opinion; the Idols of the Den with those resulting from habit; and the Idols of the Tribe, alone, do not accord thoroughly with those caused by empty display and the desire to conceal ignorance. These fallacies seem to be included under the Idols of the Tribe,* but they are not distinctly assigned to any of the four divisions; and on a close examination it will be discovered that there is much confusion in Lord Bacon's distribution of fallacies, and that the four genera, which the translator has clumsily rendered species, run continually into each other. His hand is not as steady as Roger Bacon's in drawing the lines of demarkation between the several classes; and his exposition manifests much more poetry than logic.

We cannot repress the conviction that Lord Bacon originally derived his ideas on the subject of idols from his Franciscan precursor, and that he expanded and modified them according to his own taste, with rare sagacity and exuberant imagination. He did not copy servilely, but if he copied at all, he is guilty, because he studiously concealed the obligation and withheld all commendation. We only remember a single instance in which he has mentioned Roger Bacon; but that instance proves that he either was acquainted, or pretended to be acquainted with his writings, and that he disguised their true character.† His own doctrines on the subject of fallacies grew as he advanced in his philosophical career. The idols are not mentioned under their distinctive names in the Advancement of Learning, though their subsequent appellations manifestly grew out of the metaphorical expressions there employed. These designations are introduced in the Novum Organon, and thence transferred to the treatise De Augmentis Scientiarum,§ whose views, however, approximate in other respects to the original draft of the doctrine. The distribution of fallacies, as it appears in the Organon, was, therefore, not conceived at a single heat, but gradually assumed its present shape. Still, in the earlier and the later forms, it bears such a resemblance to the ideas of Roger Bacon that we cannot resist the conviction that it was thence derived. There is a singular and inexplicable substitution, at times, of four for three classes of fallacies, and three for four, in the writings

* Vide Nov. Org., lib. I, Aph. xlix.

In his censure of the Alchemists, he remarks, "Yet I count them not all alike; forasmuch as there is a useful sort of them, who, not very solicitous about theories, do, by a kind of mechanic subtilty, lay hold of the extensions of things; such is Bacon."-Interpretation of Nature, vol. xv, p. 98; vol. x, p. 440. Bacon's Works, vol. ii, pp. 190-193.

§ De Augm. Scient., lib. V, cap. iv, vol. viii, pp. 292–296.

of Lord Bacon.* This vacillation produces much confusion, and is wholly unintelligible, until we perceive a similar hesitancy and inconsistency in Roger Bacon.†

It must be observed that the mode of reasoning usually adopted by Roger Bacon is widely different from that employed by Francis. The former assails authority; he declares it to be the cause of fallacy; yet his opposition to it is sustained by the citation of authorities. Each position is backed by a long array of quotations from saints and sinners, from the classical authors, from the Christian fathers, from the Arabian philosophers, and occasionally from his cotemporaries, of whom he speaks not very highly. Some reason for this procedure may, however, be discovered in the fact that the Opus Majus was addressed to Pope Clement IV., and was written for his especial illumination.

We will not dwell upon the four kinds of causes, the efficient, the material, the formal, and the final, which were accepted by both the Bacons. These are borrowed from Aristotle, and had been fully expounded by Abelard.§ But we will note that the maxim of Aristotle, repudiated in our days, and which Lord Bacon has been represented as repudiating, that true knowledge is a knowledge of causes, is distinctly endorsed by him, "Recte ponitur; vere scire est per caussas scire."||

Induction and experimentation have been regarded almost universally as the characteristic triumphs of the Baconian method, meaning thereby the method of Lord Bacon. In very recent times the more intelligent scholars have renounced this old delusion, and, acknowledging the important services rendered by Lord Bacon in directing public attention more forcibly to these processes, they have ascribed to Socrates and Aristotle the merit of developing the Inductive system, and to the Alchemists the credit of having employed experimentation in physical inquiries, and of having applied induction to the investigation of nature with much greater success than attended the efforts of Lord Bacon. If, indeed, he had otherwise any special claims to original invention in these respects, they would be sadly attenuated when it was recognised that he. had been anticipated by Roger Bacon. Both modes of proceeding are

Advancement of Learning, vol. ii, p. 193. De Augm. Scient., lib. V, cap. iv, vol. viii, p. 292.

Opus Majus, Ps. I, cap. ii, p. 2; cap. iii, p. 3; cap. iv, p. 6; cap. viii, p. 9; cap. ix, p. 9.

Opus Majus, Pars 1, cap. vii, p. 9.

§ Rémusat Abélard, No. II, chap. v, vol. ii, p. 444.

|| Nov. Org., lib. II, Aph. ii.

contemplated in the significant precept, "per experientiam sensibilem in arcanis naturæ et artis expergefactus inveniat rationem."* Nor can it be objected, that the induction proposed by the friar is nothing more than the "inductio simplex" ascribed by Lord Bacon to Aristotle. It is true, he does not trouble himself with the cumbrous and complicated system of Instances, Prerogative, Negative, Comparative, Proximate, Exclusive, Solitary, Migratory, Conspicuous, Clandestine, Constitutive, Proportionate, Conterminous, Dominant, Concomitant and Hostile, Subjunctive, Federative, Crucial, Divorcing, Illuminating, Thural, Citing, Itinerant, Supplementary, Twitching, Mathematical, Benevolent, Ferular, Cursive, Quantitative, Wrestling, Suggestive, and, what might have included all, and dispensed with all, Instances generally Useful. He does not embarrass himself with this artificial and inoperative machinery, nor does he concern himself with First and Second Vintages, but he distinctly declares that his notion of the experimental procedure was very different from anything contained in Aristotle, Seneca, or Avicenna,† and Lord Bacon makes a similar declaration for himself.‡

There is nothing in Lord Bacon more urgent or explicit than the manner in which Roger Bacon continually insists upon the necessity of observation and experimentation. It is not a bare or hurried perception of facts and relations which will content him, but a regular, methodical, diligent investigation, assisted, in case of necessity, by suitable apparatus. This is evident from his plain and repeated declarations,§ and is acknowledged by Humboldt.|| In

Opus Majus, Pars I, cap. x, p. 11.

"Sed nec Aristoteles, nec Avicenna in suis naturalibus hujusmodi rerum notitiam nobis dederunt; nec Seneca, qui de eis librum composuit specialem, aed scientia experimentalis ista certificat."

Instaur. Magna. Distributio Operis, vol. viii, p. 167; v. Nov. Org., lib. I, Aph. lxix.

§ "Ad hæc intelligenda necessarium est uti experientiis certis." Opus Majus, Ps. VI, cap. vii, p. 344. Hæc omnia docet experientia, sicut de Iride, unde argumenta non certificant hæc, sed grandes experientia per instrumenta perquiruntur, et per varia necessaria; et ideo nullus sermo in his potest certificare; totum enim dependet ab experientia; et propter hoc non reputo me attigisse hic plenam veritatem, quia nondum expertus sum omnia, quæ oporteat requiri in studio sapientiæ; . . sic igitur quilibet sapiens de facili recipiet, quod experientia certificat quæstiones circa has res, et non argumentum." Opus Majus, Ps. VI, cap. xii, p. 351. "Veritates magnificas in terminis aliarum scientiarum, in quas per nullam viam possunt illæ scientiæ hæc sola scientiarum domina speculativarum (Experimental Philosophy,) potest dare." Opus Majus, Ps. VI, cap. xii; De Sec. Prærog. Sci. Exp., p. 352.

Humboldt's Cosmos, part II, sect. vi, vol. ii, pp. 619, 620. Ed. Bohn.

one respect Roger Bacon's views reached through the future generations far beyond the range of Lord Bacon's, and anticipated the time when the physical sciences would be treated mathematically, a prevision only realized by the labors of Newton, La Place, and Fourier.*

There is a distinctive feature in the Baconian philosophy which has been rarely noticed, though it is one of its most valuable characteristics, and the one which has unconsciously exercised the greatest influence on our modern sciences and scientific methods. This is the entire elimination of all consideration of first principles, and the repudiation of all research into occult causes. It is a point frequently and most strenuously insisted on by Lord Bacon; but it is not original with him. The same doctrine is inculcated by Roger Bacon, and has been repeated, more or less distinctly, by many other philosophers, ancient and modern. In them, however, it is, until very recent times, rather an indication than a cardinal principle.§

We will pass on to the consideration of the agreement between the special positions assumed by the two Dromios. For the sake of condensation we will refrain from commentary, as far as practicable, though the temptations to violate this rule will be almost irresistible, and we will also exhibit our illustrations, whenever it can be done conveniently, in parallel columns. We shall also occasionally append extracts from other authors, who may have rendered unavowed services to Lord Bacon. We turn to the Novum Organon, and commence with the celebrated Aphorism with which it opens:

"Nulla scientia potest sciri sine mathematica." Opus Majus, Ps. VI, cap. ii, p. 338. ".. scientias alias non debere sciri per argumenta dialectica et sophistica, (cf. Nov. Org., lib. I, Aph. xi,) quæ introducuntur communiter, sed per demonstrationes mathematicas descendentes in veritates et opera aliarum scientiarum, et regulantes eas, sine quibus nec possunt intelligi, nec manifestari, nec doceri, nec disci," etc., etc. Op. Maj., Ps. IV, Distinct. I, cap. iii, p. 49.

† Fab. Cupid., vol. xi, p. 99. De Augm. Scient., lib. V, cap. ii, vol. viii, p. 262. Nov. Org., lib. I, Aph. lxvi.

"... hæ veritates non sunt de primarum substantia, sed penitus extra eas, licet sint in terminis earum, quum nec sint quæstiones ibi, nec principia." Op. Maj., Ps. VI, cap. xii, p. 352; cf. Ps. I, cap. x, p. 11.

§ Theophrast., Metaph., c. 5. Aristot., Metaph., III, c. iv; X, c. 5, 6. Anal. Post., I, c. ii. Alex. Aphrod., Schol. Aristot., pp. 525, 527, 592, 605, 653. Asclep. Schol., p. 599. Ammon. Schol., p. 519. Plat., Tim., p. 17, Caietan. ap. Leibn's: tom. i, p. 94. Leibnitz, Op., tom. i, p. cxliv, clxi. Des Cartes, ap. Morell., Hist. Phil., p. 117. Spinoza, Ibid., p. 125. Jacobi, Ibid., p. 597. Comté, Syst. Phil. Pos., vol. i, p. 7.

"Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more."-Nov. Org., lib. I, Aph. I. Cf. Inst. Magna. Distr. Op., vol. ix, p. 178.

"The unassisted hand, and the understanding left to itself, possess but little power. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand."-Nov. Org., I, Aph. II. Cf. De Augm. Sci., lib. V, cap. ii, vol. viii, p. 264.†

"Even the effects already discovered are due to chance and experiment, (casual experience?) rather than to the sciences."-Nov. Org., I, Aph. viii.!

66

Experience assures us of this, since more of the secrets of wisdom have been discovered among the simple and neglected, than among those famous with the vulgar."-Op. Maj., Ps. I, cap. x, p. 12.

"Therefore let not your Holiness be surprised, nor disdain the authority, if my labors are opposed to the habits of the multitude and vulgar examples. For this is the only way of arriving at the knowledge of truth and perfection."-Op. Mag., Ps. I, cap. viii, p. 9.

"This Experimental Science has three great prerogatives with respect to the other sciences. One is that it tests by experiment the noble conclusions of them all. For the other

ο “ ὅλως δὲ ἡ τεχνὴ τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελέι ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ Hueira." Aristot., Phys., Ausc. II, VIII. "Homo non est institutor naturæ, sed utitur in operibus artis et virtutis ad suum usum rebus naturalibus." S. Thom. Aquin., Summa., Ps. I, Qu. xxii, Art. ii. “. . . ut exinde stupenda sæpe consurgant miracula, non tam arte quam natura, cui sears ista ministram exhibet hæc operanti." H Corn. Agrippa, De Incert. et Van. Scient., c. xlii. “. . . . . cum tamen ars omnis non posset naturam superare, sed illam imitatur, et longis passibus sequitur, et multo fortior sit vis naturæ quam artis." H Corn. Agrippa, ejusd. op., c. XC. Cf. Fr. Bacon, Nov. Org., I, Aph. III.

The idea of an instrument for the mind is taken from the word Organon, and Aristot., Probl., lib. xxx, § 5.

This idea is originally from Cassiodorus, Var. I. Ep. ii. ". . . ut est mos hominibus, occasiones repentinas ad artes ducere, talia exempla meditantes, fecerunt," etc.