"that it is not inconsistent with the justice of God to inflict an eternal punishment. To evince this, I shall use only one argument, namely, that sin is heinous enough to deserve such punishment, or such a punishment is no more than proportionable to the demerit of sin. If the evil of sin be infinite, as the punishment is, then it is manifest, that the punishment is no more than proportionable to the sin punished, and, therefore, is no more than sin deserves. The eternity of the punishment of ungodly men renders it infinite, and it renders it no more than infinite, and, therefore, no more than proportionable to the heinousness of their guilt. Sin, then, being an infinite evil, deserves an infinite punishment;' such punishment, therefore, is just, which was the thing to be proved."

It has already been shown, that sin is not an infinite evil: the only argument on which the justice of the eternity of punishment is founded, is therefore fallacious. Some persons, indeed, believe in the eternity of punishment who do not believe in the infinity of the evil of sin, but they differ from this author only in believing without any reason, what he believed for an insufficient reason..

In the nature of things, sin cannot deserve an infinite punishment; it has no attribute of infinity it is the act of a finite being, and therefore cannot be infinite in magnitude: it is limited

to the duration of a few years, and therefore can bear no proportion to eternity: between a punishment extending through eternity, and sin committed in that brief period of time which constitutes the present life, there is just the same disproportion that there is between eternity and time. Admitting, therefore, according to Dr. Edwards's own definition, that a just punishment is that which is proportioned to the crime punished, it follows, that the infliction of misery without end, for the sin committed in so brief a period as this mortal life, is not only unjust, but unjust beyond all measure and bound.

Dr. Edwards endeavors to show that this argument is not conclusive, because it proves too much, since it supposes that no crime can be justly punished for a longer period than was con. sumed in the perpetration of it. He maintains, that if it be once allowed that a crime may be punished for a longer time than was consumed in the perpetration of it, the whole argument that a creature cannot in a finite life commit such sin as shall deserve an endless punishment, must be given up that if a person may in one day commit a crime worthy of a punishment that shall continue a year, he may in one day commit a crime worthy of a punishment that shall continue two years, or ten years, or during his whole life. That, therefore, in determining the duration of punishment, no regard at all is paid to the time

taken up in the perpetration of the crime; and that if no regard be paid to this, there is no absurdity in supposing, that the crimes of a finite life may deserve an endless punishment.

It is true, that in apportioning punishment to crime, less attention is paid to the time consumed in the commission of it than perhaps to any other circumstance, yet it is not correct to state that no attention is paid to it for a crime which is committed in a very short space of time, is generally considered less heinous than one which requires many months or years to consummate it. All the other circumstances of a crime remaining the same, the length of time required to perpetrate it, is itself considered an aggravation of it: not, indeed, simply because so much time has been spent in the commission of the evil deed, but because, in proportion as the time is lengthened, the opportunities for reflection are supposed to be multiplied: it is, therefore, considered as implying a more fixed determination to evil, to continue in the commission of it a very long, than a very short period. But the true principle on which alone punishment can be apportioned to crime, is the sum of evil produced, or likely to be produced, by the criminal action. A crime deserves punishment in proportion, and only in proportion, as it tends to produce misery. This must regulate both the degree and the duration of all punishment that is just. The duration of

punishment, it is true, is of no consequence except as it influences the amount of punishment. However long it last, it is not unjust, provided the punishment upon the whole be not excessive. But for this very reason it is that the infliction of endless misery, for the sins of the present life, is utterly inconsistent with justice, because whatever be the amount of misery which those sins may deserve, provided they do not deserve infinite misery, (and that they do not deserve infinite misery, has already been shown,) a period must come in the ages of eternity, when that amount will have been exceeded, even though the suffering endured at any particular period be inconsiderable. The collective sum of misery endured, through a successive but interminable series of ages, however small the actual suffering at any one period, must at length exceed what any one can conceive the sins of the present life to deserve; and of this the conviction would be inevitable and universal, were it possible to present that collective sum distinctly before the mind; to compare the amount of the suffering with the number and magnitude of the offences. It is when the mind does contemplate what the sins of the present life are, and what misery without end is, and does compare the one with the other, that it perceives clearly that, were every moment of human life, from the cradle to the grave, devoted to the perpetration of the most

horrible crimes, it would be utterly inconsistent with justice to visit them with endless misery; because the amount of misery produced by all the crimes which it would be possible to crowd into this short space of existence, could bear no manner of comparison to that which would ultimately be produced by such a punishment. If a person for stealing from his neighbour the sum of one guinea were made positively miserable seventy years, every one would acknowledge that the punishment was greater than the crime deserved, and was, therefore, unjust: but the infliction of positive misery seventy years for the crime of stealing one guinea, is mildness and mercy, compared with the infliction of positive misery through the never-ending ages of eternity, for the crimes of seventy years. Even admitting, therefore, that in apportioning punishment to crime, no regard is to be paid to the time spent in the commission of the crime; yet, regard must be paid to the time spent in suffering the punishment, otherwise the amount of the punishment may become most excessive, and therefore, most unjust. For, though the mere duration of punishment may be of no importance, so long as the whole punishment is not excessive,

yet, it may become excessive from the very cir

cumstance of its protracted duration.

Nor is it possible in this argument to separate the idea of punishment from that of the duration