229. Sin, or the wilful transgression of the divine law, may be either mortal or venial.

Under divine law are here comprised, not only the immediate law of God, but also His mediate or indirect ordinances (221). The transgression is wilful when the commandment and the unlawfulness of the action are known to the transgressor.

For

Sin is, therefore, not as it is represented in some modern systems of philosophy, merely a minor grade of good; it is the contrary of good. Nor is it a natural and necessary transition to virtue, being an aversion from good; nor a natural manifestation of man's limited power, being repugnant and derogatory to human nature. what is good cannot be detested by God; the necessary passage to virtue cannot be forbidden by divine wisdom; the natural outcome of human nature is not punishable before God. Sin is a disobedience, a rebellion against God, an offence against our Lord and Master, a defacement of God's image and likeness in man.

1. Mortal sin, so called from its effect, namely, the destruction of the supernatural life of the soul, is the wilful transgression of the divine law in an important matter. The matter may be important in itself (e.g., murder) or in its circumstances (e.g., a grave damage inflicted). In order that the transgression may be simply free the gravity of the action must be known and the consent of the will must be perfect.

2. Venial sin is so called because it is more easily pardoned, since it does not destroy the life of grace and the friendship of God. It is the transgression of a divine command either in a light matter or without full consent.

The object may be venial either because the thing commanded or forbidden is, according to its nature, of lesser moment, or because the command or prohibition, though having an important matter for its object, has been transgressed only to a slight extent or in a small matter. For the first reason a lie (abstracting from aggravating circumstances) is a venial sin; for the second reason a small theft is a venial sin. The transgression is not perfectly wilful when either the necessary knowledge of the sin and its gravity or the perfect consent of the will is wanting.

Mortal, or grievous, sin includes in its nature not only the conversion of man to God's creatures, but also his aversion from God, his last end; venial sin, on the other hand, while it includes an immoderate attachment to God's creatures, does not imply an aversion from God, our last end. As among men not every offence takes away friendship, neither does every offence against God destroy the divine friendship, which is based on sanctifying grace. Holy Scripture distinguishes between venial and grievous sins. It speaks, on the one hand, of sins which do not take away the friendship of God:

'For in many things we all offend" (James iii. 2). On the other hand, it speaks of sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven : "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers . . . shall posses. the kingdom of heaven" (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10). The Church also in all ages made this same distinction; for in the controversy against the Pelagians it taught that even the just commit certain venial sins, without thereby losing justice, or sanctifying grace (144).

Eins are also, according to various points of view, divided into sins of omission and commission, sins against God, against our neighbor, and against ourselves; into internal and external sins, etc.

230. All sins or vices may be reduced to seven chief heads or sources, commonly called the seven capital or deadly sins. As sin is opposed to a single good action, so vice is opposed to virtue, or the habitual inclination to good; both vice and virtue imply a continued habit. Vice is, therefore, a permanent disorder. If there is question of an inborn disorder or immoderate inclination, however, we generally call it a defect, while the word vice expresses an inordinate habit developed by repeated sins and excesses.

The seven capital or deadly sins (or vices) are so called because they are, as it were, seven sources from which all other sins or vices flow. And in fact seven such fountainheads of sinful actions may be easily discriminated (S. Thom. I. II. q. 84, a. 3). First we may distinguish a fourfold immoderate appetite: of spiritual goods, namely, of praise and honor (pride); of external goods (avarice); of two distinct kinds of sensual pleasures (intemperance and lust). Moreover, we may distinguish a twofold repugnance: against the difficulties connected with the performance of good works (sloth); against the good or welfare of our neighbor (envy); and this latter repugnance, if greatly intensified, develops into a special vice (anger).

When the threefold concupiscence-luxury, avarice, and prideis called the source of sin (1 John ii. 16), it is in a somewhat different sense. In this case there is question of the inordinate passions as such from which sin flows, not of the chief vices or sins themselves, to which other vices or sins are subservient as means. The inordinate passions may thus be divided into three classes, according to the threefold object to which they are directed (S. Thom. I. II. q. 77, a. 5). Again, when we read (1 Tim. vi. 10) that the love of money is the root of all evil, it is characterized as such because it procures the means of indulging all the other passions (S. Thom I. II. q. 84, a. 1). Immoderate self-love is also rightly called the source of all sins; for sins are commonly committed by immoderate self-indulgence,

SECTION II.

CHRISTIAN MORAL IN PARTICULAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE CHRISTIAN'S DUTIES TOWARDS GOD

I. THE THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

231. The three theological virtues-faith, hope, and charity -whether considered in themselves, or in their effects, or in their growth and perfection, occupy the first place in Christian life.

1. If compared with the moral virtues, the theological virtues occupy the place of the end, to which the former are the means. For by the moral virtues we are inclined so to regulate our actions as to remove all obstacles to our union with God, and to procure the means towards our union with Him. By the divine virtues, on the other hand, we are actually united with God-with God the all-truthful by faith, with God the all-faithful by hope, with God the chief good by love. In the same proportion, therefore, as the end is superior to the means the divine virtues are superior to the moral (S. Thom. II. II. q. 104, a. 3).

2. The object of Christian life is to prepare us for the future possession of God, our supernatural end. Now, this end is chiefly attained by the three theological virtues. For faith teaches us to know God as our supernatural end; hope arouses in us the longing to possess Him; love unites us with Him as far as this is possible here on earth. The three divine virtues comprise the entire Christian life. For faith is the beginning of salvation, the foundation and root of justice (149); the hope of the possession of God as the object of our eternal happiness urges us on to implore God's grace and to

make use of the means of grace; charity insures the observance of God's commandments, since it is active of its very nature, and cannot exist without the fulfilment of the law.

Since the divine virtues are so important in themselves and in their effects, it naturally follows that it is our duty often in life to elicit acts of faith, hope, and charity. This duty is particularly urgent as soon as the child comes to the use of reason; for, as soon as man has known God as his supernatural end he cannot remain indifferent towards Him, but must submit his understanding to divine revelation, direct his love and longing towards God-in short, he must begin a Christian life, which without the divine virtues is impossible. In temptations against the theological virtues, on important occasions, on approaching the holy sacraments, in mortal dangers, there arises a special obligation by faith to raise the mind to God, our last end, by hope to direct our aspirations to Him, and by love to unite ourselves with Him.

3. The growth and perfection of the three divine virtues im ply at the same time the increase and perfection of the whole internal spiritual life. For, since the divine virtues are infused into the soul as permanent habits to enable us to perform functions of supernatural life (148), it follows that in pror tion as the supernatural life itself, or sanctifying grace, is augmented those virtues themselves are increased and fected (cf. Trid. Sess. VI. c. 10). The theological virtues. are, consequently, increased by the same means as sanctifying grace itself.

Like sanctifying grace itself the divine virtues can be lost. They are lost each by the contrary sin-charity by every grievous sin, hope by a grievous sin against hope, faith by any grievous sin against this virtue (150). In the blessed in heaven faith and hope cease, while charity remains. For faith is a light which in this nether darkness lights us to our last end, and, consequently, it has no further object when the darkness has vanished and the goal is reached hope implies expectation and longing for what we do not possess, and, therefore, ceases as soon as the object hoped for is obtained; but love is the more intense the more closely we are united with, and the more clearly we contemplate, the object loved (1 Cor. xiii. 8, 13).

A. Faith.

232. Faith is either actual or habitual.

1. Actual faith is an act of the understanding whereby we firmly hold as true whatever God has revealed, because He,

who can neither err nor deceive, has revealed it. The objectmatter of faith is, accordingly, whatever God has revealed; its motive is the truthfulness of God, who speaks to us.

Faith is in itself an act of the understanding; for to know and to assent are intellectual acts. This activity of the understanding, however, requires the influence of the will which moves the intellect to assent. For, since the object of our faith is not so clearly proposed to the mind as to compel assent, since faith, on the contrary, resting upon the authority of the invisible God and having an invisible object, is always to some extent obscure, it follows that the will must move the understanding to assent. The latter, however, in following the will does not act blindly; on the contrary, it has sufficient grounds, since the fact that God has spoken is not merely probable but absolutely certain.

The evidences for the fact of revelation, however, are not, strictly speaking, the motive of faith; they are only grounds which render revelation credible (motiva credibilitatis), which give us the moral certainty that God has spoken and revealed this or that truth. Not until one has formed the judgment: I may and must believe, because miracles and other facts prove that God has spoken, can one proceed to the act of faith itself: I believe, because God, the unerring Truth, has spoken. Although faith is an activity of man, yet it does not proceed from natural power alone. Grace is necessary in order that man may believe as is necessary for salvation; nay, without grace not even the good will to believe can exist in man (142).

Faith differs from knowledge; for knowledge arises from the perception of truth in the object itself, while faith rests upon the authority or testimony of another. Thus, for instance, we know that there is a God, because various manifest proofs have convinced us of this truth; but that in God there are three persons we believe on divine authority. What is matter of knowledge, however, may also by revelation become matter of faith (5). Though reason can never reach to the internal truth of some articles of our faith (91), yet there can never be any real contradiction between faith and the principles of reason. For, since the same God who has given us the light of reason to follow has also sealed the mysteries of faith with His authority and demands our belief, He would contradict Himself if that which is true according to revelation were false according to reason; for to require, on the one hand, that we should accept certain truths as revealed, and, on the other hand, that we should reject them as contrary to reason, would be a manifest contradiction. It is only the limited nature of our knowledge that may sometimes make it appear that certain revealed doctrines are contrary to reason (Vat. de fide c. 4).

2. Faith considered as a permanent habit is a divinely infused virtue, whereby we firmly hold as true whatever God has revealed, because He, the all-truthful. has revealed it.