would not offer a reasonable service if caprice, not wellgrounded conviction, prompted our belief in revelation.

3. Considered in its form, revelation is the voice of God, and as such claims faith, i.e., an unwavering belief resting on the authority of God. Without previous certainty, however, our faith in revelation is infirm. For it is unreasonable to accept a truth as the utterance of God so long as there can be any just cause to doubt whether or not God has really spoken.

Groundless doubts as to the existence of revelation do not impair the firmness of faith, but are simply to be disregarded, since no reasonable man allows himself to be influenced by such in his ordinary actions. A conviction which rests upon such cogent arguments that only groundless and unreasonable doubts can be raised against it we call moral certainty. A conviction which rests upon such evident reasons that it cannot give room even to unreasonable doubts is called a metaphysical certainty. Only a moral certainty of the existence of revelation is required for faith, i.e., for a firm belief of a revealed truth on the authority of God. For such certainty directs man in the most important affairs of life, and suffices to enable us firmly to grasp the motive of faith, that is, the authority of God upon which rests our belief.

Although such arguments as make the existence of revelation only probable do not suffice of themselves, yet they may be added to others which produce moral certainty, as they aid us to overcome possible doubts with greater facility and to submit with greater promptness.

10. There are distinctive marks by which a true revelation may be recognized.

I. The marks of revelation, i.e., those signs by which we may judge whether a revelation is genuine or spurious, are: (a) positive or negative, (b) internal or external.

By positive marks we may judge with greater or less certainty that a revelation which pretends to be divine is really such; by negative marks we conclude that it is not such. Internal marks are those which are taken from the substance of revelation itself, to prove or disprove its divine origin. From the revelation itself which is announced as divine we may conclude whether the bringer is the messenger of God or not. External marks are those taken from the conduct of him who professes to be a divine messenger and the bringer of a revelation.

1. Among the internal marks of revelation the negative have the greatest weight. A pretended revelation, the substance of which includes anything contrary to reason, or to the laws of morality, cannot possibly be genuine. For God is

not the author of falsehood and cannot lead man to anything unholy. By this mark alone many pretended revelations of paganism, sanctioning polytheism and other immoral tenets, are refuted.

In like manner, every pretended revelation which contradicts a divinely approved revelation (e.g., Christianity) is necessarily false; since God cannot contradict His own former statements.

It does not follow, however, that in order to assure ourselves of the genuineness or spuriousness of a revelation we are bound to test each point of doctrine separately. (a) Such a test is not suited to every revelation; since among revealed doctrines there may be mysteries which, not being accessible to human reason, may contain truths apparently contradictory. (b) Nor is it suited to the capacity of most persons, who, even in natural truths, are unable to judge of the presence or absence of a contradiction. (c) Such a test is, furthermore, needless; for, once the fact of revelation is established, its substance cannot possibly contain anything contrary to reason; all apparent contradictions will vanish upon closer examination.

If the substance of a revelation is noble, holy, and in keeping with the higher aspirations of man, this fact is a very probable positive mark of its divine origin. The divinity of such a revelation remains probable only so long as it is not manifest that those doctrines have not been discovered by human reason or drawn from other sources. Even pagan philosophers have known many sublime truths relating to God; and Mahomet has borrowed several of his doctrines from the Mosaic and Christian revelations.

Internal positive marks are not calculated, under all circumstances, to be a convincing proof of the divinity of a revelation. For, (a) not every doctrine can be compassed in its intrinsic nature and sublimity, and the bulk of mankind is unable to examine the truth, sublimity, and fitness of doctrines. (b) It is only after a man believes, often only when he takes pain to regulate his life in harmony with them, that he discovers that certain doctrines satisfy the cravings of his heart. (c) Again, there may be times of hard trial, when coldness and insensibility take the place of spiritual consolation. (d) Besides, the interior, spiritual life is easily subject to illusions; and fanatics may sometimes feel apparent satisfaction in their absurd opinions.

2. If by external marks one is proved to be a messenger of God, we have thereby a guarantee for the truth of all he

announces in this capacity. A person, then, is proved by external signs to be God's envoy if his assertion that he is such is substantiated by divine testimony, sanctioned by God's signature and seal (miracles and prophecies). While, therefore, we may conclude a divine mission from internal evidence taken from the substance of revelation, we may, on the other hand, infer the divinity of a revelation from the divine mis sion of him who announces it.

Hence the Vatican Council (de fide III. can. 3.) decrees: "If any one assert that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and, therefore, that men must be moved to faith only by the inward experience, or by the private inspiration of each individual;

let him be anathema."

II. The most effectual way to assure one's self of the divinity of a revelation is to examine the divine mission of the bringer by means of external marks. (a) It is the easiest way; for external facts are more easily known than the internal truth of most dogmas, particularly when the facts attending the divine revelation appear in the clearest light. (b) It attains its object in the shortest time, whilst the life of man would scarcely suffice to examine in detail even those truths which are accessible to reason. (c) It is the safest way and, in every case, the most convincing. For, while the knowledge of the internal truth of dogmas and of the fitness of certain institutions is often beyond our reach; and while, even in case such knowledge were attained, a reasonable doubt might still remain whether the doctrine in question might not be the product of human reason,-as soon as the fact of a divine mission is established, all doubt as to the truth and origin of the doctrine ceases; since a divine messenger, as such, can announce only divine truth. Therefore the Vatican Council (de fide c. 3) teaches that "miracles and prophecies, because they clearly show forth God's omnipotence and omniscience, are absolutely certain signs of divine revelation, and suited to the capacity of all."

The total absence of external signs is a proof that he who professes to be a messenger of God and to announce a divine revelation is not such in reality. For, if God must make revelation knowable in orde

that it may be reasonably and firmly believed, and if external signs are the only adequate means for that end, we must conclude that, if signs are wanting, God did not intend the belief of the doctrine in question, and, consequently, that He did not reveal it. Since God always suits the means to the end, it is certain that if He allows the means necessary to an end to be wanting He does not intend the end itself. This, however, applies only to a new revelation not yet proved by previous divine facts. The teacher of a doctrine already established as divine can justly appeal to those previous miraculous facts on which its credibility rests.

11. Miracles and prophecies are sure evidences of the divinity of a revelation.

a. By miracles we mean such extraordinary works as cannot be accomplished by natural forces, but only by God's omnipotence; e. g., the instantaneous and complete cure of a sick person, the raising of a dead man to life. God, no doubt, can, in virtue of His omnipotence, whenever His wise designs demand it, change the nature of created things, increase and diminish their forces, govern them by other laws, substitute for these forces His own divine power, or produce in nature such effects as no created power can produce. Or are nature's laws more powerful than He who framed them? Should He who has power to create not be able to restore lost health or even departed life? Is He not free for a moment to withhold His co-operation from created causes to prevent them from exerting their power?

God alone can work miracles, since He alone is Lord of all nature. He alone is the ultimate cause of things, and, consequently, His will is the last cause of their being and their laws. God may use finite beings as means to produce miracles, but these are not the authors, but only the instruments, of miracles.

From the knowledge we possess of many of the laws of nature it follows that, in many cases, miracles are knowable as such. We know, for instance, with certainty that a stone thrown in the air must fall to the ground. Though we are not conversant with all nature's laws, yet we know many of them, and, consequently, we discern what is in harmony with, and what is in opposition to them. If God can work miracles; if, as the Lord of the universe, He wishes to speak to us through miracles, He can also so dispose circumstances, and so influence our mind, that in many cases we may know with certainty that a miracle has taken place. However the powers of the evil spirits may be hidden from us, yet we must concede that God has the means of convincing us that He, and not His enemy, speaks to us through any unusual occurrence. For the rest, the enemy of God, who only devises evil, though for a time he may conceal his designs, will sooner or later betray himself.

b. Prophecies are predictions based upon a certain knowledge of future events, which cannot be, or at least were not, foreseen from natural causes. God alone knows the whole future; for He alone comprehends all that is knowable, while man can only know those

The free ac

future events which may be foreseen in their causes. tions of man cannot, by reason of their freedom, be predicted with certainty by a finite being; since one act of the will does not follow upon another as in nature one movement is the result of another. Nor can the evil spirits foresee free actions with certainty, although they may perhaps, from natural causes unknown to us, surmise much that we cannot foresee, and foretell their own future actions. As, in many cases, a fact may be known as a miracle, so also a prediction may be known as a true prophecy, as often as it can be established, on the one hand, that the event foretold is a free action that could not with certainty be foreseen by the human mind; and, on the other hand, the prediction is based on certain knowledge and is not mere conjecture.

The Vatican Council (de fide, III. can. 4) issued the following definition regarding the possibility, knowableness, and convincing force of miracles: "If any one assert that miracles are impossible, and that, consequently, all records of them, though contained in Holy Writ, are to be considered as fables or myths, or that miracles can never be known with certainty, and that the divine origin of the Christian religion cannot be properly demonstrated by them; let him be anathema."

Miracles and prophecies are irrefragable evidences of those truths in confirmation of which they have taken place, and, consequently, of the divine mission of him who claims to be an envoy of God and bases the divinity of his mission on those supernatural signs which God works through him.

1. God the all-truthful cannot bear witness to a falsehood. But He would bear witness to a falsehood if He worked mira cles in favor of an impostor who appealed to such signs a proofs of his divine mission. For a miracle, under such circumstances, would be a divine seal with which God would confirm a false utterance.

2. God the all-holy cannot lead men to believe what is false. Now, He would lead whole nations and races into error if He worked miracles in favor of a false prophet, or conferred on him the gift of miracles. And, in fact, this universal error would, in such a case, proceed from God; for the more prudent and upright a man is, the more he is inclined to put faith in one to whom God has vouchsafed the gift of miracles.

3. God the all-wise cannot renounce the fittest means of communicating His will to man. But the fittest means to this