firmly established. For the fact of God's having revealed any mystery; for instance, "that in the one divine nature, there are three distinct persons," establishes the existence of it, viz. of the Trinity of persons in one God; and the establishment of the existence of a thing is the best proof of its possibility. When a philosopher was perplexed by the subtility of a metaphysical argument, against the possibility of loco-motion, he rose from his seat, and by the act of walking proved the possibility of it, and refuted the sophistry. Those, therefore, who attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of revealed mysteries, must first disprove their existence, to the highest degree of evidence; and undo all the facts by which the certitude of their existence is supported.

When the arguments drawn from the self-evident prin- " ciples of natural science, to prove intrinsically the natural ⠀⠀ impossibility of revealed mysteries, are impartially considered, it will appear that they shew nothing more than that the possibility of these mysteries is intrinsically obscure; but not that the impossibility of them is intrinsically evident.

Can the man who denies the existence of the Trinity of persons in God, demonstrate to a higher degree of evidence that the possibility of this mystery is repugnant to any selfevident principle of natural science; than he who denies the fact of the creation of the world, can shew that the possibility of creation is repugnant to the principle" ex nihilo nihil fit ?" And yet how often does it happen that those who deny the mystery of the Trinity, admit of that of the creation; though, when both are intrinsically examined, the impossibility of the one can no more be demonstrated by the self-evident principles of natural science, than the impossibility of the other?

CHAPTER IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NOT ADMITTING THE TRUTH OF REVEALED DOCTRINES, UNLESS IT CAN BE PROVED BY INTRINSIC DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE.-Uncertainty in religious doctrines.-Infidelity.-These consequences appear in the history of religious opinions, since the changes made in religion in the 16th century.-Reason and revelation not opposed to each other.—The province of reason, in the search of revealed truths.-Religious liberty.

Ir the truth of any one of the revealed doctrines of Christianity can be resonably denied by any individual, because he cannot intrinsically demonstrate it, by shewing the connexion of the doctrine with some principle of natural science; what mystery, what doctrine of the Christian religion, can such a man consistently support or believe? If on that ground he denies the truth of the doctrine of the real presence, or of transubstantion, must he not, to be consistent with himself, deny the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity of persons in God; of the union of two natures in one person in Christ; of original sin; of the resurrection of the dead; of the eternity of torments in hell; of the creation of the world; and, indeed, of all the revealed doctrines of Christianity, since they all relate to objects which, intrinsically considered, have no connexion with the principles of natural science? It is evident, therefore, that the medium of intrinsic demonstrative evidence cannot be reasonably applied to the objects of divine revelation, and that when perversely followed in this respect, as a medium of the certitude of revealed truth, it must lead to uncertainty in matters of religion, and even to absolute infidelity.

This is not a mere speculative and possible conséquence of

doctrines by the intrinsic demonstration of the agreement or disagreement of the objects of these doctrines with the principles of natural science. This consequence has been fully proved to have been realized in the history of religious opinions, that have been adopted by those who have folowed this rule of judgment. This has been shewn by a multitude of writers; and lately by a Protestant minister, the late Baron de Starck, in his "Entrétiens Philosophiques,' translated into English, under the title of "Philosophical Dialogues on the Reunion of the different Christian Communions." Is it not by a direct consequence from this principle, that the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, the truth of the Sacred Scriptures, and other articles of revealed religion, are publicly denied, at present, in this country ? On what principle can these errors be consistently condemned or refuted, by those who admit that the truth or falsehood of the doctrines of revealed religion is to be proved by intrinsic arguments, drawn from the principles of natural science?

Is then the light of reason to be extinguished by revelation? Is the total exercise of natural reason to be pro. hibited in the search of religious truths? No, certainly not. The truths which are the objects of reason and of revelation are distinct, and are grounded on distinct motives of assent. Reason and revelation have their separate provinces, in which they may respectively exercise their rights.

Revelation leaves reason free to range over the vast field of nature, and to pursue the study of natural and moral truth by the principles of natural science. Revelation brings a new light to the human mind, by infusing a sublime knowledge of supernatural truths, and by giving additional testimony, perfection, and sanction to the truths and precepts of the moral law of nature. But revelation opposes no obstacle to discoveries and improvements in the natural sciences. Indeed, have not civilization and literature been introduced into many countries, by those who introduced the belief of the doctrines of revelation? Has not reason been improved, to the highest degree, in minds enlightened with the knowledge of revealed truths? Were an Origen, a St. Chrysostom, a St. Augustin, a St. Jerom, in former ages; or a Bossuet, a Fénélon, a Paschal, a

Descartes, in later times, impeded in the improvement of their natural talents, or in the acquisition of natural sciences, by their belief of the doctrines of revelation? Have not the ministers and professors of revealed religion been the greatest encouragers and promoters of the arts and sciences in all ages? Revelation, as well as good sense, commends the use, and condemns the misuse, of the powers of reason.

In the search of religious and revealed truths, reason is by no means prohibited the use and exercise of her powers, provided she employ them about those objects, which lie within her proper jurisdiction, and she do not wander out of her own province. But if reason attempt to demonstrate the truth or falsehood of the doctrines and mysteries of revelation, by discussing the intrinsic nature of the objects of these doctrines and mysteries, or by philosophical arguments drawn from self-evident principles of natural science, with which they have no connexion, reason does go out of her own province; she acts unreasonably, by attempting to demonstrate that -by intrinsic evidence, which is not the object of it; any more than colour is the object of the ear, or sound of the eye, or the existence of an historical fact is the object of a mathematical demonstration.

Admitting the existence of God, whose infinite wisdom knows more than the mind of man can comprehend; whose infinite power can do more than man can conceive possible; whose infinite goodness surpasses all understanding; reason may exert her powers in demonstrating, from these admitted principles, that if this great God reveal, or manifest, any thing relating to the perfections of his nature, or to his own works or designs in favour of man, what he reveals must be most certainly true, because, being infinitely wise, he knows all things as they are in themselves; and, being infinitely true and good, he cannot deceive us, by making any declaration contrary to what he knows to be the truth. Again, reason may demonstrate, that it is most reasonable to be-lieve, with a firm conviction of mind, whatever God has revealed; because it is reasonable to believe most firmly whatever is certainly true; and whatever God has revealed, is most certainly true.

It then only remains to inquire whether, in fact, Almighty God has revealed any thing to men, and what he has revealed.

These are plain questions of FACT, the existence of which like that of all historical facts, is to be ascertained by the evidence of testimony. Here, again, reason may employ her powers, in applying to the external evidences of divine revelation, which are so many external facts, all the principles and rules of criticism by which the certitude of testimony is established.

But, when reason has discovered and ascertained the fact of divine revelation, there she must stop. Reason has, indeed, a right to be satisfied that God has spoken. But when it is made certain, by satisfactory extrinsic evidence, that he has really spoken; reason has no right, she is not qualified nor competent, to sit in judgment on the TRUTH, or JUSTICE, of what God has taught or commanded. Reason herself teaches, that it is the duty of man to do homage to the truth and veracity of God, by submitting his understanding to the obedience of faith, and by believing, implicitly and firmly, whatever God has revealed; as it is his duty to do homage to the wisdom and justice of God, by submitting his will to the obedience of the divine law, and by faithfully doing whatever GOD has commanded.

But what, then, becomes of religious liberty? If by religious liberty it be only meant, that every man should be at liberty to inquire into the existence of the fact of divine revelation, and to examine the evidence of the testimonies brought to ascertain its reality, it is clear that this is the natural right of every rational creature. The same must be said of the right that each one has, to examine the evidence of the extrinsic motives of credibility, relative to the divinely established medium, by which the revealed doctrines are to be communicated, with certitude, to mankind. Without this, we should be exposed to the danger of mistaking the erroneous opinions of men for the revealed truths of God, and of being the dupes of every impostor or self-authorized fanatical teacher.

If by religious liberty be meant a right, to believe or to disbelieve what is certainly revealed by the God of truth, and what is proposed as revealed to our belief, by an authority, which God himself has commissioned to promulgate his revealed law, and which he has commanded us to obey : no such right can exist. For it is as wrong and as criminal