which lead to faith and conversion, are the first steps towards justification, the foundation of the supernatural structure, and, therefore, a means towards the attainment of eternal salvation. But such they can be only in the supposition that they are supernatural acts; for the means must be proportioned to the end; nor can they be supernatural without grace.

We can, therefore, neither merit nor in any way obtain grace by our own natural resources. The first grace is always unmerited, and is altogether a free gift of God's goodness; for "if by grace, it is not now by works; otherwise grace is no more grace" (Rom. xi. 6). Neither can we by merely natural works positively dispose ourselves, i.e., make ourselves worthy of the first grace; for there is no proportion between what is natural and what is supernatural; nor does God await man's will, but He prevents it by His grace (Araus. II. can. 4). Man can, however, negatively dispose himself, i.e., abstain from sin, which would make him not only less worthy, but also less susceptible of God's grace; though no sin, however grievous, forms an absolute obstacle to grace. God gives sufficient grace to all, even to unbelievers. Therefore the generally received principle, "That God does not refuse His grace to those who do what lies in their power," must be understood to mean, that God does not refuse further graces to those who, to the best of their ability, co-operate with the graces given them.

143. The necessity of grace extends also to the observance of the natural moral order.

Pelagius, having denied the existence of original sin and its consequences, was forced to the conclusion that man in his present state, by his own natural power, is equally capable of knowing the natural truths of religion and morality, of observing the natural law, and of overcoming grievous temptations as our first parents were. We do not here speak of supernatural truths, or of an observance of the natural law or a victory over temptations which would be effectual for eternal salvation; for from what we have already said (141) it follows that grace is absolutely necessary to that effect. We mean natural truths (3), an observance of the natural law and a victory over temptations based solely on natural motives. This necessity of grace results not from total depravity, but from moral weakness in man; therefore the necessity of grace for the observance of the natural law is not absolute, but only moral (6).

1. Man left to himself, without grace, without the aid of revelation or some equivalent, could not without error know the substance of the truths of natural religion. (a) That man of his own nature, as at present constituted, is incapable of obtaining a sufficient knowledge of the essential truths of

religion we have already shown (6) to be the result of experi ence. How much less capable, then, is he of knowing the entire system of religious truths without error? (b) We can more easily understand this incapacity, or invincible difficulty, from what has been said (114) of the darkness of man's understanding resulting from original sin. (c) Hence Scrip ture says: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and ou counsels uncertain. For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind” (Wis. ix. 14, 15).

Man can, however, by his own natural faculties, without the assistance of grace, arrive at the knowledge of the existence of God, and of some other religious truths. Nay, he cannot completely elude all knowledge of God and of the principles of morality (73).

2. Without the aid of grace it is impossible for man to observe the entire code of the natural law for any considerable length of time. Man left to himself will, at some moment or other, transgress the moral law, because of the difficulties connected with its observance. His transgression will be voluntary, and therefore sinful, because at that particular moment it was not impossible for him to observe the law, and because God, moreover, was ready to supply by His assistance what was wanting to him. (a) What the Apostle says of himself applies to all men. "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members. Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God by Jesus Christ Our Lord" (Rom. vii. 23–25). It is not in himself, therefore, but in God's grace that St. Paul possessed power to observe the law of the mind, the moral law. (b) If, on the one hand, we consider the difficulty of observing the whole law, and, on the other hand, the instability of man's will resulting from original sin, we may easily perceive that man cannot o. his own strength constantly fulfil all his moral duties, but that he will sooner or later violate them in some point or other. (c) The fathers characterize as an error irreconcilable with the Catholic faith the assertion

of Pelagius that without grace man can fulfil the entire law (cf. S. Aug. de haeres. c. 88).

As original sin has not altogether destroyed man's free will and effaced from his soul the natural likeness of God, he is not of himself, without the assistance of grace, unfit to fulfil his natural duties, so long as they involve no great difficulty. Hence St. Paul says that even the heathens "do by nature those things that are of the law" (Rom. ii. 14). It is, therefore, false to assert with Baius that all works performed by unbelievers are sinful, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices," or that "he who admits the existence of a naturally good work, i.e., a work proceeding from merely natural faculties, is guilty of Pelagianism" (prop. dam. 25, 37).

3. Without the aid of grace man is unable from a morally good motive to overcome strong temptations. He may be able to resist the allurements of one passion by motives derived from another for instance, lust by the motives of ambition or avarice-but without the assistance of grace motives founded on morality or a sense of duty are not sufficiently strong to secure him against violent temptations. For, (a) in consequence of original sin his intellect is too much obscured, especially in regard to suprasensible truths, and his will too weak efficaciously to struggle after that which is beyond the realm of sense. (b) Hence St. Paul (Rom. vii. 25) hoped from grace alone to obtain strength sufficient to overcome his evil inclinations. (c) The holy fathers are wont to infer this necessity of grace from Christ's precept to watch and pray, that we may not enter into temptation (cf. S. Aug de bono vid. c. 17).

As man can of his own strength discharge the easier moral duties, so he can also of himself overcome the lesser temptations; for every difficulty which deters us from doing our duty is a temptation to evil, and therefore the possibility of fulfilling easier duties implies the possibility of overcoming lighter temptations.

144. The assistance of grace is necessary also for the just (1) to perform supernatural works, (2) to observe the moral law and overcome grievous temptations; while (3) final perseverance requires a special grace, and (4) the preservation from all venial sins is an extraordinary privilege.

I. The just man needs the help of grace for the perform.. ance of supernatural works, whether this aid is habitual, con

sisting in sanctifying grace itself with the accompanying virtues, or, what is more probable, actual grace distinct from the grace of justification.

1. "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in Me.

.. Without Me you can do nothing" (John xv. 4, 5). These words were addressed to the disciples, who are presumed to possess the grace of justification, and, consequently, they cannot refer to sanctifying grace; therefore actual grace is necessary also for the just.

2. The Council of Trent (Sess. VI. can. 22) says that "as the head infuses strength into the members, and the vine into the branches, so Christ constantly infuses strength into the just, which always precedes, attends, and follows their good works, and without which they in nowise could please God."

3. Though the just man possesses in sanctifying grace the power to perform supernaturally good works, yet this power must be aroused and sustained; and this is done by means of actual grace.

II. The just, moreover, need actual grace to enable them. to observe the entire moral law, and to overcome strong templations. For the reasons advanced above (143) are of a general nature, and may be applied also to the case in question. He who is in the state of grace is still weak; for sanctifying grace does not remove the difficulties arising from our depraved

nature.

III. Even the just man needs a special grace to persevere in good to the end.

Those are called ordinary graces which are given to all the just in virtue of sanctifying grace. The grace or series of graces constituting final perseverance is not necessarily connected with sanctifying grace, and is, consequently, itself an extraordinary grace.

1. St. Paul attributes perseverance in good to the same cause as the beginning of salvation: "He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ” (Phil. i. 6). But the beginning is from God; therefore also the consummation.

2. The Second Council of Orange (can. 10) teaches against the Semi-Pelagians, who attributed perseverance to man's free will, that "the regenerate and holy must aiso implore the help of God in order to be able to attain to a happy end or persevere in good." The Council of Trent (Sess. VI. can. 22) condemns the assertion that the just man can without a special assistance of God (sine speciali auxilio) persevere in justice, or that with such assistance he is unable to persevere.

IV. The just require a very special privilege, exceptionally granted to very few, in order to avoid, not only mortal, but also venial sins during the whole or even a considerable part of life.

1. “In many things we all offend" (James iii. 2). Here the apostle speaks generally, and addresses himself directly to the early Christians, who are to be presumed in the state of grace.

2. The fathers and the councils of the Church defend this doctrine as a Catholic truth against the Pelagians; and they expressly teach that, owing to the depravity of human nature, without God's special providence and protection man is unable to guard against all transgressions (cf. S. Aug. de civ. Dei, XIX. c. 27). True, if man sins he does so voluntarily; but certain it is that, owing to his weakness and to the difficulty of perfectly fulfilling all his duties, he will fall sooner or later.

3. The Council of Trent (Sess. VI. can. 23), in accordance with Scripture and tradition, condemns those who maintain that "the just man can, during his whole life, without a special divine privilege (speciali Dei privilegio), avoid all, even venial sins, as the Church believes concerning the Blessed Virgin."

145. God gives sufficient grace to all men-also to sinners and infidels.

1. God gives sufficient grace to all the just to fulfil their duties and to overcome temptations. (a) "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just, and His ears unto their prayers" (1 Pet. iii. 12). This particular care of God for the just entitles