VIII.

ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE.*

respectful acceptance

He has set an honor

THE well-earned reputation of Dr. Wayland, as a writer and a moralist, ensures a ready and of any new production of his pen. able example to literary men in the employment of time and talent. Charged with all the duties appertaining to the Presidency of a very respectable literary institution, and actively engaged in the details of instruction, he has yet found time for the preparations of two manuals † of science, every line of which evinces care and patient thought. We are indebted to him for the only considerable treatise on Moral Science, of which this country has to boast. The natural partiality for an American work on a subject, to which our countrymen have hitherto paid little attention, would secure to it no little favor, were it less able to stand on its intrinsic merits. But we risk nothing by the assertion, that this treatise and Mackintosh's "Review have done more for Ethical Philosophy, than any other publications of the present century in our language. We speak not now of the opinions, which Dr. Wayland has advanced, to some of which we object, and shall take occasion to

*From the Christian Examiner, for July, 1837.

The Elements of Moral Science. By FRANCIS WAyland, D. D., President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. Boston. 1836.

† Besides the work under review, Dr. Wayland has published a text-book of Political Economy.

express our objections with perfect freedom. We refer particularly to the literary execution of the work, and to the spirit in which it is written. It is marked by great originality of thought, clearness and force of argument, and extraordinary vigor and purity of style. Perhaps a mode of reasoning less abstract and severe might have added to the attractiveness of the book, and greater fulness of illustration have been used without any loss of precision or depth.

It is to be hoped, that the publication of this work will rescue the science, of which it treats, from unmerited neglect in our schools and colleges. The present is not the time, ours is not the country, in which we can safely give up the study of first principles, and trust the formation of character to the exigencies of active life. We hold that conscience may be educated, nay, that it requires education; that, by accustoming the mind to dwell on questions of casuistry, to look at the motives of actors rather than at the consequences of actions, and to try doubtful cases rather by general rules than by particular results, a healthy state of moral feeling may be induced, or the original and pure impulses of the better part of human nature may be cherished and confirmed. If this work be not systematically performed in early life, to what influences shall we trust the protection and improvement of the moral faculty? To the calls of business, in which the auri sacra fames is for ever at war with scrupulous justice, and trivial but frequent violations of moral law are sanctioned by custom ? Or to the struggles of the political arena, where it is well for the combatants, if in the heat of the contest they do not forget, that such a thing as moral law has any existence? By imparting knowledge, we create a power of fearful magnitude, and the responsi

bility for its misuse rests not more on those who do, than on those who might have prevented, the wrong.

The fact, that the community is not fully sensible of the importance of these studies, only places in a stronger light the necessity of fostering them in the higher institutions of learning. To do otherwise would be to make these bodies follow, and not guide, public opinion. The interests of learning can be safely intrusted only to the learned. The public cannot appreciate the gradual but effective workings of the higher modes of education, and in the attempt to make them productive of more immediate and tangible good, would probably destroy their efficiency altogether. Doubtless, a knowledge of French and Italian is held in higher estimation in our fashionable circles, than great skill in determining casuistical doubts; and a merchant's operations on Change would not be much facilitated by an acquaintance with the Theory of Moral Sentiments. The public, therefore, are not likely to call with much earnestness for improved modes of instruction in Moral Philosophy, and did the matter depend on them alone, the science might sleep in as undisturbed repose for centuries to come, as Aristotle's Logic has done for centuries past. This last branch of learning, we may remark in passing, seems to have revived of late, much to the astonishment of those who are not accustomed to watch the cycles of popular opinion respecting matters of knowledge. It has revived for the same reasons, which, among others, should procure greater attention to be paid to the study of Ethics. The discovery has been made, that proper discipline of mind is at least of equal value with a large fund of practical information. Syllogistic lore may be useless, and worse than useless, if the proficient be induced to dress up matters of common reasoning in a scholastic garb, and enunciate his premises and conclusions according to the strict rules of

art. But it may be highly valuable, in the veriest utilitarian sense, if it lead to an increased power of analysis, to greater acuteness in detecting fallacy, and a more cautious regard to the ambiguity of terms. So moral subjects afford the fairest field for the application of moral reasoning, and the intellect cannot fail to be improved, while the affections are cultivated, and the conscience enlightened and made strong.

We have spoken of the neglect of Moral Science in our seminaries, and the term will hardly appear strong, if we look at the present mode of instruction in this branch. Recitations memoriter from the text of such a moralist as Paley will do little towards the formation of sound principles, or the cultivation of taste for the pursuit. A book is studied instead of the subject, and the memory is strengthened at the expense of the understanding. A slavish habit of mind. is induced. The student readily accepts conclusions supported by such admirable clearness of style, and by an unrivalled power of illustration. Never was there a stronger instance of the force which reasoning borrows from perspicuity and method. Never a more unhappy application of these qualities to the support of error. Blinded by the author's candor and suavity of manner, the pupil will hardly admit that the positions can be controverted.

The instruction afforded is not only unsound, but imperfect. Hardly a hint is given, that the subject embraces the most curious problems, which have exercised the master minds of antiquity, and which the acutest of modern philosophers have discussed with various degrees of success. The speculations of the ancients are the more instructive, from the remarkable exemplification, afforded by their lives and characters, of the workings of their principles. Religion afforded them no positive precepts to modify the operative power of speculation. Their principles affected not

only their writings, but their lives. They acted what they taught. The cynic lived in his tub, and growled at the follies and vices of the world. The skeptic would not turn aside from his path, though a precipice lay before him. The stoic quailed not, though the fatal mandate from the emperor had arrived, and the blood was already flowing into the bath from his opened veins. The epicurean remained aloof from public cares, wandered in his gardens, and surrendered himself to the charms of literature and love. Compare the characters of Cato and Sallust, of Pomponius Atticus and Brutus, and you detect at once the different schools to which they belonged, and estimate the merits of the respective systems from their practical effects. Mackintosh calls the five hundred years, which elapsed from Carneades to Constantine, the greatest trial of systems which the world has witnessed.

Consistency is not so highly prized among the moderns. The truth of opinions is estimated by other tests than the conformity between them and the lives of their supporters. Public opinion tyrannizes, and the dread of singularity, arising from the increased power of fashion, brings the actions of men to the same standard, however much their doctrines vary. The lives of skeptics and scoffers too frequently put to shame the professions of the more orthodox in point of opinion; the bigoted, the selfish, and the uncharitable may take a lesson even from the infidel Hume. The common rules of morality are too generally approved, to admit of individuals violating them with impunity; and the founders of vicious systems are interested to show, in their own persons at least, that their principles lead not necessarily to vicious practices. With their followers, however, this consideration holds not to an equal extent; and among them, corrupt doctrines commonly produce their appropriate fruit. To confine the student of morals, therefore, to the knowl