work? They afford sufficient encouragement to me. I lament from my heart the tendency which I perceive in some minds to clothe those principles which can appeal only to the mind, with a vestment which may impose on the senses. I fear that the strong hold which such views have on their affections, derives much of its tenacity from the dignity supposed to be imparted by them. Popery, in some shape or other, is the religion most natural to us all. It exists in a dissenting meeting-house as really as in the gentlemen at Rome, and with this difference principally, that at Rome it is at home, but with us it is contemptible-the priest is in our conventicles a poor little imitator, they do these things, at least consistently, at Rome.

I proceed, in the last place, to prove, that if this promise belong to ministers in any sense, it assuredly belongs to the papists, and that consequently protestant ministers holding the view of D. E. F. are precluded from any capability of pleading this promise. If this promise belong to any minister besides the apostles, it must belong to those who succeed the apostles, for in no other sense can this promise have any relation to persons absent at the time of its first communication, whilst it is addressed to certain persons under the term you, excepting those absent individuals could, by an usual fiction, be included under that pronoun by participating in the official character of the persons primarily addressed. They must have succeeded the apostles. Then the promise must proceed in a right line to their successors, that is, unquestionably to the pope and his ministers. If the promise be really theirs, then we can have no right to it, for God's presence cannot be equally with them who oppose each other on material points of doctrine. The pope then, having this promise by right of succession, gives his determination plainly, and I confess I see only the following objection which we could bring against his claim. We might ask him to prove his right to this promise by exercising that miraculous power which the apostles possessed in consequence of its being addressed to them. But to this the papist would reply by saying, that we protestants do not make this power necessary to the verification of our claim, and so could not fairly urge this as a difficulty to the adversary; and if pressed farther on this subject, he would boldly, as he actually does, lay claim to the ability to perform such miraculous acts.

Nor will it be permitted to D. E. F. to answer the papist by saying that this promised presence is the privilege of those only who preach the same doctrines as the apostles, because in thus saying he departs from his first principle. His principle requires that they who succeed the apostles enjoy that promise-and the text gives this privilege, without limitation, without qualification as to what is preached, which is a distinct proof that the promise was intended only for inspired, infallible men, preserved from error by direct - inspiration. The pronoun you can in no rational manner be applied to absent persons, excepting that in an official capacity they do really occupy the same ground as that on which the first recipients stood: In quitting this principle, and substituting that of agreement with the apostle's doctrine, my adversary does in fact forsake his original ground, and though I do heartily and thankfully acknowledge that the gentle

men whom I know to hold the controverted view of Matt. xxviii. 20, can amply prove the general verity of what they deliver in their ministerial capacity, yet I beg to affirm that this way of claiming the promised presence is totally opposed in principle to the opinion of D. E. F., namely, that in consequence of the language of Matt. xxviii. 26, being addressed to the apostles and succeeding ministers that promise is enjoyed.

I refrain from adding more. I have the highest respect and love for all my faithful brethren, and I would particularise my opponents T. K. and D. E. F. May the Spirit of truth make us all wiser and

holier.

THE REVIEWER OF FABER.

ON THE TRUST-DEEDS OF CONGREGATIONAL PLACES OF

WORSHIP.

SIR, I HAVE carefully perused the article which appeared in the Eclectic Review, on trust-deeds, and the correspondence which it has called forth in your Magazine, and beg to trouble you with a few observations on the subject. I cannot agree with your correspondent W.; that we ought to give "to religious communities, in every deed of trust, the power of modification to any extent, to be exercised by the members for the time being;" nor with your correspondent S. R., " that a deed constructed on congregational principles ought not to go a step further than to secure the use of the chapel to the church assembling therein;"-because such deeds afford no security against the perversion of the property of evangelical Christians to the propagation of dangerous error, and even blasphemy itself, Instances of such effects have been of frequent occurrence, and even, not many years ago, a chapel in South Wales, which had been erected for the use of evangelical dissenters, and which had been occupied by them for nearly a century, was diverted from its original purpose to the use of a portion of the congregation who adopted Unitarian sentiments.

Now, Sir, it does seem to me that we are bound to provide against such injurious consequences. The property given by Christians in one generation for the propagation of truth does not, of right, become the property of any individuals of a future generation, unless they carry out the objects of the donors; and this principle, I submit, is "founded alike on essential equity and religious expediency." The arguments of W. and S. R., if carried out to their fullest extent, would leave chapels entirely at the disposal of the majority of the occupants for the time being, provided they call themselves "the church assembling therein," even if they should maintain Unitarian, Socialist, or Chartist views, all of which parties form what they call churches. Surely, this cannot be right. Such parties ought not, under any circumstances, to acquire a right of occupancy. I am far from contending for those trust-deeds which "perpetuate secta

N. S. VOL. III.

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rianism and lamentable divisions in the church of God," but it appears to me, Sir, that in all our trust-deeds, we ought to require that the ministers for the time being should hold and maintain those grand doctrinal truths on which our hopes of salvation are exclusively founded; whilst the members of the church for the time being should have full power to determine all other matters. In modern deeds which have come under my own notice, this principle appears almost to be carried out. They, certainly, mention the denomination for whose use the chapels are erected, and require that the pastors should be of the evangelical sentiments which they express, but the management of all its own affairs is left to each church, and there is a clause allowing other Christians to be admitted to communion who are not of the Independent or Congregational denomination. In these deeds, therefore, although they might be much improved, there appears to me nothing to prevent that general union of evangelical Christians which is so much to be desired. I remain, Sir, Your's respectfully,

Bath, October 3, 1839.

R. H.

FURTHER REMARKS ON TRUST-DEEDS.

(To the Editor.)

SIR, WHERE reasoning involves important consequences, it should be rigidly scrutinized; and I perfectly agree with your correspondent, Mr. S. R. Brynmair, that whether "Wesleyans have more to lose than Congregationalists have, can in no way affect the principle under consideration,"-the principle assumed, (I presume,) that Dissenters are fettered in their theology, by their trust-deeds, as the friends of establishments are fettered in theirs by the state endowment. But you will allow me to inform Mr. S. R. B. that he mistakes in attributing to me any remark or reference whatever to the Wesleyans. The remark he refers to was made in an appendix to my letter, and for which appendix I am not responsible. So far from agreeing with that remark, I should say that the Wesleyans might, with justice, as strongly deny being fettered in their theology by their corporate property, as I have denied such restriction to exist with respect to Dissenters generally. No one can be said to be fettered by that which he can rid himself of when he pleases. He may be put to a great trial to part with golden chains, but if he finds himself in chains, and voluntarily wears them, it is not by them but by his own will that he is fettered. If any Dissenters are fettered in their theology, it is not by their trust-deeds, but by their preference of gain to godliness. The comparison of Mr. Morrison, on which the Eclectic Reviewer discoursed, was between the conditions of those who hold the principle of an establishment and those who do not. But the case has been argued as if the comparison were between the conditions of those who say "We claim public funds for the maintenance of

religion," and a second party, who are assumed to say, “We claim such a meeting-house or endowment." The whole alarm, therefore, raised by the Reviewer, and re echoed by your correspondents, is founded upon the wrong assumption that Dissenters bind themselves to keep their chapels or endowments, at all events, as the friends of an establishment bind themselves, (as they necessarily do,) at all events, to receive public funds.

So long as the Dissenter will have his chapel or endowment, after he dislikes the conditions upon which he holds it, his theology is, of course, fettered; but he is not obliged to have it. But the contender for an establishment must have a state-endowment, and therefore cannot but be fettered in his theology by it, when he disapproves the enjoined discipline or creed. He will have the state money; he must have the state creed. When the Dissenter says to the friends of the establishment, " you are pledged upon your principle to have a stateendowment, and must therefore have the creed it is tied to;" they cannot rejoin, "and you are pledged to keep your endowment, and are therefore enthralled by the terms of your trust-deeds." It is no such thing. The Dissenter may disenthral himself as soon as he feels his trust-deed to be irksome. But the contender for an establishment, as such, cannot get free. The moment he says, I will follow the Bible, come what will, he has given up his principle of-1 claim the provision of the state-and is a Dissenter; and the comparison instituted by Mr. Morrison is at an end, and all argument with it.

But now, to come to the matter of real and practical importance to Dissenters, it appears to me that both your correspondents, W. and Mr. Brynmair, have adopted false positions; and I trust Dissenters will beware, lest zeal for liberty beguile them into unfaithfulness to the truth or presumptuous neglect of prudential measures. I adhere most entirely to the opinion expressed in my first letter, that, (contrary to the opinion of W.) we ought to dispose of our property, in the prospect of death or otherwise, according to our own convictions, and not according to what may be the convictions of those living a hundred years hence. If it is our conviction that we had better leave our property absolutely, well and good; but if we think it had better not be left absolutely, why, the property being now our own, should we dispose of it in any way that we think would not be right? The principle of W., I submit, would discourage benevolence, by rendering its desired exercises uncertain of realization. Besides, if we may not equitably controul the future use of our property by testamentary provisions, as W. contends, it is wrong to make a will at all. If, because I have only " a life-enjoyment" of my property, I may not leave it to W. upon certain conditions to be fulfilled by him, I have no right to leave it to him absolutely; for I do no less controul its disposal beyond the period of my "life-enjoyment," if I say it shall go to W. after my decease, than if I say it shall go to W. upon certain condi tions, after my decease. The principle of W., consequently, is proved to be a fallacy; for to say that we may not make a will, (which his principle does say,) is to contradict reason and scripture in so many obvious points, that the contradiction must be evident to every It is quite clear then that we may equitably arrange, (so the

one.

apostle thought,) what shall be done after our decease; and that if I leave property to persons of such or such opinions, I do not lay any embargo upon the property of A. or B. It never was their property absolutely, or except conditionally-it was theirs only to the extent of

оссирапсу.

Mr. Brynmair says, "It appears to me that a deed constructed on Congregational principles ought not to go a step further than to secure the use of the chapel to the church assembling therein." What church? This must be stated in the deed, or the deed means nothing. If the property is left to the church as its property, it may be personally applied, and the end of the testator be entirely defeated. If its property only for certain uses, and under certain conditions, the thing is done which W. says is "an illegitimate use of law in a testator;" for it deprives successors of the power of a proprietor. It matters not how few and simple the conditions, the "illegitimate" thing, according to W., is done. Yet W. himself admits that "chapels ought to be built; and, being built, they ought to be secured to those who, after we are gone, will worship in our room.'" The question, then, after all this discussion, is only of more or less; and any thing said by either of your correspondents against the principle of "embodying the articles of our belief in the trust-deeds of our chapels," comes to nothing, and such embodying does not "unnecessarily fetter our theology," and is not done" in direct violation of our fundamental principles as Congregational Dissenters;" but is perfectly compatible with them, the contrary supposing a denial of the right to arrange what shall be done with our property, after our decease, altogether, which is an absurdity. As I said in my first letter, trust-deeds should not needlessly embarrass; but when Mr. Brynmair says, "Ought not. a Unitarian congregation to be empowered to convert their Unitarian meeting-house into a Trinitarian meeting-house, if they choose ?” I answer, certainly; their Unitarian meeting-house, but not a Unitarian meeting-house which is not their's, and the conditional use of which only is their's.

Mr. Brynmair inquires-"How can it be said that Congregational churches are allowed to determine their internal arrangements by a suffrage free from all foreign interference, if they be not allowed to use their chapels as they please?" I answer, Mr. B. assumes what is not the fact; viz. that Congregational churches are not allowed to use their chapels as they please. But they are allowed to use their chapels as they please, to the full extent that they are THEIR's. Mr. B.'s inquiry assumes for them a right beyond their right. Mr. Brynmair says," Why should the conflicting provisions of antiquated trust-deeds be left as eternal stumbling blocks on the pleasant paths of benevolence and truth?" I ask, in reply, why should the vague provisions of indefinite trust-deeds be left as eternal inlets for the incursions of fraud and error upon the pleasant paths of benevolence and truth? Mr. Brynmair says, no man, or body of men, should have the power of immortalizing an erroneous creed, or a defective formulary, by any kind of bequest. Truth is of greater value than either monies, lands, or buildings." I rejoin, no man, or body of men, should have the power of perverting my bequests, so long as "the

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