when it is wisely and fairly administered.

The other sources of income are the salt tax and other Customs duties, and the opium monopoly. This last is, however, a very precarious source; for although it now produces between two and three millions per annum, it is liable to almost extinction should the growth of opium be encouraged in China, which seems highly probable. On the other hand, the amount raised by Customs, taken as a standard of the commerce, is deplorably low, and may, most unquestionably, be much raised if the internal resources of the country were properly developed.

The total revenue for 1851, was estimated at £24,540,529; and the expenditure of the same year at £26,219,238, leaving a deficit of about £678,000. The estimated result for 1852 is, however, more favourable, but the cost of the Burmese war will doubtless more than counterbalance this increase. Deficiency has been too long the rule of Indian finance; the debt at present being about £51,770,000. This is a heavy burden, if we consider the poverty of the country, and must long prove an incubus to the efforts for improvement.

The first item in the expenditure is the payment of the shareholders' dividends, which the law requires to be paid from the first proceeds of the revenue. Then come the civil disbursements, among which the amount for public works is little over £300,000 per annum, and the amount for education the paltry sum of £66,000. The great cause, however, of the deficiencies is the military expenditure incurred by the almost continual wars in which we have been engaged. These wars are often determined by the Board of Control, while the means have to be provided by the Directors. We feel little doubt that if the finances of India were to be brought regularly befoer the British parliament, (which is but proper-a parliamentary authority having power to spend the money), some means might and would soon be found to improve their condition.

Perhaps the greatest evil under which, commercially, India suffers, is the want of public works, such as means of irrigation, but most especially want of roads. This last want is so great as to be hardly credible. There is scarcely as much good road in India as in one of the English counties. It may be said that, in England, the roads are made by private enterprise, and that, in India, that should also be the case. But we must remember the great and essential differences. In England, certain landholders and other capitalists may combine and may obtain from parliament power to purchase land for such purposes, and then proceed in India, the whole of the land belongs to the government alone, and without its sanction nothing can be done: add to which the fact that the natives are a conquered race, from whom we have in a great degree taken the power of action and self-support; and we must come to the conclusion that the government and the people of England are responsible for this pressing evil. But for this, the commerce of India-more especially that in cotton-might be most wonderfully increased, European capital might more largely be employed, and both India and England be mutually benefitted. Something, indeed, has been done in this matter; but more-much more-remains to be done, if we are to think of justifying our power over the people by our improvement of them.

We find, then, that what appear to us to be the chief reforms required for India, as far as legislation here is concerned, are as follow :-The alteration of the constituency appointing the governing body the proper arrangement of the powers of the Board of Directors (should they still be continued) and of the Board of Control; and the definite understanding of where the responsibility of government shall rest: an honest distribution of the patronage for the obtainment of the highest ability in the several services: a better provision for administering the laws, and a clearer arrangement of the laws themselves: a revision of the taxation, and an equitable and consistent means of collecting the revenue: a more spirited promotion of public works, and greater facilities of commerce: much greater attention to the spread of education: a preparation as much as may be of the natives for self-government: and care that they shall be allowed to fill offices for which they are competent.

VOL. II.

G

We append the Memorandum of the proposed government measure, which was sent by the President of the Board of Control to the Directors:

"MEMORANDUM.

แ HEADS OF THE PROPOSED PLAN FOR THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

"1. The government of India to be continued in the East India Company, with all their existing powers and privileges, and subject to existing restrictions, until Parliament shall otherwise provide.

"2. All the provisions of existing acts and charters, except in so far as they are altered by the bill, to remain in force.

"3. The Court of Directors to consist of eighteen members, of whom twelve are to be elected by the proprietors and six to be named by the Crown, out of persons who have served in India. In the first instance, fifteen out of the present thirty Directors to be chosen by the Court and three only to be named by the Crown, and, on the occurrence of the first three vacancies in the number of the elected Directors, three more to be named by the Crown, till the full number of six is obtained.

"4. The privileges, qualifications, and powers of all the Directors to be the same in all respects.

"5. One-third part of the Directors, both elected and nominated, to go out every second year, but to be eligible for immediate re-election or nomination.

"6. The appointments of students to Haileybury and Addiscombe, and also of assistant surgeons, to be open to competition, under regulations to be framed by the Board of Control, from time to time, and laid before Parliament. No alteration to be made as to other appointments to the Indian service.

"7. A permanent Lieutenant-Governor to be appointed in Bengal.

"8. Power to create a fresh presidency or lieutenant-governorship.

"9. The nomination of members of Council in India to be subject to the approbation of the Crown.

"10. An enlarged Legislative Council to be appointed in India. The Governor-General to have a veto on the acts of the Legislative Council.

"11. A temporary commission to be appointed in England, to whom the reports of the Law Commission of India shall be referred for their report and suggestions, to be ultimately sent to the Legislative Council.

"12. Supreme Court and Sudder Court in each presidency to be united, and an improved system of judicature to be introduced. "13. Appointment of Advocate-General in each presidency to be subject to the approbation of the Crown.

"14. The Commander-in-Chief of the Queen's forces in each presidency to be Commander-in-Chief of the company's forces.