cenigo, prince Hardenberg, count Bernstorff, and cardinal Spina, the representative of the pope.

se

The conferences lasted till the middle of December, and were conducted with uncommon crecy. Every precaution was taken to baffle prying curiosity; no stranger was allowed to remain in Verona, without a most satisfactory explanation to the Austrian authorities, of the business which kept him there; nor was permission even to pass through that town easy to be obtained. Conjecture was busy every-where; rumours of warlike councils began to prevail, fortified by the threatening aspect which the preparations of France on the Spanish frontier were every day more and more assuming; and though these rumours did not for some time excite serious apprehensions, yet, towards the end of November, the belief which they won was well attested, by the fall which took place in the government securities of all the continental powers, and in some degree, in those of England too.

Three subjects, it was supposed (and as afterwards appeared with truth) occupied the attention of the congregated sovereigns, generals, and ministers-Italy, Turkey, and Spain. With respect to the former two, there was no reason to complain of the course of policy which was adopted, for peace was preserved in the East, and the situation of Italy was in some respects ameliorated. The army of occupation in Naples was to be reduced by 17,000 men; and the Austrian troops were to be withdrawn from Piedmont, by three equal portions, in January, May, and August following, so that the evacuation of that country might be complete by September 1823.

It was not equally easy to come to a decision with repect to the affairs of Spain. M. de Montmorency represented the existence of the actual government of Spain as inconsistent with the safety of monarchical power, and called upon the sovereigns to make common cause against it; or, if they would not proceed so far, to look on with indifference or with favour, while France took up arms against so dangerous a neighbour, and re-established the throne of Ferdinand on the ruins of the Cortes. To this policy Russia was decidedly inclined; Austria and Prussia were less resolute for violent measures, though they agreed in condemning vehemently the proceedings of the Cortes. England, on the contrary, advocated the cause of peace; maintaining that foreign powers had no right to interfere in the affairs of Spain; that such interference would in all probability increase the evil; and that if the sword was once unsheathed, no person could foresee what consequences in the present state of Europe might ensue, before it was again restored to its scabbard.

The result was, that no open joint declaration of actual hostilities to Spain was made; that it was not, arose from the influence of England. But before the congress separated, notes were written by the ministers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia respectively, to the representatives of their several governments at Madrid [see Public Documents, p. 565, et. seq.] for the purpose of being communicated to the Spanish administration, expressing unequivocally and strongly their disapprobation of the political state of Spain. A circular too, was drawn up by the assembled sovereigns, dated from Verona on the 14th of

December, in which, after stating the measures which they had adopted towards Italy, lamenting that "the fire-brand of rebellion had been thrown into the Ottoman empire" and denouncing the conduct of the Greeks as "rash and culpable," they expressed their sentiments on Spanish affairs. "If it could be the object of civilization" said this circular "to overthrow human society-if it were possible to suppose that the armed force, which has no other vocation than that of maintaining the internal and external peace of the state, might with impunity assume the supreme dominion over it-the Spanish revolution might certainly pretend to the admiration of all ages, and the military insurrection in the isle of Leon serve as a model for reformers. The legitimate authority fettered, and changed into a forced instrument of the overthrow of all rights and legal privileges; all classes of the people hurried away by the stream of revolutionary movement; violence and oppression exercised under the forms of law; a whole kingdom given up a prey to disorders and convulsions of every kind; the last resources of the state consumed by civil war; this is the picture which the present state of Spain presents-such are the evils by which a generous people, deserving of a better fate, is visited-such, in fine, are the grounds of the just apprehensions, which such an assemblage of elements of trouble and confusion must excite in the countries more nearly in contact with the Peninsula. If ever, in the bosom of civilization, a power arose hostilely alienated from the principles of preservation, from the principles on which the European confede

ration reposes, such a power is Spain, in its present state of dissolution.... Could the sovereigns have contemplated with indifference so many evils heaped upon one country, accompanied with so many dangers to the others? Depending, in this important affair, only on their judgment and their own consciences, they have been obliged to ask themselves, whether they

could longer remain calm spectators of an evil which every day threatens to become more terrible and dangerous, and even, by the presence of their representatives, lend the false colouring of a tacit sanction to the measures of a faction which is ready to undertake every thing for the maintenance of its destructive sway. The decision of the monarchs could not be doubtful. The Legations have received orders to quit the Peninsula. . . . . The wishes of the monarchs are directed to peace alone; but this peace, though fully established between the powers, cannot diffuse its blessings on society, while the fermentation is kept up which, in more than one country, inflames people's minds, by the perfidious arts of persuasion, and the criminal efforts of a faction which aims only at revolution and destruction: so long as the heads and instruments of this faction (whether they openly take the field against thrones and existing institutions, or whether they brood on their hostile plans in the dark, prepare plots, and poison public opinion) shall not cease to torment the nations with discouraging and lying representations of the present, and fictitious apprehensions of the future. The wisest measures of the governments cannot prosper, the best-meant plans of

improvement cannot succeed, confidence cannot return, till those promoters of the most odious purposes shall have sunk into utter impotency; and the monarchs will not believe that they have accomplished their great work, till they shall have deprived them of the with which they may threaten the repose of the world."

arms

In the meantime, France had exhibited strong indications of warlike purposes. The army on the frontier, which had now changed its name from Sanitary Cordon, to Army of Observation, was increased; and the commands in it were given to men of violent political partialities. Bayonne assumed the appearance of a camp -every day waggon-loads of lint and dressings for the wounded were arriving, and a park of artillery was prepared, consisting of 300 tumbrils and 36 field-pieces, in readiness to move at a moment's notice. The Spanish refugees were kindly received; and at Paris, an attempt was made to raise a loan for the service of the insurgents.

Upon the dissolution of the congress, and the return of M. Montmorency to Paris, it was generally understood (though the joint circular and the separate notes of the sovereigns were not published to the world till the beginning of the next year), that France was at liberty, if she thought proper, to invade Spain, and that, in so doing, she would meet with no opposition from any of the powers of the Continent. Whether she would avail herself of this license, was long doubtful. England, it was known, had exerted all her influence to dissuade her neighbour from the adoption of violent counsels; and public opinion in France

was adverse to war. The commercial part of the community, in particular dreaded the interruption, of the peace, and presented addresses, deprecating any attack on Spain. The individual opinions and inclinations of the king bent, it was said, towards peace; and even the ministry was reported not to be altogether unanimous. For though the majority of them, with the duke of Angoulême and ́ M. de Montmorency at their head, were for instant war, Villèle, whe was decidedly superior to his colleagues in talent and in public estimation, was the friend, if not of pacific, at least of more cautious measures. Whatever might be the agreement of these two statesmen in principle, and as to the end to be ultimately aimed at, they certainly did not agree with respect to the immediate steps which ought to be taken. Many discussions in the council were the result. At last the two ministers were ordered to embody each of them his views, on the question of peace and war, in the form of a note to the French ambassador at Madrid: each of them did so. These notes were read in a council held on the 25th of December; and were subjected respectively to a rigid examination. After the merits of each had been well weighed, and the ministers had, in turn, given their opinion on the two lines of policy recommended, the king decided in favour of M. de Villèle. His note being thus preferred, M. de Montmorency instantly tendered his resignation, which was accepted on the same evening, and announced to the country on the following day. On the 28th of December, he was succeeded in the department of foreign affairs by the viscount de

Chateaubriand: and Villèle was now the acknowledged Prime minister.

The resignation of Montmorency was regarded at first as amounting to a complete defeat of the war-party, and as ensuring the continuance of peace. But this delusion was speedily dispelled by the publication of M. de Villèle's note on the 27th of December[see Public Documents, p. 574.] That document, though probably less violent in its language than the one which Montmorency proposed, was still of a very lowering, and threatening aspect. Though it did not make war inevitable, it was far from giving any promise or pledge of peace; and if it did not announce the immediate commencement of hostilities, it at least contained a tolerably express intimation, that, unless Spain, of her own accord, altered her political constitution, France would employ force to convert her from her revolutionary theories. "You will declare" says this note to the French ambassador, "that France will not relax in any point the

measures of preservation which she has taken, so long as Spain shall continue to be torn by faction. The government of his majesty will not even hesitate to recall you from Madrid, and to seek its guarantees in more efficacious measures, if its essential interests continue to be compromised, and if it lose the hope of an amelioration." Still the dismissal of the keen partizan of war, left the friends of peace specious grounds of hope.

Thus at the close of 1822, however fixed the plans of the French cabinet might in reality be, every thing with respect to them appeared outwardly uncertain and contingent. The ministers, it was supposed, differed in their views, and were wavering in their projects; even if they were themselves inclined to war, they seemed so irresolute, that they might probably be dissuaded or deterred from yielding to their own wishes. Not France only, but all Europe, expected anxiously the issue of their counsels; for on these counsels depended the tranquillity of the world.

of America.

year, scarcely any materials for history. The people were tranquil; but the agricultural classes complained loudly of the distress in which they were involved by the lowness of the current prices of live stock and of the produce of land, and presented petitions in which they denounced the importation of foreign corn as the source of all the mischief, and called for a restrictive system, similar to that which had been adopted in England, in France, and, indeed, in every country of Europe. This subject, always a delicate one, is attended with peculiar difficulties in the Netherlands: for not only are the interests of the producer and the consumer opposite there, as they are everywhere else; but the wants and circumstances of the two portions of the kingdom are wholly different. The exclusion of foreign grain, which might be favourable to the predominating classes in

altogether inapplicable to the commercial Dutch provinces, which do not and cannot grow corn nearly sufficient for their own consumption.

In the States-General, great unanimity prevailed. The discussions, which occupied them, related principally to the composition of a civil code and to the finances. The revenue was found unequal to the expenses of the year; so that it became necessary to add a capital sum of 57,500,000 florins to the debt, the interest of which amounted to 1,725,000 florins annually. Laws regulating the tariff, and the levy of duties of importation, exportation, transit, and excise, were passed without one dissenting voice. A law for ceding national domains, yielding a revenue of 500,000 florins a year, in full property to the king, was opposed in the first chamber only by four votes. The session was terminated on the 28th of August, by a speech