LECTURE I.*

Ephes, 1. 11.

In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.

HAVING discoursed to you, what I thought requisite, concerning the attributes and perfections of the Divine Being, we now come, according to the order of discourse, to speak to you of the DIVINE DECREES. I choose to call them by that name, because, by divines, they are usually so called; though according to the more ordináry use of that word in Scripture, it more frequently signifies public laws or edicts, whether human or divine, than private and secret purposes. And so in common speech too, and other writings, nothing is more usual than to call the constitutions of states and princes, decreta. But however, the word being so explained, to signify a secret purpose, antecedent to any manifestation, it may then fitly enough be so used; and in that sense, it is generally understood by divines, treating on the head of religion.

And upon this subject, my design is not to speak to every thing that is disputed in the schools about it; but only what may be requisite, and sufficient unto the common faith and practice of christians. Nor shall I need to lay down any other doctrine, than the very words of the text, that God "work

* Preached December 25, 1691.

eth all things, according to the counsel of his own will,"wherein you do see, there are several particulars to be considered. There is,

1. The final term of all God's works, that wherein they do directly terminate, All things.

2. There is his working itself, tending towards that term, he worketh all things.

3. There is his purpose and volition of all that he worketh, called his will. And

4. There is the supreme measure of all those volitions or acts of his will, and so of his subsequent actions, and that of his counsel. He worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will.

I shall speak briefly to each of these, but most largely to that which is our most proper subject, with reference to the purpose for which we have chosen to insist upon these words, that is, the will of God; not merely the faculty, but the acts of his will.. But we shall briefly go over the several particulars already men

tioned.

1. For the things wherein the acts willed by him, do finally terminate, which we are told are all things, and that universality may be understood two ways, either relatively, in reference to those works that do terminate in these things; as if he said, all things that he works, he works according to the counsel of his will. Or else, also, it may be understood absolutely and simply, there being simply nothing at all, unto which his agency, one way or other, extends not: though not to every thing in the same way; as there will be occasion to shew hereafter.

2. For his working that terminates in these things, that is, in all things; it is emphatically expressed in the text: the word is gyors, in-acting, or in-working all things. It shews the peculiar kind of the divine agency, such as nothing can exclude, and nothing can disappoint. And then,

3. There is his will itself, which must be looked upon as the immediate source of all these operations of his. And that we shall consider, not only as it is the measure of all his actings, but as it is self-measured by that counsel, that lies in his eternal and all-comprehending mind, which is the fourth particular in order, that we have briefly to consider. And touching that,

4. We must know, that it cannot be understood in the same sense with God, and with men, as indeed nothing can that comes under the same name with him and with us; for nothing can be absolutely common between God and the creature; or have precisely the same common notion: there cannot but be infinite difference, always, between whatsoever is finite, and that

which is infinite. Counsel with men imports imperfection; it signifies that we have not suddenly a perspection of the reason, and aptitudes of things, what it is fit for us to resolve, and not to resolve! and do, or not to do. And thereupon, we deliberate, and arrive more slowly and by degrees from a more indistinct perception of the reason of things, to a clearer and more distinct perception of them. With God, it cannot be so, before whose all-seeing eye, all things lie in their aptitudes and correspondencies at one view; so as he doth not see things because they are connected with one another, so as to proceed from the knowledge of things that are more clear, to the knowledge of things that are more obscure; all things being equally clear and equally present, to his eye and to his view. But by way of analogy, that which is effected by counsel among men in the way of consultation, debate of things with themselves, continued discourse, reasonings and arguings of matters in their own minds to and fro, that, which with men hereupon is called judgment, counsel, hath the same name given it with him also. Not that it signifies the same, but that most perfect judgment of things, which is indeed the highest and most exquisite wisdom, which he hath eternally and all at once, when we do arrive to the like by steps. And so according to that perfect perception, that he hath of the reason of things, and their aptitudes and correspondencies to one another, and to his creatures, and to him, so accordingly he wills, and accordingly he doth.

And this counsel of his, it may be taken two ways, either 1st. As it is internal, lying only in his own mind: or else 2nd. As it hath an after manifestation, as many of those things which lay from eternity, and through many successions of ages of time, secret in his own mind have, and do come to be revealed and made manifest more or less, and in such degrees as to him hath seemed fit. In that latter sense, counsel is taken frequently in Scripture, even when it is spoken of God, as these phrases do plainly signify, "If they had stood in my counsel. They despised all my counsel, and set at nought my reproofs. I have declared to you the whole counsel of God." Jer. 23. 22. Pro. 1.30. Acts 20. 27.

But here, it must be understood to signify counsel as it is secret, as lying in his own eternal mind, and as it is, thereupon, the measure of all the purposes of his will, and of all he subsequently doth, and hath done, in the creation and continual government of this world. In that latter sense, counsel is, even among men, correspondently in that acceptation of it with God, put for certain, established laws, and constitutions, and even as

decrees are. Thus, with the Romans, many constitutions of theirs are known to go under the name of senatus consulta, that is, things consulted of, and agreed upon, by the governing power among them. But this is not the sense that it is to be taken in here, for notwithstanding much of the counsel of God be manifested, we are to consider it now as antecedent to any such manifestations: and thereupon, to return to that which is our more principal subject, his will, according to such counsel, "He works all things after the counsel of his own will;" according to that counsel which doth (as it were) guide and measure all the determinations and purposes of his just and holy will. We are not to understand, that the divine will here signifies the faculty of will, abstractly and precisely, but as comprehending the acts, the volitions, the determinations and purposes of the divine will, that which is commonly meant by the word decrees. And so, concerning the will of God and the purposes thereof, I shall first give you some distinctions, and then, secondly, lay down what I conceive necessary to be said concerning this subject in certain propositions.

First. There are sundry distinctions of the divine will, which it may be fit to take some notice of: and some of them will be of great use to us.

1. There are, who distinguish the will of God into antecedent and consequent. But I know no ground for that distinction, there being no first or last with him, or former or latter, as we shall have occasion further to shew.

2. Again, some distinguish it into absolute and conditional; but certainly, it is over bold to feign any such distinction as that, of the divine will, properly so called; it is indeed agreed on all hands that there are conditions of the things willed, but there can be none of the will itself concerning those things; the faculty and act of the will not being distinguishable in God, as they are in us; for he is a pure act: and to suppose there can be a condition of the will itself in God, is to suppose a conditional Deity and so, consequently, a contingent one, and so, consequently, none at all.

3. Again, some do more truly distinguish the divine will into that which is bene placite, and that which is signi. And for the former member of that distinction, it is most unexceptionable and scriptural: good pleasure, and the good pleasure of his will, we read of again and again in this very context, as well as many times besides in Scripture. But for the other member of the description, it is too obscure for common use; and will require more explication than is proper for this place.

4. It is again distinguishable into his objective and active