ance, or from the ignorance, the confined views, and the disadvantageous situation of the observer for perceiving the whole plan of the Great Agent. "It may be owing either to an actual want of goodness, or to the infinity and unfathomableness of it. The first of these accounts contradicts numberless phenomena of nature, is inconsistent with the perfection apparent in the general frame of the world, and opposes our most reasonable apprehensions concerning the nature and attributes of the First Cause. The latter account is in the highest degree easy, natural, and obvious. It is suggested to us by what we have experienced in similar instances, and agreeable to what, from the reason of the thing, we might have foreseen must have happened to such creatures as we are, in considering such a scheme as that of nature. Can we then doubt to which of these accounts we shall give the preference? Is it reasonable to suffer our conviction of a fact, for which we have good evidence, to be influenced by appearances which may as well be consistent as inconsistent with it; nay, by appearances which, on the supposition of its truth, we must beforehand have expected?" *

* Four Dissertations, &c. By Richard Price, D.D. F.R.S. p. 105.

Let us, then, observe the exact state of the case. It can be proved in the most satisfactory manner that the Deity is good, because it can be proved that he has imparted pleasure where it ean answer no other purpose than that of promoting the happiness of its recipient; that he has therefore rested in the production of happiness as an ultimate object. One such case is a demonstration of his goodness. On the other hand, it cannot be proved that pain is ever occasioned where no purpose is answered by it but the misery of the sufferer. Not a single example can be found in all nature, from which it can be concluded that pain is rested in as an ultimate object; while numberless instances can be adduced, from which it can be demonstrated that it is the means of producing good: the utmost which can be said on the opposite side is, that there are particular cases of such a nature, that we cannot explain how they will terminate in good: even with respect to these, no one can show that they will end in evil, no one can render it probable; but the probability produced by all, which we really know, is altogether against the conclusion. Although we are ignorant of

* "No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease: or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, 'This is to irritate, this to inflame.'" Paley's Natural Theology, p. 502.

the exact means by which in these cases good is promoted, yet we are equally ignorant of the exact means by which a thousand other things are brought to pass, which we are certain happen and at all events our ignorance of what we do not know cannot bring doubt upon what we do know; nor can we, without manifest absurdity, conclude that the Deity is not good, merely because we are ignorant of the mode in which, in particular cases, he chooses to accomplish the purposes of benevolence. Belief is founded upon evidence, not upon ignorance; but the notion that the Deity is not perfectly good, is founded altogether upon our ignorance. Evidence is completely against it; evidence is wholly in favor of his perfect benignity; evidence amounting to absolute demonstration.

Thus we have entered into a particular consideration of the various classes of evil. We have seen that the appointment of it is consistent with infinite wisdom and goodness; that while its actual amount is by no means so great as is commonly supposed, in every instance in which it does prevail, it produces a preponderance of good, and that it exists only for the sake of that greater good which it is the means of securing. We have seen, then, that the positive proof of the benevolence of the Creator is absolutely irresistible, and that the partial and temporary prevalence of evil, which alone can

involve in doubt the perfection of his goodness, is not only not irreconcileable with it, but is as real án evidence of it, as the appointment of the sweetest pleasures of which he has permitted the heart to taste. The human faculties cannot be better employed, than in investigating such subjects; and, perhaps, the review of them that has now been taken, may tend to remove some doubts which may sometimes have perplexed and disturbed the mind, and to render its conviction of the most glorious and cheering of all truths more complete, more impressive, and more stable.

SECTION. IV.

OF THE DESIGN OF GOD IN THE CREATION.

SUPPOSE then the Deity really possesses the atributes which we have endeavored to show must belong to him; suppose that he is self-existent, independent, infinitely powerful, wise, and good, and that he determines to call into existence millions of beings, endowed with such a capacity of happiness, and furnished with such faculties as distinguish man. What could induce in him such a determination? By the supposition, he is infinitely powerful, wise, and good: he must, therefore, be infinitely happy, because infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, must render him self-sufficient; must supply him, that is, with all the means of happiness, whatever they may be, and at the same time exclude every thing which is incompatible with perfect felicity.

Being, then, infinitely powerful, wise, good, and happy, the inquiry recurs, What could determine him to call into existence a world of sentient and reasonable creatures? Could it be weakness? That is impossible; for by the sup position, he is infinitely wise, and therefore must act not only with some design, but with wise design. Could it be to occasion misery? That