may be seen both from the words themselves and from the contrast of the pagan philosophers with the Jews, both of whom deserved the same reproach-the Jews because they did not profit by divine revelation; the pagans because they did not profit by the manifestation of God in creation.

The philosophers could have arrived, and did arrive, at the knowl edge of a personal God, distinct from nature; else they could not be blamed for not giving Him thanks. It is only to a person, or be ing endowed with intelligence and free will, that thanks is due. When the Apostle teaches that the philosophers could, and did, know God, he certainly meant the true God. In fact, he reproaches those philosophers precisely because, instead of the true God manifested to them by nature, they set up false gods. St. Augustine (de Civ. Dei, VIII. 12; XI. 22), in reference to this passage, repeatedly expresses the opinion that Plato knew not only the existence of God, but also many other sublime truths from the contemplation of the created universe; as, for instance, when he calls God Him who is, or when he teaches that God created the world merely from benevolence.

But not only philosophers, but all men can know the Creator from the creatures. St. Paul says to the inhabitants of Lystra: "We preach to you to be converted from these vain things [idols] to the living God, who made the heaven and the earth and the sea, and all things that are in them; who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways. Nevertheless, He left not Himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness" (Acts xiv. 14-16). The Apostle here teaches generally that even after men had abandoned divine revelation God still manifested Himself to them through nature; and he adduces as evidences the commonest natural phenomena.

In like manner we read in the Book of Wisdom: "All men are vain in whom there is not the knowledge of God; and who by these good things that are seen could not understand Him that is, neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman. . . . For by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature the Creator of them may be seen so as to be known thereby, . . . For if they were able to know so much as to make a judgment of the world, how did they not more easily find out the Lord thereof ?" (Wis. xiii. 1–9.)

...

Here again the inspired writer evidently speaks of a know edge of the true God derived from created things, and he ascribes, not only to philosophers, but to all without excep. tion, the possibility of such a knowledge of God.

Since this knowledge is possible for all, it cannot be very difficult, but comparatively easy to obtain it. It is easy to gain an imperfect knowledge of God, more difficult to obtain a perfect and developed knowledge (6). The words addressed by St. Paul to the Athenians likewise lead us to this distinction of the knowledge of God [God] hath made of one all mankind, . . . that they should seek God, if haply they may feel after Him or find Him, although He be not far from every one of us; for in Him we live and move and are (Acts xvii. 26, 28).

b. Conscience, by declaring that certain actions are unlaw ful and others lawful, by its warnings and exhortations, its approvals and reproofs, according to the teaching of the Apostle, gives evidence that man in his heart acknowledges a supreme lawgiver and judge. "For when the gentiles, whe have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the. law, these having not the law are a law to themselves; who show the work of the law written on their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another" (Rom. ii. 14, 15). The Apostle here speaks of a knowledge of the natural law, which is obtained not from revelation, but from nature; for he teaches that the Jews who possess revelation as well as the gentiles who have lost that gift, are blame. worthy if they do not observe the law. But only he who knows that the law which he transgresses is a divine law is guilty before God; and, consequently, the knowledge of the natural law, resulting from man's rational nature, necessarily supposes the knowledge of God as the supreme lawgiver.

2. The same is the teaching of the fathers. They teach now that the existence of God is manifest from the creation of the universe; now that, as an earthly king, though he may not be known personally to all his subjects, yet may be known by his laws, his representatives, and his likenesses, so God is known from His works and the manifestations of His power. Now they assert that a total ignorance of God is

impossible; now that a certain knowledge of God is the com mon property of human nature (cf. Hier. in Gal. 3, 2; Iren. adv. haer. 1. 6; Theophil. Antioch. ad Antol. I. 5; Tertull. Apol. xvII.; cont. Marcion, I. 10). Some sort of knowledge of God is given to man by reason itself, in this sense-that reason, as it develops, necessarily of its natural powers comes to a knowledge of God from the contemplation of visible creation and from the testimony of conscience.

3. The teaching of the Church on the knowableness of the existence of God is proposed by the Vatican Council (de fide II. can. 1) as follows: "If any one assert that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty from created things by the natural light of human reason; let him be anathema."

4. That which the Church teaches in accordance with Scripture and tradition is confirmed by reason, which by various arguments concludes the existence of God from created things.

a. From the existence of contingent and produced beings we infer the existence of God as a necessary and self-existent being. We call that contingent which, according to its na ture, can be or not be; which, therefore, does not possess in itself the reason of its being; and, consequently, must have its reason of existence in something else. A necessary be. ing, on the other hand, is one that has in itself the reason of its existence and of all its attributes.

(1) If there were only contingent beings, no being could come into existence; for if every individual contingent being must have its reason of existence from without, so also all contingent beings taken collectively. Hence there must exist a being which has not its reason of existence from without but which necessarily possesses of itself existence, and all that this existence implies; and this being, the first cause of all things, is God.

(2) There are evidently beings which did not always exist, but were produced. However vast the succession of beings produced from one another, it leads back to a being which

has not been produced; for as every effect presupposes a cause, so also all effects, or things produced, taken collectively, suppose a cause, which, being outside the whole assemblage of things produced, must be unproduced. This necessary and self-existing cause we call God.

Hence this self-existent being is distinct from the world. For the latter is of its nature changeable, subject to various movements and modifications. The necessary and self-existent is, on the contrary, incapable of change; for by its very necessity of being it is alsc what it is. All that it has it possesses of necessity, as it necessarily possesses existence itself, for the reason of its existence is also the reason of its attributes.

b. From the order and the fitness of the universe the exist ence of God as an intelligent creator and ruler may be inferred. That there is an admirable order in the universe— that, for instance, the various organs of the human body are suited to the end for which they were intended; that one class of beings of the universe is subservient to another; that in nature there are various grades of subordinate beings—no one can deny without self-contradiction. For, if in nature there is no order, no design, where, then, is order or design to be found? Nor again, can any one deny, without self-contradiction, that this order and fitness of things in nature is the work of intelligence. For, if in works of art we cannot but discover the intelligence of the artist, how much more in the work of nature? True, the order of nature could have been different; that the present order of nature therefore exists, with so striking an adaptation of means to end must be the result of design. The movement of the planets, the position of the earth rela tively to the sun, might have been different; but it is on the present movement precisely that the harmony of our universe depends; and it is on the present position of the sun that all life on our earth depends. This is an evident proof of de sign. The fitness and the order of the universe, therefore, force on us the conclusion that there is a creator and ruler of all things, endowed with superior intelligence and wisdom.

The systematic operation of the forces of nature has its ultimate cause, not in the forces themselves, but in the intelligence

of the Creator. For what holds of the universe itself is true also of the forces that energize in it; and as the order and the fitness of the universe as such compel us to admit the existence of a wise and intelligent creator, so in like manner the design observable in the forces of nature urges upon us the same conclusion.

c. The voice of conscience within us proclaims the existence of a supreme lawgiver, judge, and avenger. Conscience ap proves certain actions as lawful, condemns others as unlawful; it restrains us from the latter, urges us to the former: one action fills us with fear, another with satisfaction. Now, this law, which rules all men, is not reason itself; it is higher than, and antecedent to, reason. It is not of his own reason that man is afraid, but of a judge distinct from himself, who sees the secrets of his heart. He knows, with the same necessity as he knows other theoretical truths, that certain actions are good and others bad; that the former are permitted or commanded, the latter forbidden, by a superior law; consequently, that there is a lawgiver, judge, and avenger -in other words, that there is a God.

d. The universal belief of nations bears testimony to the same truth. Among all nations we find temples and altars testifying to the belief in the existence of a supreme being. Upon what does this universal conviction rest? It must rest upon evidence which is inseparable from man's rational nature, convinces every understanding, and endures through all time -the evidence of objective truth, which alone can have this power of conviction (3).

74. God is, however, more perfectly known from revelation. The knowledge of God obtained from divine revelation may for three reasons be called more perfect than that natural knowledge gained simply by the light of reason.

1. It is more complete. Revelation contains not only truths regarding God which may be acquired from the contemplation of nature, but also such as have not been manifested in creation, and, consequently, cannot be reached by the mere light of reason (12).