wisdom, love, and power, and every perfection of the Godhead, to the eternal admiration of the principalities and powers in heavenly places.

SECTION IX.

Several Evasions of the Arguments for the Depravity of Nature, from trial and events, considered.

EVASION 1. DR. TAYLOR says, p. 231, 232, "Adam's nature, it is allowed, was very far from being sinful; yet he sinned. And therefore, the common doctrine of Original Sin, is no more necessary to account for the sin that has been, or is in the world, than it is to account for Adam's sin." Again, p. 52— 54, S., &c., "If we allow mankind to be as wicked as R. R. has represented them to be; and suppose that there is not one upon earth that is truly righteous, and withont sin, and that some are very enormous sinners, yet it will not thence follow, that they are naturally corrupt. For, if sinful action infers a nature. originally corrupt, then, whereas Adam (according to them that hold the doctrine of Original Sin) committed the most heinous and aggravated sin, that ever was committed in the world; for, according to them, he had greater light than any other man in the world, to know his duty, and greater power than any other man to fulfil it, and was under greater obligations than any other man to obedience; he sinned, when he knew he was the representative of millions, and that the happy or miserable state of all mankind, depended on his conduct; which never was, nor can be, the case of any other man in the world then, I say, it will follow, that his nature was originally corrupt, &c. Thus their argument from the wickedness of mankind, to prove a sinful and corrupt nature, must inevitably and irrecoverably fall to the ground; which will appear more abundantly, if we take in the case of the angels, who in numbers sinned, and kept not their first estate, though created with a nature superior to Adam's." Again, p. 145, S., " When it is inquired, how it comes to pass that our appetites and passions are now so irregular and strong, as that not one person has resisted them, so as to keep himself pure and innocent? If this be the case, if such as make the inquiry will tell the world, how it came to pass that Adam's appetites and passions were so irregular and strong, that he did not resist them, so as to keep himself pure and innocent, when, upon their principles, he was far more able to have resisted them; I also will tell them how it comes to pass, that his posterity does not resist them. Sin doth not alter its nature, by its being general; and therefore how far soever it spreads, it must come upon all just as it came upon Adam."

These things are delivered with much assurance. But is there any reason in such a way of talking? One thing implied in it, and the main thing, if any thing at all to the purpose, is, that because an effect's being general, does not alther the nature of the effect, therefore nothing more can be argued concerning the cause, from its happening constantly, and in the most steady manner, than from its happening but once. But how contrary is this to reason! If such a case should happen, that a person, through the deceitful persuasions of a pretended friend, once takes an unwholesome and poisonous draught, of a liquor he had no inclination to before; but after he has once taken of it, he be observed to act as one that has an insatiable, incurable thirst after more of the same, in his constant practice, and acts often repeated, and obstinately continued in as long as he lives, against all possible arguments and endeavors used to dissuade VOL. II.

46

him from it; and we should from hence argue a fixed inclination, and begin to suspect that this is the nature and operation of the poison, to produce such an inclination, or that this strong propensity is some way the consequence of the first draught in such a case, could it be said with good reason, that a fixed propensity can no more be argued from his consequent constant practice, than from his first draught? Or, if we suppose a young man, no otherwise than soberly inclined, and enticed by wicked companions, should drink to excess, until he had got a habit of excessive drinking, and should come under the power of a greedy appetite after strong drink, so that drunkenness should become a common and constant practice with him; and some observer, arguing from this his general practice, should say, "It must needs be that this young man has a fixed inclination to that sin; otherwise, how should it come to pass that he should make such a trade of it?" And another, ridiculing the weakness of his arguing, should reply, "Do you tell me how it came to pass, that he was guilty of that sin the first time, without a fixed inclination, and I will tell you how he is guilty of it so generally without a fixed inclination. Sin does not alter its nature by being general; and therefore, how common soever it becomes, it must come at all times by the same means that it came at first." I leave it to every one to judge, who would be chargeable with weak arguing in such a case.

It is true, as was observed before, there is no effect without some cause, occasion, ground or reason of that effect, and some cause answerable to the effect. But certainly it will not follow from thence, that a transient effect requires a premanent cause, or a fixed influence or propensity. An effect's happening once, though the effect may be great, yea, though it may come to pass on the same occasion in many subjects at the same time, will not prove any fixed propensity, or permanent influence. It is true, it proves an influence great and extensive, answerable to the effect, once exerted, or once effectual; but it proves nothing in the cause fixed or constant. If a particular tree, or a great number of trees standing together, have blasted fruit on their branches at a particular season, yea, if the fruit be very much blasted, and entirely spoiled, it is evident that something was the occasion of such an effect at that time; but this alone does not prove the nature of the tree to be bad. But if it be observed, that those trees, and all other trees of the kind, wherever planted, and in all soils, countries, climates and seasons, and however cultivated and managed, still bear ill fruit, from year to year, and in all ages, it is a good evidence of the evil nature of the tree; and if the fruit, at all these times, and in all these cases, be very bad, it proves the nature of the tree to be very bad; and if we argue in like manner from what appears among men, it is easy to determine, whether the universal sinfulness of mankind, and their all sinning immediately, as soon as capable of it, and all sinning continually, and generally being of a wicked character, at all times, in all ages, and all places, and under all possible circumstances, against means and motives inexpressibly manifold and great, and in the utmost conceivable variety, be from a permanent, internal, great cause.

If the voice of common sense were attended to, and heard, there would be no occasion for labor in multiplying arguments and instances to show, that one act does not prove a fixed inclination; but that constant practice and pursuit do. We see that it is in fact agreeable to the reason of all mankind, to argue fixed principles, tempers, and prevailing inclinations, from repeated and continued actions, though the actions are voluntary, and performed of choice; and thus to judge of the tempers and inclinations of persons, ages, sexes, tribes and nations. But is it the manner of men to conclude, that whatever they see others once do, they have a fixed, abiding inclination to do? Yea, there may be sev

eral acts seen, and yet they not taken as good evidence of an established propensity; nay, though attended with that circumstance, that one act, or those several acts, are followed with such constant practice, as afterwards evidences fixed disposition. As for example, there may be several instances of a man's drinking some spirituous liquor, and they be no sign of a fixed inclination to that liquor; but these acts may be introductory to a settled habit or propensity, which may be made very manifest afterwards by constant practice.

From these things it is plain, that what is alleged concerning the first sin of Adam, and of the angels, without a previous, fixed disposition to sin, cannot in the least injure or weaken the arguments, which have been brought to prove a fixed propensity to sin in mankind in their present state. The thing which the permanence of the cause has been argued from, is the permanence of the effect. And that the permanent cause consists in an internal, fixed popensity, and not any particular, external circumstances, has been argued from the effects being the same, through a vast variety and change of circumstances. Which things do not take place with respect to the first act of sin that Adam or the angels were guilty of; which first acts, considered in themselves, were no permanent, continued effects. And though a great number of the angels sinned, and the effect on that account was the greater, and more extensive; yet this extent of the effect is a very different thing from that permanence, or settled. continuance of the effect, which is supposed to show a permanent cause, or fixed influence or propensity. Neither was there any trial of a vast variety of circumstances attending a permanent effect, to show the fixed cause to be internal, consisting in a settled disposition of nature, in the instances objected. And however great the sin of Adam, or of the angels was, and however great means, motives, and obligations they sinned against; whatever may be thence argued concerning the transient cause, occasion, or temptation, as being very subtle, remarkably tending to deceive and seduce, or otherwise great; yet it argues nothing of any settled disposition, or fixed cause at all, either great or small; the effect both in the angels and our first parents, being in itself transient, and for aught appears, happening in each of them under one system or coincidence of influential circumstances.

The general continued wickedness of mankind, against such means and motives, proves each of these things, viz., that the cause is fixed, and that the fixed cause is internal, in man's nature, and also that it is very powerful. It proves the first, namely, that the cause is fixed, because the effect is so abiding, through so many changes. It proves the second, that is, that the fixed cause is internal, because the circumstances are so various: the variety of means and motives is one thing that is to be referred to the head of variety of circumstances; and they are that kind of circumstances, which above all others proves this; for they are such circumstances as cannot possibly cause the effect, being most opposite to the effect in their tendency. And it proves the third, viz., the greatness of the internal cause, or the powerfulness of the propensity; because the means which have opposed its influence, have been so great, and yet have been statedly

overcome.

But here I may observe by the way, that with regard to the motives and obligations which our first fathers sinned against, it is not reasonably alleged, that he sinned when he knew his sin would have destructive consequences to all his posterity, and might, in process of time, pave the whole globe with skulls, &c. Seeing it is so evident, by the plain account the Scripture gives us of the temptation which prevailed with our first parents to commit that sin, that it was so contrived by the sibtilty of the tempter, as first to blind and deceive them as

to that matter, and to make them believe that their disobedience should be followed with no destruction or calamity at all to themselves (and therefore not to their posterity), but on the contrary, with a great increase and advancement of dignity and happiness.

EVASION 2. Let the wickedness of the world be ever so general and great, there is no necessity of supposing any depravity of nature to be the cause; man's own free will is cause sufficient. Let mankind be more or less corrupt, they make themselves corrupt by their own free choice. This, Dr. Taylor abundantly insists upon, in many parts of his book.*

But I would ask, how it comes to pass that mankind so universally agree in this evil exercise of their free will? If their wills are in the first place as free to good as evil, what is it to be ascribed to, that the world of mankind, consisting of so many millions, in so many successive generations, without consultation, all agree to exercise their freedom in favor of evil? If there be no natural tendency or preponderation in the case, then there is as good a chance for the will's being determined to good as evil. If the cause is indifferent, why is not the effect in some measure indifferent? If the balance be no heavier at one end than the other, why does it perpetually, and, as it were, infinitely, preponderate one way? How comes it to pass, that the free will of mankind has been determined to evil, in like manner before the flood, and after the flood; under the law, and under the gospel; and among both Jews and Gentiles, under the Old Testament; and since that, among Christians, Jews, Mahometans; among Papists and Protestants; in those nations where civility, politeness, arts, and learning most prevail, and among the Negroes and Hottentots in Africa, the Tartars in Asia, and Indians in America, towards both poles, and on every side of the globe; in greatest cities and obscurest villages; in palaces and in huts, wigwams and cells under ground? Is it enough to reply, it happens so, that men everywhere, and at all times, choose thus to determine their own wills, and so to make themselves sinful, as soon as ever they are capable of it, and to sin constantly as long as they live, and universally to choose never to come up half way to their duty?

As has been often observed, a steady effect requires a steady cause; but free will, without any previous propensity to influence its determinations, is no permanent cause; nothing can be conceived of, further from it for the very notion of freedom of will, consisting in self-determining power, implies contingence: and if the will is free in that sense, that it is perfectly free from any government of previous inclination, its freedom must imply the most absolute and perfect contingence; and surely nothing can be conceived of, more unfixed than that. The notion of liberty of will, in this sense, implies perfect freedom from every thing that should previously fix, bind or determine it; that it may be left to be fixed and determined wholly by itself: therefore its determinations must be previously altogether unfixed. And can that which is so unfixed, so contingent, be a cause sufficient to account for an effect, in such a manner, and to such a degree, permanent, fixed and constant?

When men see only one particular person, going on in a certain course with great constancy, against all manner of means to dissuade him, do they judge this to be no argument of any fixed disposition of mind, because he, being free, may determine to do so, if he will, without any such disposition? Or if they see a nation or people that differ greatly from other nations, in such and such instances of their constant conduct, as though their tempers and inclinations were

*Pages 257, 258, 52, 53, S., and many other places.

very diverse, and any should deny it to be from any such cause, and should say, we cannot judge at all of the temper or disposition of any nation or people, by any thing observable in their constant practice or behavior, because they have all free will, and therefore may all choose to act so, if they please, without any thing in their temper or inclination to bias them; would such an account of such effects be satisfying to the reason of mankind? But infinitely further would it be from satisfying a considerate mind, to account for the constant and universal sinfulness of mankind, by saying, that the will of all mankind is free, and therefore all mankind may, if they please, make themselves wicked: they are free when they first begin to act as moral agents, and therefore all may, if they please, begin to sin as soon as they begin to act: they are free as long as they continue to act in the world, and therefore they may all commit sin continually, if they will: men of all nations are free, and therefore all nations may act alike in these respects, if they please (though some do not know how other nations do act). Men of high and low condition, learned and ignorant, are free, and therefore they may agree in acting wickedly, if they please (though they do not consult together). Men in all ages are free, and therefore men in one age may all agree with men in every other age in wickedness, if they please (though they do not know how men in other ages have acted), &c. &c. Let every one judge whether such an account of things can satisfy reason.

EVASION 3. It is said by many of the opposers of the doctrine of Original Sin, that the corruption of the world of mankind may be owing, not to a depraved nature, but to bad example. And I think we must understand Dr. Taylor as having respect to the powerful influence of bad instruction and example, when he says, p. 118, "The Gentiles, in their heathen state, when incorporated into the body of the Gentile world, were without strength, unable to help or recover themselves." And in several other places to the like purpose. If there was no depravity of nature, what else could there be but bad instruction and example, to hinder the heathen world, as a collective body (for as such Dr. Taylor speaks of them, as may be seen p. 117, 118), from emerging out of their corruption, on the rise of each new generation? As to their bad instruction, our author insists upon it, that the heathen, notwithstanding all their disadvantages, had sufficient light to know God, and do their whole duty to him, as we have observed from time to time. Therefore it must be chiefly bad example, that we must suppose, according to him, rendered their case helpless.

Now concerning this way of accounting for the corruption of the world, by the influence of bad example, I would observe the following things:

1. It is accounting for the thing by the thing itself. It is accounting for the corruption of the world by the corruption of the world. For, that bad examples are general all over the world to be followed by others, and have been so from the beginning, is only an instance, or rather a description of that corruption of the world which is to be accounted for. If mankind are naturally no more inclined to evil than good, then how comes there to be so many more bad examples than good ones, in all ages? And if there are not, how come the bad examples that are set, to be so much more followed than the good? If the propensity of man's nature be not to evil, how comes the current of general example, everywhere, and at all times, to be so much to evil? And when opposition has been made by good examples, how comes it to pass that it has had so little effect to stem the stream of general wicked practice?

I think from the brief account the Scripture gives us of the behavior of the first parents of mankind, the expressions of their faith and hope in God's mercy revealed to them, we have reason to suppose, that before ever they had any