given time, some considerable effect; though this is not easy, and for any very long period, can hardly be expected. But a defensive alliance, formed of long discordant interests, with innumerable discussions existing, having no one pointed object to which it is directed, which is to be held together with an unremitted vigilance, as watchful in peace as in war, is so evidently impossible, is such a chimera, is so contrary to human nature, and the course of human affairs, that I am persuaded no person in his senses, except those whose country, religion and sovereign, are deposited in the French funds, could dream of it. There is not the slightest petty boundary suit, no difference between a family arrangement, no sort of misunderstanding, or cross purpose between the pride and etiquette of courts, that would not entirely disjoint this sort of alliance, and render it as futile in its effects, as it is feeble in its principle. But when we consider that the main drift of that defensive alliance must be to prevent the operation of intrigue, mischievous doctrine and evil example, in the success of unprovoked rebellion, regicide, and systematic assassination and massacre, the absurdity of such a scheme becomes quite lamentable. Open the communication with France, and the rest follows of course. How far the interior circumstances of this country support what is said with regard to its foreign politics, must be left to better judgments. I am sure the French faction here is infinitely strengthened by the success of the assassins on the other side of the water. This evil in the heart of Europe must be extirpated from that centre, or no part of the circumference can be free from the mischief which radiates from it, and which will spread circle beyond circle, in spite of all the little defensive precautions which can be employed against it. I do not put my name to these hints submitted to the consideration of reflecting men. It is of too little importance to suppose the name of the writer could add any weight to the state of things contained in this paper. That state of things presses irresistibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has long lain, with a heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot think that what is done in France, is beneficial to the human race. If it were, the English constitution ought no more to stand against it than the ancient constitution of the kingdom in which the new system prevails. I thought it the duty of a man, not unconcerned for the public, and who is a faithful subject to the king, respectfully to submit this state of facts at this new step in the progress of the French arms and politics, to his majesty, to his confidential servants, and to those persons who, though not in office, by their birth, their rank, their fortune, their character and their reputation for wisdom, seem to me to have a large stake in the stability of the ancient order of things. REMARKS. As the proposed manifesto is, I understand, to promulgate to the world the general idea of a plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and through the regulation of that kingdom probably to decide the fate of Europe for ever, nothing requires a more serious deliberation with regard to the time of making it, the circumstances of those to whom it is addressed, and the matter it is to contain. As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own opinion) I have some doubts whether it is not rather unfavorable to the issuing any manifesto, with regard to the intended government of France and for this reason, that it is, (upon the principal point of our attack) a time of calamity and defeat. Manifestos of this nature are commonly made when the army of some sovereign enters into the enemy's country in great force, and under the imposing authority of that force. employs menaces towards those whom he desires to awe; and makes promises to those whom he wishes to engage in his favor. As to a party, what has been done at Toulon leaves no doubt, that the party for which we declare must be that which substantially declares for royalty as the basis of the government. As to menaces-Nothing in my opinion, can contribute more effectually to lower any sovereign in the public estimation, and to turn his defeats into disgraces, than to threaten in a moment of impotence. The second manifesto of the |