CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. I. A CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY INTO THE PREVAILING NOTIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. PAGE PART I. Wherein are explained and stated various terms and things belonging to the subject of the ensuing Discourse 1 SECT. 1. Concerning the Nature of the Will ib. III. Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c., and of Contingence 23 037 8 13 17 IV. Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability v. Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency PART II. Wherein it is considered, whether there is or can be any such sort of Freedom of Will, as that wherein Arminians place the essence of the Liberty of all Moral Agents; and whether any such thing ever was or can be conceived of SECT. 1. Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power 20 ib. . II. Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning, considered III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its existence IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul v. Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently VI. Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the mind 2 22 2 26 30 VII. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference x. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with particular observations of the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings about the Freedom of the Will . XI. The evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral Agents XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of mora. agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those volitions as is without all Necessity. XIII. Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty PART III. Wherein is inquired, whether any such Liberty of Will as Arminians hold be necessary to Mora! Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise and Dispraise, &c. SECT. 1. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy II. The Acts of the Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ, necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, &c. . |